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THE IMPACT OF DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE ON INDIA 
Introduction and Overview 
India became an independent nation in August 1947. Even before 
attaining independencethe Indian intellectual and politicalleadership 
'had become convinced of the necessity for 'economic planning as a means
 
,for solving the major economic problems of the country. In 1950,.the. 
Government of'India established a Planning Comission. The main objective 
ofeconomic planning in, India was to atta in a rapid rate of growth of 
income in order to achieve social justice. Thejother objectives of 
planned economic development, stated in the First Plan document ad 
reaffirmed subsequently and. frequently, included national self-reliance, 
the reduction of inequalities in income and wealth, and the reduction of 
unemployment. India's First Five Year Plan began in.1951,and since 
.then a series of plans.have 'strongly influenced the overall pattern of
 
growth in India.
 
At the time when India's First Plan began, the population of India 
was about 360 million. India's per capita income and literacy and 
education levels were among the lowest in the world. Its schools and 
educational facilities, roads and rail transport facilities, electric 
power and irrigation capacity, credit and finance institutions, and 
other elements of infrastructure were at a low level of development'. Its 
total foodgrain production was estimated to be about 56 million tons, 
.and crop yields-in India were among the lowest levels observed in any
 
country of the world. In 1951, India's consumption of chemical fertilizers 
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that is, less than 1 kilogram .per hectare'of was: about 70,000tons, 
gross sown area. The domestic production of fertilizers was about 18,000
 
tons, and the production of other modern agricultural inputs. 
especially pesticides and tractors, was nonexistent and indeed was'' not­
to"begin for nearly another decade. 
Over te ,past thirty years, much progress has been made toward
 
solving,some of India's critical economic problems. Between 1951 and
 
1977,,the Indian economy recorded an average growth rate of 3.65 percent 
.per year. During the first five years of planned growth, net national 
product at constant prices grew at 3.7 percent per year. This slowed to 
.a rate of growth of 3.1. percent per year during the Second'Plan period, 
and slowed further to a rate of 2.5 percent per year during the period 
1961 to 1966 (Chaudhuri, 1979: 52). It is important to note that the, 
*unprecedented droughts of 1965-1966 and 1966-1967 reduced the overall rate
 
,of growth of the economy. The excellent agricultural harvest of 1967-196E 
the economyys"and between 1967 and 1971 
spurred overall economic activit , 
grew at an average rate of over 4 percent per year. A fall in 
agricultural production in the early 1970s againV.slowed economic. growth. 
But between 1974 and 1977, the economy again grew at a rate above the 
long-run rate of growth 0f 3. 65 percent (RaJ Krishna, 1980: "78) 
The relatively low rate of long-run growth has meant a very ,slow 
increase in per capita income since population has continued to increase. 
Between 1951 and 1961, the population of India grew at nearly 2 percent 
per year, and this rate in fact accelerated to 2.25 percent per year 
between 1961 and 1971 (Bhagwati and Srinivasan.' 1975: 7)'.While,"the 
Indian economy grew at more than twice the rate rie.corded in British 
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India between 1900 and.Indian independence, the rate of growth since , 
planning began has been not only less than the targeted-growth rates but 
also lower than growth rates achieved in most other countries. As Raj, 
Krishna has pointed out, "in as-many as 90'nations out of 121 the rate 
of growth of the gross national product per capita exceeded that ofIndia 
for the period 1960 through 1977" (Krishna,,1980: 78). 
India remains today a desperately poor country. Krishna has,'' 
characterized India as "a case of stunted, sub-optima growth burdened 
as it is;-,with the: world!s lar'gest. single mass of poverty and unemploy ­
.ment" (Krishna, 1980: 78). While. much, of the resources and knowledge 
needed to eradicate poverty exist, the failure to increase overall 
industrial and economic growth.is "man-made" and "managerial" (Krishna, 
1980: 85). 
This summary indictment of Indian economic performance does not," 
ignore, or even minimize, the tremendous changes that have occurred 
in the Indian industrial economy and in the agricultural sector over 
the past few decades. A wide range of industrial capital goods is now 
produced in India. For example, it has been noted that between 1955 and 
1978 Indian imports fell to a level of between 2 and 21 percent of total 
supply in 21 industrial sectors and exceeded 25 percent of the total 
supply in only 6 industrial sectors (Krishna, 1980': 78). This change in 
the'industrial structure has been the outcome of.basically import 
.substituting, :inward-oriented policies that India has pursued over the 
past. But it does not mean that the full implications of the import 
substitutingpolicies were understood by.the policy plannersin India 
-or, for that matter, by theaid givers abroad. 
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In the massive agricultural economy' o.f India there have been phenomena
 
.hanges. It is not often realized that 'foodgrain production in India 
Las shown a sustained upward trend. Between the beginning of planning 
in India and 1977,,foodgrain production doubled. The rate of growth of 
total, foodgrain production achieved during that period was,2.8 percent 
per year, which ranks favorably with the growth rates achieved in the 
ieveloped world (Sanderson and Roy, 1979: 2). However, since population 
also rose, the average yearl.y increase in per capita production was.only 
o.6 percent. The history of agricultural production in India seems to 
be characterized by certain periods of rapid growth and other periods 
Df relative stagnation. Simultaneously, there have been periods of 
optimism and of despair at the foodgrains production performance and 
future prospects in India.
 
When India looks ahead on the basis of agricultural production 
brends from the recent past, the outlook for agriculture is promising.
 
.,.he amount of land that can be brought under irrigation in the next 
two decades can be increased to almost two-thirds of India's present 
:ropped land surface. The yields that have been realized under various 
aational demonstration programs are many times the actual average 
ields, especially for rice, corn, and millet. India has now a well-run 
agricultural research and extension system with a high-caliber staff. 
find, as Raj. Krishna points out, "for India, the gloomy prediction of a 
growing gap between food demand and food supply, a prediction that some 
international agencies publicize regularly, seems in fact to have no 
basis!, (Krishna, 1980: 83). 
In this transformation of the Indian economy, foreign assistance, 
bas played an important role, but India itself provided the great bulk, 
14­
.of its own development requirements. Foreign. aid: to India was insignificant 
during the First Plan period: 
The 'era' of aid began with a distinct jump at the beginning of the 
Second Plan, grew rapidly to a peak at the end of the Third 
Plan, held that peak briefly with the drought-induced increase in 
food aid, and then declined rapidly. Thus, large-scale foreign aid 
as development assistance was concentrated largely within the ten 
years of the Second and Third Five Year Plans. (Mellor, 1976: 218) 
After this somewhat lengthy introduction and overview of the Indian
 
economic scene, the primary objective of this essay may be stated...
 
The objective is to review the assessments that have been made of various.
 
aspects of the entire development aid activity in India. -We will examine.
 
.issues related to the magnitude of economic assistance to India; the
 
terms and conditions of economic aid; the types of 'aid,that'is, whether7
 
project aid or non-project aid or aid in'the form of agricultural com­
modities; and the role that foreign assistance in general has played 
in the overall economic development policies of India. The history of 
aid to India will be examined. We will review the assessments of the
 
impact of aid on rural development strategies that India has pursued,,
 
beginning with the Community Development program of the early 1950s and
 
the Intensive Agriculture District Program of the 1960s. Food aid 
constituted a major part of the development assistance to India and the' 
impact of such aid has been a much studied and controversial topic, and.
 
we will review those studies. The impact of development assistance on 
the growth.and maturation of the Indian.agricultural research establish­
ment, now generally recognized as among the major national agricultural 
research systems in the world in terms of resources employed and level 
of scientific endeavor, will also be revieweld. The primary purpose of 
this exercise is to understand the"natur'e":of the aid program, pay close 
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attention to those' facets of the aid-program that have-been ch'aacerized
 
,as successes, anddraw some general conclusions.
 
'For the most part, the works and references cited in this review
 
are American or British or, at least, published outside Indi a. The ; 
'iterature that has been surveyed was mainly restricted to articles
 
published since 1970 and cited in the American Economic Association's
 
Index of Economic Issues and the Journal of Economic Literature. Some
 
,well-knownworks published prior to 1970, notably the writings of I. M. D.'
 
Little (1965), Edward Mason (1964), Raymond Mikesell (1968), and P. T.
 
Bauer (1961) were also surveyed..- But no exhaustive search was made for
 
articles on economic aid in the professional Indian literature published
 
in India. It may, however, be noted that, not entirely'unexpectedly,
 
.the most perceptive observers and commentators on the economics of aid
 
have been-several internationally-known Indian economists. The works
 
by these Indian economists have been published outside India under the
 
auspices of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development
 
(OECD),and the National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER), the latter
 
under an AID inanced project. It is also noteworthy that just asthe
 
U.S. aid program in India dropped off sharply in the late 1960s to early
 
1970stthe economic assessments of aid to India in the professional
 
literature also dropped off after a certain time lag.
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1.4.1 :Histo6ry of Aid to.India 
The U.S. government,, under' its Point Four program, provided its 
first'technical'assistance to India in 1950, even before formal economic 
planning began in India. In 1951, the U.S. provided an emergency wheat 
loan' of-about' $190 million (repayable in dollars) to help alleviate food 
shortages caused by widespread crop failures in 1950. But the beginning 
of a broad-based program of U.S. economic and technical assistance to 
India can be dated to the Indo-U.S. Technical Co-operation Agreement of 
January 1952 (Hendrix and Gir, 1970: 142). Under this agreement and sup­
plemental agreements extending to 1970, the U.S. provided economic and 
technical assistance to more than 150 projects-in agriculture, industry,'' 
transportation, education, health, and:other fields. 
The early observers of aid and the early participants in the aid 
effort in India usually cited various reasons for aid-ito' India. Among th. 
was. the sheer size of.India, its great poverty and low levels of living 
of the vast.majority of its population, its high mortality rates, and'its 
low education levels. Through much of this literature there exists a 
recognition of the political aspects of.the aid program in " ForIndia. 
example, Edward Mason, writing in 1964, says that " the principal purpose 
of foreign aid in my view is to promote the security of the United States, 
and, insofar, as our security: is dependent on theirs, foreign aidids an 
essential part of a mutual security policy" (Mason, i964: ). Again, 
as recently as 1975, Valentine Belfiglio, in his survey of'U.S. grants, 
to India,Isaysthe following: "American officials had looked 
in ave at the absorption of backward and undernourished China by communist 
forces in 1949. To strengthen -and keep in power the friendly Indian 
14­
'government, in .1951theU.S. gave increased economic assistance to that 
impoverished nation. American aid was also given to obtain the goodwill
 
of the Indian people and for humanitarian reasons.". (Belfiglio, 1975: I18).
 
These political overtones have also been noted by various other authors, 
including ;I. M. D. Little (1965),,and, as we shall see momentarily, clouded 
the assessments of the 1966 devaluation of the Indian rupee. 
From a relatively modest beginning at the start of India's First
 
Pla:, India received more aid from more countries than any other developing
 
country. Foreign aid to India during her First Plan was small, small
 
-relative to absolute amounts of,aid during subsequent plan per-iods,.and 
small in terms of its contribution to gross investment in India relative 
to subsequent plans. 
During the.First Plan, the amount of foreign aid from all donors 
utilized by India was Rs 1.94&bilions, which was a little less than 6 percent 
of the total investment in India during that period (U.S. Embassy in India, 
n.d.: 19). However, from data provided by Mellor, who defines net foreign 
resource transfers to India as the excess of imports over exports, the 
:arithmetic mean of -net foreign resource transfers as a percentage of gross 
investment in. India during the five years of the First Plan period was. 
9.98 percent, with the variables denominated in dollars (Mellor, 1976:
 
219).
 
The above paragraph illustrates one difficulty encountered in this
 
survey of the role of foreign aid in Indian economic development. In
 
studying the amount of aid authorized and/or utilized by India, various
 
authors provide data on the magnitude of aid either in dollars or in
 
rupees. Bhagwati and Desai (1970) and Bhagwati and Srinivasan (1975)
 
provide data on foreign aid in rupees and cite as their source the
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Government of India's Economic Survey publications. Streeten and Hill
 
..(1968) also provide data in rupees but they cite as their source the Indian
 
uqegtral bank, the Reserve Bank of India. But they also provide some data
 
in dollars citing the World Bank as the source of the data. Harberger
 
(1970) provides data in dollars using AID publications. Narain and Rao
 
(1963), in an often-cited study on foreign aid and India's economic
 
development, prepared for UNESCO, provi'.': data in rupees but do not cite
 
any sources for their data. Howeve-, they are careful to point out that
 
"it is difficult to give a completely unambiguous and meaningful total of 
aid that has been received from diverse sources and in diverse forms"
 
(Narain and Rao, 1963: 1). The principal reason for this is that the use
 
of official rates of exchange between the Indian rupee and the currencies
 
of the various donor countries may be inappropriate.
 
In the First Plan aid authorizations were made by 7 countries and 
by the World Bank. The 7 countries were (in order of size of authorization) 
the U.S., U.S.S.R., Canada, Australia, New Zealand, Norway, and Britain. 
Insignificant amounts of U.S.S.R. and U.K. aid were utilized and the U.S.
 
share in total aid utilized by India was nearly 70 percent. (U.S. Embassy
 
in India, n.d.: 19). During the Second Plan period, aid authorizations were
 
provided by 13 countries and this had increased to 19 countries during the
 
Third Plan. With the increased number of co,'ntries contributing to India's
 
economic development, the share of the U.S. in the total aid utilized by
 
India fell to 54 percent during the Second Plan, but rose to nearly 60
 
percent during the Third Plan. The share of the Soviet Union, which was
 
insignificant during the First Plan period, had increased to just over
 
5 percent;in the Second 'Plan and to over 8 percent during the Third Plan'. 
14 10f 
At least one outcome of India's receiving aid'from several countries 
was the adoption of a wide range of techniques and methods in various 
industrial sectors such as metals and machinery production. For example, 
in steel making, the U.K., West Germany, and the Soviet Union each financed, 
steel plants in the public sector (Bhagwati and Desai, 1970: '210).. Unlike 
the industrial sector, however, there was some specialization in aid to 
India for the development of the agricultural sector. While'the U.S. and, 
to some extent, Canada, provided both technical assistance and loans and 
'grants to specific programs in agriculture, as well as financing imports 
of fertilizers and foodgrains, development assistance from Australia, 
Ne,T Zealand, Denmark, Switzerland, the Netherlands, and Hungary was largely 
in the field of animal husbandry, including dairy development. Development 
assistance from .the Scandinavian countries (Sweden, Norway, and Finland) 
was largely confined to the fishery and forestry sectors. West Germany 
contributions to ..
to the agricultural extension service, and the U.S.S.R. to a large mechanized 
-farm and to'the seed industry. India also received sizable assistance from 
made significant the area development program, Japan 
non-official sources such as the Ford and Rockefeller Foundation. The bulk
 
of Ford Foundation assistance went for the extension program of IADP, while­
the Rockefeller Foundation assistance was directed to the: strengthening
 
of agricultura research facilities in India'(Govt. of India, National
 
Commission on Agriculture, 1976: 667-68).
 
Table 14.1 fromMellor provides data!on the magnitude of net
 
foreign resource transfers to India from the first year of the First Plan-.
 
to the early 1970s' (Melior, 1976: 219) and presents data on foreign resource
 
transfers as a percentage of India's net national product,.gross investment,
 
Table 14.1. The relative importance of eoreign resource transferIndia: 
1951-52 to 1973-74 
Net foreign resource Net foreign resource transfer 
transfer* as percent of 
Central 
Total (million Per capita National. Gross government 
Year U.S. $) (U.S. $) income t investment expenditures Imports 
18.2
1951-52 335 0.92 1.6 16.1 23.7 

1952-53 193 U.52 0.9 18.0 16.6 13.7 
1953-54 87 0.23 0.4 5.6 5.8 7.2 
1954-55 132 0.34 0.7 5.9 7.2 9.6 
1955-56 123 0.32 0.6 4.3 6.0 9.0 
1956-57 506' 1.48 2.4 1.9,, 26.0 31.3 
1957-58 84t. 2.08" 3.5 23.8 27.2 38 7 
1958-59 692 1 .68 A. 22.3-~ 2.6, I89 36,.6 
1959-60 675 1.59 2. 5 18.1 18.o 33.4 
196o-61 1,,007 2.33 3.6: 22.9 26.6 42.7 
1961-62 903 2.04 3.1 20.5 21.1 39.4 
1962-63 937 2.07 3.0 17.0 17.7 39.4 
1963-64 903 1.96 2.5 13.;9 13.5 35.1 
1964-65 1,119 2.37 2.7 14.9 15.4 39.5 
1965-66 1,267 2.63 2.9 14.7 15.4 42.8 
1966-67 1,229 2.49 3. 9 20.8 20.8 44.4 
1967-68 1,079 2.14. 2.9 16.5, 18.0 .4o.3 
1968-69 735 1.43 1.9 10.8' 12.3 28.9 
1969-70 225 0.43 0.5 3.1 :3.4 10.7 
1970-71 132 0.25 0.31 .7 1.9 6.1 
1971-72 325 0.59 0.7 n.a. 3 5 13.5 
1972-73 -120 -0.21 * * , , 
1973-74 534 0.92 0.9 n.a. _ 5.7 15.0 
*Defined as imports less exports. tAt factor cost. UNo net foreign resource
 
transfer.
 
Sources: Columns 1 and 6: 1951-52, 1955-56, and 1960-61 to 1973-74, Appendix,
 
Tables 11 and 12; all other years based on import and export figures in Reserve 
Bank of India, Report on Currency and Finance, various issues. Column 2: Based
 
on population figures published in Economic Survey (New Delhi: Governmefit of
 
India, Ministry of Finance), various issues. Column 3: Based on data in Estimates
 
of National Product (Government of India, Central Statistical Organisatio),
 
various issues; and Reserve Bank of India, Bulletin, various issues. Column 4:
 
Based on data in Reserve Bank of India, Bulletin, various issues. (Gross in­
vestment for 1951-52 to 1959-60 was estimated by assuming that the average
 
ratio of net investment to gross investment was the same in that period as in
 
1960-61 to 1970-71. Column 5: Based on data in Economic Survey, various issues;
 
and Report on Currency and Finance, various issues.
 
Source: John Mellor. (1976). The New Economics of Growth. Page 219. Corneii
 
University Press, Ithaca, New York.
 
The data show that foreign
central government-expenditures, and imports. 

aid *increased sharply at the beginning of the Second Plan in 1956-1957.,
 
Foreign aid,as development assistance was most heavily concentrated in
 
.the ten years of the Second and.ThirdPlans, that is between 1956-195T and
 
1965-1966. The large foreign'resource transfers in 1966-1967 to: 1968-1969
 
were principa.ly PL 480 grain shipments to India necessitated by the
 
disastrvs crop failures in India in 1965-1966 and 1966-1967.-
Table 14.2 from Bhagwati and Srinivasan also provides detail on 
the utilization of,external assistance by India as a percentage of national
 
income. 'While these data are not comparable to those of Mellor, they 
nevertheless underline the "era" of aid as the Second and Third Plan periods, 
1956-1957: to 1965-1966,
 
Much of the literature on economic assistance to India is marked
 
by a concern for suitably deflated measures of aid, for example, aid per
 
capita. Most academic commentators seem to agree that while India received
 
substantial amounts of aid in aggregate terms, India was a grossly under­
aided country if one takes suitably deflated measures as aid per capita"
 
(Bhagwati and Desai, 1970: 180). Several commentators have pointed out
 
that on the basis of foreign assistance per capita India ranked virtually
 
at the bottom of the list of aid recipients. In terms of aid relative to
 
xisting.levels of national income per capita, India fared alittle better 
compared to aid per capita. The reason for this is that India's per capita 
Comparing
.income'ranks near the bottom of the worid distribution of income. 
India with the other major country of the Asian sub-continent, it has been 
pointed out that aid received by India per head was much lower than that 
received by Pakistan in-the early 1960s (Streeten andHill, 1968: 332). 
Table 14.2. 	 Utilization of External Assistance by India, as Percentage of Net National Product at
 
Factor Cost, 1951-52 to 1969-70
 
1951-52 1952-53 1953-54 1954-55 1955-56 1956-57 1957-58 1958-59 1959-60 196016i
 
Sl. .Loans 	 0.81 0.34 0.02 0.02 0.08 0.25 1.06 1.78 1.27 1.39 
2. Grants-	 0.04 0.12 0.16 0.10 0.28 0.35 0.30 0.19 0.26. 0.22 
3. Assistance under-
P.L. 480/665, etc. -- .. 	 0.05 0.45 1.01 0.74 0.75 1.39 
4. Total aid 	 0.86 0.47 0.19 0.11 0.40 1.05 2.37' .T1 2.28 3.011. 
1961-62 1962-63 1963-64 1964-65 1965-66 1966,67 1967-68 1968.69,1969-70 
1. Loans 1.60 2.02 2.21 2.38 2.37 0.41 0.47 0.39 0.37 
-2. Grants 0.5 0.10 0.09 0.10, 0.16 0.6 .0.03 0.03 0.01 
3. Assistance under, 
0.09,",i
P.L. 480/665, etc. 0.61 0.81 1.05 1.07- 1.14 0.21 0.20 0.09 
4. Total aid 	 2.37 2.93 3.35 3.55 3.67 o.69 -71 0.52. 0.48 
Note: The 1960-61 to 1969-70 estimates are for the revised NNP,series. ' The 196 6-67-to 1969-70 aid 
estimates are at the post-devaluation exchange rate.:-
Source: Economic Survey, annual issues 1966-73, Government of-India, Ministry of Finance, Department;of-
Economic Affairs, New Delhi. 
Source: J. Bhagwati and T. N. Srinivasan. (1975)-. Foreign Trade Regimes and Economic-IDevelopment: India.
 
Columbia University Press, New York. Page U1.-
- ­
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Whereas some asthors used the figures on the low levels''of:aid per capita
 
for -India to argue that India should have gotten even more aid, other
 
commentators have argued that the growth of aid to India during her. first 
three five-year plans was exaggerated since data on gross inflow of'aid'' 
' 
concealed the reduction in the share of grants in the total aid .flowas 
also the deterioration in the terms and other conditions of aid. 
Implicit in the use of these,"deflated" measures of aid is the view 
that if aid, suitably deflated, is low its economic impact. would be expecte( 
tobe low. Alone among contributors in this area,. Harberger makes an 
explicit attempt in arguing that even if aid dollars were attributed "a rati 
of social yield more than twice that which is-applied in the'evaluation of 
our own federal programs and projects," the contribution of aid to the 
national income of the aid receiving countries would be expected to be 
'relatively smail (Harberger, 1970: 635). Harbe;'ger's..main point, is that 
the success of the U.S. aid, programz in Western Europe under the Marshall 
Plan could not be easily duplicated in the less developed countries because 
of the entirely different economic and other circumstances of the less, 
developed countries.
 
14.1-1 U.S. and U.S.S.R. Aid to India 
United States aid to India went to "nearly all sectors of the Indian 
.economy.This statement can only be appreciated by examining the following 
features of American aid to India. In what follows, a brief description 
of the sectors and projects aided is given and'is intended to convey the 
magnitude Cthe contribution of American, aid. 
In the mid-1960s, about one-quarter 'ofthe nitrogen used by Indian 
farmers.was imported with U.S..assistance.-In the early 196 0s, the U.S. 
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financed onei of India's large't fertiliter plants''at Trombay, near Bombay,
 
TheU.S. aided some of India',s lar'gest'irrzigation projects, such as those
 
at Hi'akud (in Orissa 'state), Kosi (in Bihar state'), Nagarjunasagar (in
 
Andhra Pradesh state), and Chambal (in Madhya.Pradesh state)'. Most of
 
the' assistance to these projects was in the-form of heavy construction.
 
:equipment, and a major part of the rupee expenditures for these projects'
 
was met by PL 480 loans and grants. In the area of power projects,.India
 
received more assistance from the U.S. than froni any other country. These
 
included,some of India's largest thermal,power units, including Bandel (in
 
West Bengal state),. Barauni and Chandrapura (inBihar state),, Satpura (in
 
Madhya Pradesh state), and Talcher (in Orissa state).
 
-In the field of transport, initially U.S. aid was in'the form''of'steam, 
diesel, and electric locomotives and railway wagons andcoaches., The U.S. 
also aided the diesel-locomotive factory at Varanasi (in Uttar Pradesh 
.state); diesel components were initiallyiimported but are now being manufac­
tured in India. The U.S. also provided some centralized traffic control
 
equipment for the Indian railways. The U.S. aided improvements in:India's
 
national highway system,.including.System,.e bridges overaiduino two major.... rivers. ,'In.auto....,
asexstn...  ­
motor vehicle production, the U.S. provided aidto India existing auto­
mobile and truck assembly plants for the import of vehiclecomponents.
 
In aviation, the U.S. provided funds to India's international airline
 
for the'purchase of airplanes, and provided.iinroved navigational aids to,
 
facilitate faster and safer domestic flights.. The U.S. also aided other
 
industrial projects, including a coal mine ropeway, a rayon-tire cord
 
factory, analuminum plant, paper mills, 'and others.
 
Apart from"commodity assistance and assistance for industrialization,
 
.the U.S. also provided considerable funds for nearly every area of education,
 
'14-16
 
includinga major contribution.to the establishment of agricultural 
universities. The U.S. provided funds for the purchase of laboratory 
and scientific equipment for several engineering colleges. One of India's 
premier engineering schools, the Indian Institute of Technology at Kanpur 
(in Uttar Pradesh state) was solely assisted by the U.S. A consortium
 
of several leading American universities (M.I.T., Cal Tech, Illinois 

Institute of Technology, Carnegie-Mellon, Michigan, and California)
 
provided faculty for'the Kanpur institute. The Teacher's College of
 
Columbia University was involved in the establishment of the National Insti­
tute of Education in New Delhi. Under.U.S.,auspices, summer institutes
 
were created under which each summer college and-.secondary school teachers,
 
of science and mathematics were exposed to new methods of science teaching.
 
In the field-of medical education, scientific and laboratory equipment
 
was provided to the All India Institute of Medical Sciences, located in
 
New Delhi, which is now India's leading research ' and teaching medical
 
college. This involvement in many areas of Indian education did, as
 
Bhagwati and Desai have noted, lead to charges by Indian radical thinkers
 
that a politically sensitive area such as education was being penetrated
 
by ideologically oriented foreign powers (Bhagwati and Desai, 1970: 209).
 
They also noted that an attempt to start an Indo-U.S. Education Foundation
 
in 1966 drew strong criticism from Indian intellectuals andithe project
 
was eventually abandoned.
 
The key message from a description of the U.S., aid effort in India
 
in the preceding few paragraphs is that American aid was extensive and,
 
touched upon many different sectors of the growing Indianeconomy. F.',ther,
 
and perhaps more .importantly, the bulk of U.S. aid went to the Indian
 
i 
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public'sector. At least one commentator on this feature of American aid'
 
'to the Indian public sector has noted that "such aid has increased the
 
resources of the public sector relative to the private sector and has
 
enabled the government to pursue policies which have tended to restrict the
 
activities of private investment and have tended to discourage a larger
 
inflow of foreign private capital" (tansky, 1967: 113). The U.S. did, of
 
course, provide loans to the Indian private sector under the.provisions 
of the Cooley amendments to the use of PL 480 counterpart ,funds.- Tansky, 
however, adds that because much ofU..S . aid was for the development of 
infrastructure, theinfrastructure development could create conditions 
conducive to private sector capital formation. It has also been noted'
 
that.aid emphasis on infrastructure development, at least during the first
 
three plan periods extending up to the mid-1960s, strengthened the-public.
 
sector and increased its share of. total productive capacity, but also 
strengthened the.private sector ,(Narainand Rao, 1963:. 67').
 
In contrast, Soviet aid went predominantly for projects in the heavy
 
industrial sector, including steel, power, coal, p etroleum, and pharma­
ceuticals. Soviet andEastern-bloc aid had been negligible.-in the First,
 
Plan period, but grew rapidly in the Second and Third-Plans. In the Third
 
Plan, Soviet.aid utilized by India was about 9 percent of the total aidL
 
utilized by India (U.S.i Embassy in India, n.d.: 5-12).
 
Most of the Soviet-aided projects were in the public sector. These­
projects "are generally identifiable asSoviet projects'and,appeal to IndIia,
 
fervent aspirations -for industrialization" (Tansky, 1967: 110). .Theonly 
state-owned oil refineries in India .in the mid-J960s were financed by the 
-Soviet Union and Rumania. It is not entirely obvious that Soviet aid.to 
India resulted in the expansion of the Indian public, sector beyond what 
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domestic policy would anyway have wanted itto be (Bhagwati and Desai, 
1970: 184-85) Nonetheless, it is noteworthy that sizable Soviet aid went
 
"for such traditional preserves of private interests as petroleum and pharma­
ceuticals" (Tansky, 1967: 170)1.
 
Most of'the Soviet credits extended to India-required repayment over 
a 12-year period beginning one year after delivery of.ali (source-tied)
 
machinery and equipment for any project. The rate of interest charged 
was 2.5 percent per year. In contrast, the rate'of'interest charged on
 
U.S. AID loans between 1961 and,1966 was 0.75'to 1.0 percent per year for 
the first ten years and 2.5 percent thereafter. Table 14.3 present s .. 
estimates of the average maturities an. interest retes-for the major aid­
giving countries for India's Third Plan (1961-1966). With the exception 
-fIDA, U.S. aid carried the softest terms. However, Soviet loans carried 
repayments in kind which "definitely eased the burden of repayments insofar 
as such provisions have led to net additions to-Indian exports" (Bhagwati 
,and Desai, 1970: 184). Butit is" important to note in comparing aid from. 
idifferent countries, especially. Soviet-bloc aid versus Western aid, that 
'Soviet-bloc aid "made for greater manoeuvrability on the' part of India by 
allowing for a competitive edge through offers of aid-finance and know-how 
ofor projects which the West could not, or would not, help to implement" 
(Bhagwati and Desai, 1970: 184).,
 
Outside the..,Soviet bloc, since 1961, India has had her aid
 
channeled through the Aid-India Consortium which comprises the aid donors 
to India, including the World Bank and IDA. The World Banktook on the 
role.of a convening agent for the Consortium annualmeetings to discuss 
aid requirements, but gradually took on the task of comprehensively
 
evaluating India's economic performance. 
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Table 14.3. 	Average maturity and interest rates on fresh loans
 
authorized during'the third plan by major donors.
 
Grace period Total maturity
 
for including Interest
 
repayment grace period rate
 
Donor 	 Number of yrs. Number of yrs. %per annum 
1.: United States 	 8.7 35.5 1.86 
2. United Kingdom 6.9 	 25.0 4.43
 
3. West Germany 	 4.8 17.3 4.82
 
4. Japan 	 5.0 15.2 5.84 
5. U.S.S.R. 	 1.0 12.0 2.50 
6. I.B.R.D. 	 4.4 21.2 5.64
 
7. I.D.A. 	 10.-0 50.0 0.75 
Total: 	 all countries/
 
institutions 5.8 25.8 3.20
 
Notes: 1. The estimates include credits meant for use in the Third
 
Plan, though actual agreements were signed in the Second Plan period.
 
2. The averages have been compiled by weighing the loans by
 
size. Source: J. N. Bhagwati and P. Desai. (1970) Planning for
 
Industrialization: India. Oxford University Press for the Organisati4
 
for Economic Co-operation and Development. Page 184.
 
14.1-2 	 'Aid Tying 
In the entire foreign aid program in India (and probably elsewhere) 
there have been few other topics that have generated as much comment 
(indeed, recrimination) as the whole issue of tied aid, including project­
tying, source-tying, and reverse-tying. Project aid is aid to cover part
 
or all of the 	foreign exchange cost of an identifiable project. Non-project
 
or general purpose aid refers to aid to finance purchases of spare parts 
and raw 	materials, and generally to support the balance of payments.* 
Non-project aid may be tied to purchases from a specific country source. 
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a loan from a specific source are
Reverse-tying occurs when repayments of 
of commodity exports to that country. Aid from multilateralmade in the form 
agencies is free from source-tying due to the agencies' policies regarding 
global tendering., 
It has been estimated that, excluding U.S. commodity- assistance, 
about 66 percent of the total aid utilized by India during her Second Plan: 
was source-tied and 34 percent was untied, and during the Third Plan'
 
about 83 percent of the total aid utilized was source-tied and 17 percent
 
was untied (Bhagwati and Desai, 1970: 201). 
The issue of aid-tying has generally been,approached in terms of the 
costs of aid-tying to the recipient countries. Bhagwati and Desai notethat 
the government of India did not make any careful, estimates of the costs, of 
aid-tying, but they cite evidence from other studies concluding that siuch
 
costs were substantial (Bhagwati and Desai, 1970: 204 ). P. Chaudhuri
 
cites a study by N. Chandra who found that "the costs of tied-aid for non­
project uses is of the order of 19 percent,'indicating that the actual
 
amount of foreign resources transferred through such aid is about one-fifth
 
less than its nominal amount" (Chaudhuri, 1979: 103). While these discus­
sions on the costs of aid-tying are generally designed to demonstrate that
 
the true extent of resource transfers from aid are considerably less than
 
the nominal amounts of such aid transfers, the implications of aid-tying 
have been much leas studied.,
 
The most effective form of procurement tying occurs when.aid is used
 
to finance the import content of new projects.. It is this aspect of tying 
that, can lead to serious economic distortions in that the pattern of 
imports of aid recipients'becomes heavily biased toward capital goods for
 
new projects. ThisAis apparently what happened in India: "India has in
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the ,past sufferedfrom excessive projectization, in that the aid given for 
6apite.,,goods for projects could have been more.:rapidly and beneficially 
spent on increasing imports of components, raw materials, spare parts, 
and minor capital goods not required for specific new projects" (Little 
and Clifford, 1965: 161-62).. 
Echoing t1e same theme, Mellor',has argued that dad donors neglected
 
agriculture because they preferred projects witha large, foreign exchange 
component. There were many such projects in indLatry and infrastructure 
but few in agriculture. Because of "basic sympathy" with the Indians' own 
planned approach to industrialization,. actions by aid donors on loans 
and grants tied to specific projects reinforced the growth strategy of 
India's development efforts (Mellor, 1976: 225). With ,hindsight, 
Mellor argued that the capital intensive growth strategy was bound to 
Produce low rates of return on investment in the short run. The massive 
investments in the rural infrastructure of irrigation, power, ,and comuin1­
cations would not have yielded high returns until the complementary invest­
ments in education and research had been undertaken.
 
14.1-3 Aid Authorization and Aid Utilization 
Several observers have noted the rather long lags between the authorizi 
tion of aid and its utilization by India during the first one-and-one-half 
decades of Indian planning (Streeten and Hill, 1968: 331; Narain and 
Rao, !963: 37; Bhagwati and Desai, 1970: 187-89). Bhagwati and. Desai 
estimate that during the Third Plan period the rate o utilization, of- aid 
was in the ringe.26 to 53 percent. This lag has obvious implications for 
the efficiency of the aid program. The principal reason given for the
 
slow utilization of aid was -.he fact that •most of the aid was project-tied 
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and source-tied, and the much-vaunted administrative service in India was
 
not adequately prepared for the task of detailed project preparation,
 
programming, and scheduling. However, the trend, at least in the period
 
1961 through 1967, in the rate of utilization was upward and presumably is
 
attributable to improvements in project planning and the realization that
 
the slow utilization of aid has a social cost. Delays in utilization were
 
also due to the shortages of complementary factors and inputs.
 
Little and Clifford point out that only in 1963-1964 India began to
 
receive large amounts of non-project assistance. However, at the beginning
 
of 1965-1966 India was suffering one of her worst balance of payments
 
crises and there was, at the same time, considerable excess capacity in
 
some industrial sectors due to lack of imported raw materials and comple­
ments. They draw the inference that aid and planningwere still too much 
devoted to the creation of output capacity and not enough to promoting
 
current output or to the rapid completion of the schemes already started.
 
The end result of this was a low productivity of capital. They also
 
argue that the central and state government administrative machinery was too 
overstrained to deal with the heavy burden of public control and ownership 
which was assumed by the government (Little and Clifford, 1965: 228-31). 
In spite of all this, they still argue that India could (at least in 
the mid-1960s) have absorbed more aid by improved sectoral and project
 
planning and by using more aid for imports of raw materials such as fertilizer.
 
While arguing that insufficiency of general purpose aid means that the
 
economy operates below capacity, they argue that insufficiency of aid
 
resulted in more stringent import and investment controls. In other words,
 
something of a vicious circle exists. Administrative controls imply a
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reduced efficiency of the economy which implies that usage of aid is low.
 
If general purpose aid were increased, some controls could be relaxed,
 
especially on imports of current inputs, which would mean that more aid
 
would be absorbed and output would grow.
 
14.2 	Macro-economic Perspective on Development Assistance to India
 
The early literature on-the impact.of foreign resource transfers from
 
t.the developed industrialized countries to the developing countries of
 
..
Asia, 	Africa, and South America assumed that each dollar of these transfers
 
would 	add one dollar to.the imports ofi the developing countries (Papaneki
 
1972). Since these additional imports would be capital good imports,
 
the inflow of foreign .'resources would be expected to increase investment
 
in the developing countries by the exact same amount. Further, since
 
stable incremental capital output ratibs.were also assumed, the increased
 
investment would be expected to yield a certain stream of income. This
 
naive 	view of the process of economic growth, at least from the perspective
 
of today, somewhat naturally led to rather optimistic and exaggerated 
..expectations about the productivity'of aid. The experiences of the 
Marshall Plan in Europe shortly after the end of World War II and the
 
rapid 	economic growth that had-been attained,there tended to reinforce 
and sustain-the expectations of the early aid proponents. 
But 'Over 'time as-the economics profession began to better understand 
the nature of the economic developmnt process, studies on the impact of
 
aid on ,the developing countries alsp grew in sophistication. The role 
of education, social factors, the political framework, and traditional
 
institutions.was acknowledged and even included in some of these studies.
 
:But "assumptions about the contribution of foreign resources were not I I 
changed: they were exactly additive. o domestic savings and to domestically
 
Ifinanced imports" (Papanek, 1972: 
 '93,W) 
A "revisionist" phase apparentl began in the early 1970s when some 
.Writers argued that foreign resources contributed little, if anything, 
.to economic growth and domestic saving,. Indeed, Griffin and Enos, (i9.TO) 
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went so -far as to argue, oo. the basis of cross section evidence from Latin 
America, that over the period.1957 to 1964 the rate of growth-of GNP was 
inversely related to'the ratioo f foreign aid to GNP. While many other.:/ 
that, many of them did reach a common view'
 writers did not go so far as 
that freign aid and other foreign inflows reduce domestic savings, (Weiskopf 
1972). 
Weiskopf used a simple macroeconomic model of 
the legendary zwo-gap 
variety. Such a model was said to be necessary for an evaluation of the 
roleof foreign capital,because foreign capital contributes both to the 
potential availability of savings (easing the savings constraint on capital 
formation and.growth) and to the potential availability of imports (easing 
the trade constraint). From a total sample of 44 countries. Weiskopf 
classifies them into those where there was a binding savings constraint 
or where there was a binding trade constraint or a "hybrid.situation in" 
which both the savings and trade constraints are active at the cost of 
excess production capacity" (Weiskopf, 1972: 30).. For 17 countries that' 
were identified to be savings constrained, Weiskopf estimated savings 
functions relating GDP, total exports, and. net foreign capital inflow to 
aggregate saving. 
One of the 17 countries for which results are reported isIndia. 
The results for India are: 
s =-4968.0 + O.191Y 0.270F + Q.8l2E. 
(-15.12) (60.91) (-5.91) (4.35) 
Time period = 1950-1965; R
2 0.999; where S is aggregate savings, 
Y is GDP, F is net foreign capital inflow, and E i- total exports (Weiskopf, 
p. 36) (t-ratios are in parentheses). The striking aspect of these results 
is the strong negative and significant coefficient for the foreign aid 
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varible. Indeed,,for every single cunr of the.'17 countries for which 
results are reported, the coefficient of the.-foreign aid variable is
 
negative. With dummy variable' to distinguish each of the countries, a
 
pooled regression was also'estimated. According to the pooled regression,__
 
"the impact of: F on S is highly significant, and approximately23 percent 
of net foreign capital inflow substitutes for domestic savings" (Wiskopf,'
 
1972:' 37).
 
Disputing the above findings, Papanek.(1972) argued that much of
 
the apparent association between savings and foreign capital). inflows
 
was in. fact lexplainable in purely statistical terms, and certain 
;exogenous factors (such as changes in the terms of trade, political upheavals 
weather variables, and even cultural and religious considerations) could
 
lead to both a.positive association between foreign resources and savings
 
and growth-as well as a.negative association between these variables.
 
Unlike Weiskopf's time-series approach, Papanek (1973) used a cross­
section approach to study the impact of foreign resources on growth.
 
Papanek also distinguishes between the various forms of foreign capital , 
inflows and between primary exports and other exports. 
Papanek examines a large number of developing' countries in Asia, 
Africa, and Latin America and seeks to explain GDP growth rates in term's
 
of explanatory variables such 'as domestic savings, and various 'forms of. 
,:foreign resource inflows such as aid, foreign private investment, and 
"'other" foreign inflows. Recognizing the limitations of such a cross-country 
approach, Papanek offers his findings as "isuggestive." What. the evidence 
presented suggests is that savings and foreign inflows "texplain" about 
one-third'of GDP growth in the entire sample. The coefficient for'the aid
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explanatory variable is found 'to be nearly.twice that of the other
 
independent variables. Some interesting regional differences in the
 
estimated equations are also observed. . savings and foreign
For exampl , 
inflows, and especially aid, have the most unequivocal impact on growth 
in Asia and the Mediterranean countries.:. . Coefficients are distinctly 
lower for the Americas and barely significant" (Papanek, 1973: 123). 
Papanek also attempts to estimate aggregate savings functions of the form 
relating aggregate savings to income per capita, population, foreign 
resource inflows, primary exports, and other exports. Here the-coefficient 
for-aid turns out to be negative and highly significant but Papanek argues 
that that might be more likely due to exogenous f6.2tors affecting both aid 
and savings,rather than signifyinga causal relationship between the two 
variables. 
One other example of a cross-country approach in evaluating the impact 
of development assistance is the work by two leading "practitioners" of 
aid, Hollis Chenery and Nicholas Carter. They present "a summary evaluation 
of the interrelations between internal and external policies and the role 
of foreign assistance in the development experience" of a group of 37, 
developing countries (Chenery and Carter,. 1973: 459). India is Lamong the 
countries studied and while much detail on the Indian experience is lost 
in the aggregation of sample countries, the,cross-country approach has 
provided much useful information about the developing countries. 
Chenery and Carter base'their evaluation on the projections of growth 
and aid made by Chenery and Strout (1966) ffor the period 1962-1970 for, 
establishing aid requirements, and estimates of the actual values of the 
parameters in their model for 1960-1970. The Chenery-Strout projections 
were derived from a simplified two-gap model which exaggerates the likelihood 
:f disequilibrium between internal and external cohstraints .to growth. 
)ut of their total sample of 37 countries actual GDP growth in 25 countries 
between 1960 add 1970 was within ' 1.2 percentage points of the planned 
rate of growth in these countries. The authors attempt to indicate the 
relative importance of "internal" and "external" factors in the 5 
countries that had rapid growth (Taiwan, Korea, Iran, Thailand, and Kenya) 
and in the 6 countries 'of retarded growth (India, Colombia, Ghana,,, 
runisia, Sri Lanka, .and Chile). India's actual GDP growth for 1960-1970 
was 3.5 percent per year, which was not only below the planned 1962-1970 
growth rate of 5.3 percent per year.but also below the actual achieved 
growth during 1957,1962 of '.3 percent per year. 
Chenery and Carter discover that successful development had led 
to increased supplies of external capital,. usually on harder terms. But_ 
unsuccessful development usually led to a reduction in the aid supplied 
to those countries. They find that in the fast-growing countries there 
was substantial saving and investment even though marginal savings rates 
were not generally higher than predicted. But in countries of retarded 
growth, there was less of a shortfall in savings and investment rates 
than in growth of GNP. 
The authors observe that Taiwan had a very large increase in both 
exports and savings, permitting both an ,accelerationof growth and a reduc­
tion in capital inflow. In Korea, the substantial inflow of foreign 
capital made possible a fuller mobilization of the economy's resources. 
In the,cases of retarded growth, 'theyconclude that internal factors provide 
the primary explanation of slow growth. For example, Tunisia is said to 
have,misallocated a large share of investment to less immediately productive 
uses over much,ofthe 1960s. Chile followed a policy of,"excessive import
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substitution" and the savings rate stayed low as a result of failure to 
control inflation. Sri Lanka and Ghana were judged to have inadequately
 
adjusted to the slow growth of their major export products. In India and 
Colombia, the "reduction in external assistance played a major role in 
retarding growth" (Chenery and Carter, 1973: 464). The foreign trade. 
bottleneck in India, as also in Colombia, was made worse by trade policies 
that discriminated against exports of manufactured goods.
 
The "shortfall" of aid to India in 1962-1970 was roughly $6 billion.
 
Exports were roughly $0.5 billion short of the Chenery-Strout projections. 
Using simulation experiments on the Chenery-Strout model, the authors 
conclude that the addition of the lost exports would have added only 
0.5 percent per year to the 3.5 percent per year actual growth achieved 
by India during the decade. But the projected amount of aid (that is, the 
makeup of the $6 billion shortfall) would, in their view, have raised 
the growth rate to 6.8 percent per year. 
From these basically theoretical:modeling exercises of the relations 
between development assistance and'macroeconomic variables we now turn to 
examining the impact of development assistance on variables such as income 
and savings and investment rates in India. 
The impact of development assistance depends on the share of', 
foreign aid in,the total investment in the receiving country, ,but quantifying 
the contribution of aid to the productive capacity of a country is a difficult 
task. Among other things, aid can beused to transfer capital or technical 
skills,,but the productivity of these transfers cannot be treated analogously 
to the relatively simple, but stili complex, question about the yield of 
:capital. As Little and Clifford'have argued, foreign aid may have the effect 
of bringing into use productive resources already existing in the receiving 
country andhence might have a much greater effect than the yield of', 
,capital would suggest (Little.and Clifford, 1965: 10). However, an 
overall assessment of the impact of aid must only be attempted in conjunc­
tion with an assessment of the economic policies of the ,receiving country. 
India's attempt at formal planned development began in'1951.
 
The First Plan was largely a collection of individual projects put together,
 
as various authors have emphasized, around a Harrod-Domar growth model
 
(Bhagwati and Srinivasan, 1975.: 4). The thrust .of the plan.was to build 
infrastructure and the:plan-focused on fiscal policy to raise domestic 
savings to the.levels reqtuired'to match the projected investment that 
was considered necessary-for-the planned (that isl targeted) economic 
growth. 
The.Scond Plan (1956 to 1961) wa's a continuation of the development
 
effort ;,begun, in :the First Plan but embodied a shift in priorities toward 
industrialization, especially heavy industry. The Second Plan was developed 
byProfessor.P. C. Mahalanobis of the Indian Statistical Institute on the 
basis of a structural model which saw the key .source of growth,the capital 
•goods sector and the means of growth a large.increase in investment, 
especially by the public sector. The Second Plan' envisaged and accomplished 
.a large increase in investment, especially in public sector heavy industrial 
'projects. Very significant amounts of foreign aid flowed into India during 
the"plan period to finance infrastructure development and the creation of, 
basic industrial capacity. Despite this, the first two years of the Second 
Plan were also characterized by large scale deficit financing which, in. 
the Indian context, is defined as the'excess of government expenditures 
,.over receipts from taxes, borrowing within the country and abroad, and 
drawing down-of official reserves, and ,so is creation of money.;, The 
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implications of this have, unffortunately, not received much attention in
 
the Indian literature. However, it should be noted that, among others,
 
P. T. Bauer, a vocal and sometimes strident critic of Indian planning 
and foreign aid, argued that' the large scale deficit financing in the 
mid-1950s contributed to inflation and the foreign exchange crisis (Bauer, 
1961':33-38). The'inflation was, of course,.moderated by the large import 
surplus occasioned by foreign aid.
 
However, the important point to note about this era 'isthat the 
Second.Plan saw the beginning and subsequent strengthening of industrial 
licensing and controls over nearly all sectors of the Indian economy., The 
precarious foreign exchange position towards the middle of the Second 
Plan period led to strict licensing of imports of both capital goods and 
consumer goods. The exclusion of private enterprise from large areas of 
industrial activity (which was an outcome of government industrial 
policy) and effective exchange controls were principal deterrants to the 
inflow of private foreign capital. In the area of agriculture, the inter­
sta-t'.uovement of foodgrains became subjected to restrictions and controls 
These administrative controls have undergone considerable refinements 
and adjustments, including periods of relative liberalization, but 
continue to pervade nearly all spheres of economic activity to this date..' 
As Mellor has argued, the Second Plan "was, by, its.very nature, centralist 
since the emphasis on a few large-scale capital goods industries "lent, 
itself to administration from a highly centralized bureaucracy" (Mellor, 
'1976: 4i). 
The- Third Plan (1961 to 1966) reaffirmed the basic imbalanced approac 
to planned industrial development. But with the historic droughts of 1966 
and 1967 and the resulting industrial recession, along with the decline 
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in foreign aid in the aftermath, of-the 1965 war with Pakistan, the.' planning 
process was in disarray for several years. This was evidenced by a hiatus 
in the five-year plans between 1966 and 1969 at which time a series of 
one-year annual plans was put as :a makeshift strategy before the elements 
11of a newstrategy.of growth were put together in the Fourth Plan (1969 to 
subsequent plans. 
14.2-1,Impact of Aid on Income, Savings, and Investment 
Since the beginning of the First Plan the Indian economy has recorded 
an average growth rate of between 3.5 and 4 percent per year., While there 
.have been year-to-year fluctuations in the rate of growth, the'rate has 
,194)-and 

not risen or fallen on any sustained basis. During the, first five years 
of planned growth, net national product at constant prices grew at 3.7 percent 
.peryear.: This 'slowed to a rate of growth of 3.1 percent per year during 
the Second :Plan period, and slowed further to a rate of 2.5 percent per 
year during the period 1961 to 1966 (Chaudhuri, 1979:, 52). It is important 
to note that the unprecedented: droughts of 1965-1966 and 1966-1967 
r educed the overall rate of growth of the economy. The excellent agricultural 
harvest of 1967-1968 spurred overall economic activity and between 1967 " 
and 1971 the economy grew at an average rate of over 4.5 percent per year. 
.A.fall in agricultural production in the early 1970s again slowed economic 
•6:owth. ,But between 1974 and 1177 the economy again grew at a rate above 
the long-run rate of 3.65 percent per year (Raj.,Krishna, 1980: 78). 
'In-1979-1980 a severe drought and external events such as the rise in 
:petroleum prices led to a fall in national income, but since then the 
economy has again grown smartly.
 
he relatively low rate of long-run growth has meant a very slow 
increase in per capita income since population has'continued to increase. 
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Between 1951 and 1961', the population of India-grew at nearly 2 percent 
per year and this'rate in fact accelerated to 2.25 percent between 1961 
and 1971 (Bhagwati and Srinivasan, 1975: 7). Preliminary data from the 
1981 Census indicate that between 1971 and 1981 the rate of growth of 
population was, slightly above2 percent per year.-
Indian performance on savings and-investment has been much better than
 
on aggregate or per capita income growth. Gross domestic savings as a
 
percentage of gross domestic product at market prices has shown a steady
 
trend upward over the past 3 decades, rising from13.7 percent in 1960-1961 
to 16.8 percent in 1971-1971,to,22.2,percent in 1981-1981.' As Raj Krishna 
has commented,- "raties ,on this order (of.saving) 'are typically achieved, 
only by nations with a per capita income of $400 to $500 in 1964 U.S. 
prices" (Krishna, 1980: 82). An evaluation of the-behavior of different
 
categories of savings such as government savings, private household
 
savings, and savings by the private corporate sectoris not available.
 
But whatever data are available suggest that the contribution of the public:
 
sector to domestic saving has not been noteworthy (Bhagwati and Srinivasan'
 
1975: 9; and Mellor, 1976: 142).
 
Like the..savings rate, the rate of gross fixed capital formation as"
 
a percent ofGDP has shown a rising trend over the past three'decades of
 
planned economic development. Gross fixed capital formation as a percentage 
of GDP was 14.4 percent in 1960-1961, 15.7 percent in 1970-1971, 17.9 percenl 
in 1975-1976, and 18.8 percent in 1980-1981. .Gross fixed capital formation 
by the public sector was 46.7 percent of the total in 1980-1i, but-was 
only 23.0 percent of the total in 1950-1951. However,'as Raj Krishna has
 
pointed out, "the ratio of added investmentto increases in output has
 
risen steadily,from 3.6 in the First Plan to 6.2 in the first three years
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of hC Fifth Plan" (Krishna, 1980: 82). Investment in the public sector 
,has had a very low rate of return. Between 1970 and 1975, the private 
corporate sector had a profit rate of about 11 percent of net assets, but 
central government companies had a profit rate of only 4.h percent and ­
.state-government companies had an even lower profit rate. One of the, 
reasons why these rates of return on public sector investment have been 
low is that the prices for: the products of these companies have been kept 
artificially low "as a matter of policy," but "the main reason.for low rates 
of'return on publicinvestment seems to be inefficiency. Instead of 
generating large surpluses the public- sector has become a drag on resources. 
People have to be taxed at higher rates year after year to finance the 
mounting losses and new public investment in public enterprises" (Krishna, 
1980: 83). 
Even though government tax revenue as a percent of GNP is high in
 
India, the government has not apparently been able to mobilize sufficient
 
resources to finance its investment, especially after foreign aid
 
declined in the late 1960s. In 1969, all major commercial banks in India
 
were nationalized. And now the financial system "is compelled by a set
 
of laws and guidelines to lend a high proportion of its funds to the
 
government" (Krishna, 1980: 82).
 
14.2-21 Development Assistance and the.Foreign Trade Regime 
The key reference in reviewing studies on the foreign trade regime is 
the study by Bhagwati and Srinivasan (1975), covering the period 1950-1970, 
which is a careful examination of India's foreign trade regime in its 
interaction with domestic policies. The authors analyze insightfully 
the import and exportpolicies under the foreign trade regime that operated 
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in the period 1956-1966. They examine the interventions by the government 
in the foreign trade sector and the methods by which scarce foreign exchangc 
was allocated in an effort to study the static efficiency effects of the 
foreign trade policies. They also study the growth effects of the 
foreign trade regime by examining the question whether the foreign trade 
regime had any impact on the savings effort. The overall conclusion 
reached is that the basic strategy of industrialization followed by India 
was detrimental to the growth of the economy "by adversely influencing 
export performance, by wasteful inter-industrial and inter-firm allocation 
of resources, by permitting and encouraging expansion of excess capacity 
and by blunting competition and hence the incentives for cost-consciousness 
and quality-improvement" (Bhagwati and Srinivasan, 1975: 245). 
The ratio of exports to national income in India was low throughout 
the 1950s and 1960s and her share in total world trade fell during that 
period. Mellor attributes this relatively weak performance to "the choice 
of development strategy, the nature and conditions of foreign aid, and the 
initial composition of exports" (Mellor, 1976: 192). All through this 
period Indian exports remained hesvily biased toward "traditional" items 
'such as tea, jute manufactures, and cotton textiles. These commodities 
were believed to have poor growth prospects (the so-called export pessimism
 
syndrome) which reinforced the government's import displacement policies
 
in spite of the rising capital intensity of such efforts. According to 
Bhagwati and Srinivasan, relying on the earlier study by Bhagwati and
 
Desai (1970), the stagnation of export earnings through the 1950s is 
"to be largely attributed to domestic policies which frequently led to
 
falling shares in Indian traditional exports and an inadequate expansion 
of new exports (in the absence of any exportLpromotion on that. front)" 
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(Bhagwati and Srinivasan, pp. 54-55, parentheses in the original). The
 
accompanying Table 14.4 on "traditional" and "non-traditional" exports 
provides data from 1951 to 1974.
 
The first severe foreign exchange crisis in India occurred soon
 
after the Second Plan (1956-1961) began. While significant amounts of aid
 
flowed into India, exports continued to stagnate, and the resulting
 
foreign exchange crises led to the imposition of a quantitative-restric­
tions regime in India. The government made some tentative attempts at
 
export promotion but nothing much was accomplished. The large inflows of
 
aid constituted a painless substitute for foreign exchange earned via
 
exports, and enabled India to maintain a high rate of inves'cment, higher
 
than what would have been possible if aid flows were smaller.
 
From the early 1960s the government began a policy of export subsudies
 
and licensing preferences. As a result of these policies and due to the
 
expansion of trade with the socialist countries, total export performance 
in the Third Plan was considerably better than in the Second Plan. However, 
while the export subsidies reduced the average degree of over-valuation of 
the Indian rupee, the subsidy policy was "selective, chaotic, and cost­
unconscious." The incredible complexity of the export subsidy policies, 
involving exemptions and refunds from sales, customs, and excise taxes, 
direct tax concessions, and import entitlement schemes under which eligible 
exporters received import licenses carrying high import premia, has been 
carefully analyzed by Bhagwati and Srinivasan (especially pp. 59-75). 
The key characteristic of the whole policy milieu was intervention by the 
government in a selective manner with little economic rationale. The 
inefficient and indiscriminate export policy was accompani,.d by an equally 
indiscriminate import policy involving protection to domestic industries. 
The policy of export subsidies and increased use of import duties implied 
Table 14.4. Indian Exports 
Total exports 
Million U.S. $ 
Year (current) 
1951-52 1,503 
1955-56 1,242 
1960-61 1,349 
1961-62 1,387 
1962-63 1,44o 
1963-64 1,666 
1964-65 1,715 
1o65-66 1,692 
1966-67 1,542 
1967-68 1,598 
1968-69 1,810 
1969-70 1,884 
1970-71 2,047 
1971-72 2,091 
1972-73 2,431 
1973-74 3,021 
1974-75 4,174 
1975-76 4,672 
1976-77 5,753 
1977-78 6,315 
1978-79 6,978 
1979-80 7,997 
1980-81 8,503 
Traditional exports 

Million U.S. $ 

(current) 

1,332 

1,081 

1,120 

1,153 

1,221 

1,350 

1,446 

1,368 

1,217 

1,214 

1,242 

1,219 

1,330 

1,430 

1,466 

1,812 

Nontraditional exports
 
Million U.S. $
 
(current)
 
172
 
159
 
232
 
235
 
217
 
316
 
.269
 
325
 
322
 
384
 
569
 
668
 
716
 
663
 
971
 
1.208
 
Definitions: Traditional exports: food, beverages and tobacco, crude materials,
 
mineral fuels, animal and vegetable oils and fats, and cotton textures and jute
 
manufactures. Nontraditional exports: chemicals, manufactured goods other than
 
cotton textiles and jute manufactures, machinery and transport equipment, mis­
cellaneous manufactured goods, and others.
 
Sources: 1. John Mellor. (1976). The New Economics of Growth. Page 194.
 
Cornell University Press, Ithaca, New York. For data for 1951-52 to 1973-74.
 
2. Government of India. Monthly Statistics of Foreign Trade. Various issues
 
for data after 1974-75.
 
The data from 1974-75 are not comparable to data prior tc that year. Breakdown
 
between traditional and nontraditional exports after 1_73-74 are not available.
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a gradual de facto devaluation' which 'culminated in the -June l966 devaluation
 
of the Indian rupee.
 
The June 1966 devaluation marked the beginning of a new phase in
 
which export subsidies were eliminated and import duties were reduced.
 
The. gross" devaluation, that is, the pure parity change was 57.5 percent
..

in'the official rate on the dollar. Simultaneously.with the parity change,
 
;the import enti.leyient method of export subsidy was eliminated along with
 
some of the cash subsidies on selected engineering goods and the government
 
tax credits. Countervailing export duties were.imposed on."traditional"
 
exports aimed at neutralizing the effect of devaluation on these exports. 
but based on the assumption that India had monopoly power in trade in these 
.products. And, when the countervailing export duties and removal of 
import entitlements, tax credits, and cash subsidies are all taken into
 
account, the devaluation actually amounted-to only 21.6 percert for 
exports. Similarly, the "net" devaluation for imports was I2.3 percent 
(Bhagwati and Srinivasan, 1975: '97),. 
The Aid India Consortium had virtually made a major 'evaluation a,, 
precondition for the resumption of aid, which.had been temporarily'
 
suspended after the 1965 India-Pakistan war. The years 1'965-1966 and 
Consumer :prices rose
1966-1967 were years of very bad crop failures. 
sharply and there-was an industrial recession. In the public mind the
 
devaluation was due to the.political pressures by the aid donors. Many
 
observers also attributed the inflation of those years to the devaluation.
 
Bhagwati"and Srinivasan, however, argue that the inflation was mainly due
 
to the severe crop failures of 1965-1966 and 1966-1967. 
.The devaluation of the India rupee could not have come at a worse 
time. The -crop failures of 1965-1966 and 1966-1967 -contributed..to.the 
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.inflation following the devaluation and also to the industrial recession
 
in India. Overall Indian exports remained stagnant for nearly one-and­
one-half years after the devaluation. Bhagwati and Srinivasan argue, 
after a careful examination of the time lags involved and the entire 
policy changes that accompanied the devaluation, that even though some 
uneconomic exports did fall, non-traditional engineering and iron and steel 
exports increased after the devaluation., The cruciai lesson that they
 
draw from the entire episode is that the timing of devaluation and 
liberalization is of fundamental importance to its-success and should come 
after a good harvest. 
The political fallout from the devaluation was tremendous. It was 
seen as being imposed from outside, by the Aid India Consortium. It 
became a lively issue in partisan politics. It was seen as an attempt by 
aid donors to influence Indian policy. But because of extremely bad 
political timing (foreign pressure came at a time when the new government 
:of Mrs. Gandhi was less than six months old and was not yet firmly established), 
the entire episode was seen as a disaster for the aid relationship between 
India and Western aid donors. Bhagwati and Srinivasan contrast this aid 
relationship with that which prevailed between India and the Soviet Union. 
The Soviet Union's method of evaluating its aid activity in India was 
restricted to evaluating its aid-financed projects 'and did not extend to 
evaluating the whole range of Indian econ nic policies. This "helped to 
avoid the kind of adverse reaction the Western donors provoked" during 
the devalution-lib6ralization episode and indeed this episode even affected 
the responsiveness of Indian officials to the Smithsonian Agreement parity 
changes of 1971 (Bhagwati and Srinivasan, 1975: 152, 155, footnote 6). 
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The-,drop-off in foreign aid in the early 1970s and the commodity and 
oil price increases in the early 1970s made exporting "a question of national 
economic survival" (Dhar, 1978: 1034). Efforts at export promotion, begun 
again in 1974, did result in 10 percent, increases in exports in 1975-1976
 
and again in 1976-1977. This rate of increase has been maintained since
 
then In 1980-1981,' exports of'Indian engineering products amounted to,
 
over $1 billion and had become the largest single'export item accounting
 
::for over 13 percent of total exports. Raj Krishna has. argued that this 
isharp export growth in the late 1970s was',one measure of success of the 
import substitution policies that India followed because these policies 
"made many of',the goods produced by India cheaper in the long run than 
their importedcounterparts." As evidence, he cites Indian steel prices 
in December 1978 as being,-approximately one-half of European steel.export 
prices, as a result of which prices of Indian,engineering products were 
low relative to other countries (Krishna, 1980: 78).: : 
Indian imports exhibited a growth and composition pattern determined
 
by the development strategy that she pursued. Table 14-5 from
 
.Melior (1976) provides details on imports. The,data, of course, .reflect
 
the outcome of an explicit longterm policy to establish an adequate
 
indigenous capacity in the: basic industrial sectors, particularly metals
 
and machinery, heavy checals, and transport and communications equipment.
 
Along with strict industrial licensing,import licensing operated in India.
 
The foreign trade balance was consistently negative since external resources
 
filled the gap between exports and imports.
 
The import substituting policies that' India has pursued have led to a
 
highly diversified industrial structure. 'A wide range of capital goods is
 
now produced in India. For example, it has be.nnoted .that between 1955
 
Table 14.5. IndianImports 
Total imports 

Million U.S. $ 

Year (current) 

1951-52 1,838 

1955-56 1,365 

1960-61 2,356 

1961-62 2,290 

1952-53 2,377 

1963-64 2,559 

1964-65 2,834 

1965-66 2,959 

1966-67 2,771 

1967-68 2,677 

1968-69 2,545 

1969-70 2,109 

1970-71 2,179 

1971-72 2,416 

1972-73 2,311 

1973-74 3,555 

1974-75 5,666
 
1975-76 6,084
 
1976-77 5,676
 
1977-78 7,031
 
1978-79 8,270
 
1979-80 .1,171
 
1980-81 .5,838
 
Traditional imports 

Million U.S. $ 

(current) 

1,526 

1,082 

1,976 

1,864 

2,;o4 

2,445 
2,557 

2,403' 

.2,"303 

2 i,18 

1,681 

1,7320 

1,874 

1,779 

,17-

Nontraditional impo
 
Million U.S. $
 
(current)
 
312
 
280
 
382
 
427
 
423
 
464
 
390
 
403
 
368
 
372
 
427
 
429
 
445 
'542
 
532
 
1,038-

Definitions: Traditional imports: cereal and cereal preparations, raw cotton
 
other than linters, chemicals, manufactured goods, machinery and transport equil
 
ment, miscellaneous manufactured goods, and residual imports. Nontraditional
 
imports: food other than cereal and cereal preparations, beverages and tobacco,
 
crude materials other than raw cotton, mineral fuels, lubricants, animal and
 
vegetable oils and fats.
 
Sources: 1. John Mellor. (1976). The New Economics of Growth. Page 196. 
Cornell University Press, Ithaca, New York. For data for 1951-52 to 1973-74. 
2, Government of India. Monthly Statistics of Foreign Trade. Various issues 
for data after 1974-75.
 
The data from 1974-75 are not comparable to data prior to that year. Breakdown
 
between traditional and nontraditional exports after 1973-74 are not available. 
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and 1978 imp.ots fell to a level of between 2 and 21 percent of total
 
supply in 21 industrial sectors and exceeded 25 percent of the total ; 
supply ,in only 6 industrial sectors (Krishna, 1980: 78). This, however, 
does not mean that the full implications of the import substituting, 
policies,were understood by the policy planners in India Or, forthat matter,­
by the aid givers abroad. The government recognized, to some extent',
 
that the development of the capital goods industries was not likely to
 
provide substantial direct employment of labor. This was sought to be
 
softened by the development of the cottage and small industries sector.
 
That this policy has not been successful is implicit in the statement'by
 
Krishna that "thevolume of unemployment (in India) keeps growing, contrary
 
.to (an important) objective of Indian policy" (Krishna, 1980: 81, parentheses 
added). That this.policy was not likely to be successful had been noted 
many years ago.by several critics of Indian planning, most notably by 
Milton Friedman. P. T. Bauer (1961) quotes an unpublished memorandum 
prepared by.Friedman in 1955 for the International Cooperation Administration 
of the U.S. saying that Indian economic policy of large investment in 
heavy industry on the one hand and in cottage industry on the other 
I-"threatens an inefficient use of capital at the one extreme by combining 
it with too little labor, and an inefficient use of labor at the other 
extreme by combining it with too little capital" (Bauer, 1961: 59). 
It should be noted that given-the export pessimism of the planners 
in the early stages of planned economic growth in India, given the targeted 
rate of growth of output and the implied (by the capital output ratios) 
requirements of investment, the emphasis on import substituting industri­
alization was a'logical corollary (Dhar, 1978: 1031). This objective of 
selective,industrialization implied a tight regime of import .restrictions.
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However, the government relied less 6n import tariffs than on a'-direct 
ellocative procedure. Such a procedure was complex ard the economic 
consequences of the allocation methods included considerable administrative 
expense, delays, lack of coordination among different-agencies doing,the 
,:allocations, and automatic protection to domestic industries. :'Further., 
the strategy of import substitution involved implicit discrimination against 
exports., Indeed, it was an inward-looking strategy (Bhagwati and Srinivasan,. 
esp.-pp. 35-52). To.be sure, there were periods of liberalization of the 
,trade regime in India, but as various .authors have noted, these lasted 
only. for brief periods.and were tentative at best. The import.policy 
regime.,in India still relies heavily on quantitative restrictions. 
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AID and the Development of Financial- Institutions 
One other measure of the impact of foreign resource transfers from 
-he industrialized world to,the developing countries is in terms of the
 
:reation of viable financial institutions in the aid-rec iving'couries.
 
;uch institutions, often called development finance companies or development
 
>anks,:are an essential step in creating conditions conducive to the
 
rowthof capital markets in the developing countries and serve in mobilizin
 
-apital for development.purposes. International lending agencies have,
 
)layed an important: role in the growth of such financial institutions....
 
Jnfortunately, however, this role has not received much attention in the
 
.iterature. There are available only a few studies on this topic,.and.
 
lone of these is specifically devoted to any ozqe particular country.
 
The only study which specifically examines industrial finance companies 
.n India is the 1964 report of the Columbia University School of Law on 
ublic international development financing in India. This report arose from 
L research'project at Columbia University financed by the Ford Foundation. 
he director of the research project was Wolfgang Friedmann of Columbia 
Jniversity Law School, and the principal contributors to the project 
-eport included Dr. R. K. Hazari of Bombay U vsity. The other studies 
hat were received for thissection included the one by Adler and Mikeseli 
:1966) and by.Kane (1975). 
The Industrial Finance Corporation, set up 'in,19148, was the first of 
. number of institutions set up to provide long and medium-term finance 
;o private industry in,India. The other institutions which have since 
Deen established are the Industrial Credit and Investment Corporation of 
India, the National Industrial Development Corporation, the National Small 
Industries Corporation, the State Financial Corporation, and the State" 
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Industrial Developmnent:Corporations. In 19,64-, the 'industrial Finance
 
Corporation was reorganized and named the 1Industrial Development, Bank of 
India. It now amounts to a central bank for India's network of term 
finance institutions. 
The. Industrial Finance Corporation, now known"as the 
Industrial Development Bank is oldest and lar . long-termof India, the gest 
industrial financing institution in, India. Under its charter it has 
finaced public limited companies and cooperative societies'registered
 
in, India. It provided loans for the purchase of new machinery, replacement 
of old machinery, construction of factory buildings, and .the purchase of 
land for-factory sites, but does not provide finance for purchase of raw 
sugar,
or for working capital. Most of its loans have gone to materials 
paper, cotton textiles, chemicals, and metal products manufacturers. 
Adler and Mikesell (1966) have argued that the policies of the external 
agencies prohibiting the use of money,by sub-borrowers for working
 
capital has adversely affected the long-term growth of the development
 
banks in the developing countries (Adler and Mikesell, 1966: 59).
 
Until 1955, when the Industrial Credit and Investment Corporation of 
-Indiawas set up, the Industrial Finance Corporation was the only institu­
tional lendc-r of long-term industrial finance. The IFC approached the 
World Bank for funds several times to enable it to make foreign currency 
loans but was rebuffed (Columbia University, 1964: 225i). 'Adler and Mikesell 
point out that this was due to the doctrinaire approach of the World Bank. 
group in providing financial and technical assistance to private develop­
ment banks, and the Indian IFC was a public .sector development bank. 
Unlike the World Bank group, the U.S. Development Loan Fund-Agency. for 
International Development was much less doctrinaire with respect to its 
policies and made dollar and local currency loans to private, public, and 
.mixedownership industrial development banks. The DLF made its first 
loan (of $10 million) to the Indian IFC in 1960. This loan was repayable 
in rupees. In the first fifteen years of its existence,. the Industrial 
Finance Corporation disbursed Rs 878 millions and out of this amount 
only Rs 22 millions (or 2.5 percent) came from foreign sources (Columbia 
University, 19614: 2214-25). 
India's first private sector development bank, the ICICI,, was s'et up 
~in 1955. Its origin is traced to the "U.S. aid mission which wanted: to 
place PL 480 counterpart. funds with a private agency but could not make, 
much'progress with,the scheme, perhaps due to the lukewarm attitude .of 
the Government of India. The idea (for the private development bank)­
crystallized :only when IBRD came into the picture" (Columbia University,, 
1964: 230). The objective of the ICICI'was to assist industrial enterprises 
in the private sector in India and to foster the growth of a private 
capital market in the country. The ICICI provides financial assistance tc 
private companiesfor the purchase of capital assets through the under­
writing of securities issued by these companies, makes rupee loans, and 
makes foreign currency sub-loanslout of World Bank and other foreign 
exchange credits for financing imports of capital equipment and technical 
services. 
The work by Kane (1975).is an important contribution in assessing the 
overall effectiveness of development banking in the process of economic 
development. Kane studies 31 development banks'all of which had received 
1oans and/or equity capital from the World Bank group. These 31 banks 
include 12 in East and South East Africa, 8 in Africa, 2 in Latin America, 
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3 in ithe Middfle East', and'6ne in Europe. Kane,'s sample is aTfairly, 
.diversified group with respect to the ageof the banks, theirlsize, and
 
their ownership. Three of the banks are publicly owned,-15 are private, 
and 13 azde'of mixed public-private ownership. Among the 31 ,isthe Industrial
 
Credit, and Investment Corporation of:"India.
 
Kane uses a demand-for-funds/supply-of-funds approach in evaluating 
the performance of development banks. From a particular development
 
bank's point of view, the demand for funds is defined as the value of.all 
projects submittedto the bank by private sector entrepreneurs per period
 
of time which are evaluated by the bank as economically viable and loan­
worthy and which the bank stands ready to finance, assuming it has the 
necessary funds. The supply of funds is said to consist of all funds 
which the development bank has available for lending, including funds in
 
lines of credit extended to the banks, funds temporarily invested in
 
short-term assets, and funds from current amortization payments.
 
Kane examines the demand for funds, defined above, and also the
 
supply of funds in his sample of developing country development banks 
for the 1950s and 1960s. He concludes that the supply of funds was more
 
than adequate,and effective demand for bank funds was the real limit on the
 
level of lending by the sample development banks. In an earlier study, 
Adler and Mikesell had pointed out that the major limitation on the number
 
and volume of sub-loans made to private enterprises in developing countries 
:arose from the demand side rather than from the supply,of loanable funds 
(Adler and Mikesell, 1966: 55). 
In evaluating the role of development.banks inthe process of,economic 
.development, an understanding of the sources of capital :supply to the 
banks is essential. A knowledge of where such capital originates and 
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what processes are necessary for replenishing capital is important in
 
explaining the relative shortage or availability of funds. A relatively
 
small percentage of development bank financial resources (only 17 percent)
 
originates in the private domestic sector via debt and"equity actuall"y. 
raised in the market, by far the major share-of such resources is contributee
 
by foreign lending agencies, 47 percent(Kane', 1975: 94-98). For India, Kane
 
finds that the ICICI obtained only 15 perceut of its resources from private
 
domestic sources.. The low share of private domestic sources in the supply
 
of funds reflects low levels of income and hence of aggregate saving in
 
the developing countries.. However,. available private domestic capital
 
can often find more attractive alternative investment opportunities than
 
investing in debt or, equity instruments of the development banks. 
The foreign funds which the development banks have obtained include 
lines of credit,extended to the development banks for financing equipment 
impc rts from the capital exporting countries. Such lines of credit have 
,been extended by the U.S.:Exim Bank. Many of the development banks have 
received economic assistance funding through AID or its predecessor agencies
 
including counterpart funds. For some countries,'counterpart funds were.
 
particularly'important,,as ,in Turkey and in India. 
The key element in assessing the role of development banks in promoting
 
private enterprise and economic development is considering the emergence
 
,.ofcapital markets in the developing countries. The long-run success of
 
the development banks in becoming viable financial institutions is tied'to
 
the development of capital markets in developing countries. Development
 
banks finance their customers through both debt and equity securities.
 
When development banks underwrite the public issue of securities by private
 
industrial concerns, they create activity in the capital market. However,
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if the underwriter takes up a large fraction of any new security issue, 
that is a sign of weakness in the ,capital market. -And, if the underwriter 
takes up a small fraction of a new.security issue, that is a reflection , . 
of the fact that other investors and funds are available and these other. 
investors have confidence in the issuing corporation.
 
For much of the 1950s and 1960s, the private capital market evolved 
very slowly in India. Kane points out that between 1957 and 1969 the 
total amount of capital raised in the Indian capital market grew at an 
average annual rate of 2.2 percent. This performance "raises questions
 
about the ability of a capital market to develop adequately especially
 
with respect to private investment in the context of a highly planned
 
economy. . . . The All India Share Price Index declined from 1962 = 100 to 
77.7 in 1967. Military conflict, economic recession, and excessive or 
misdirected planning legislation all had their effect on investor confidence 
in private,industry" (Kane, 1974: 177)0 
Development banks have also used sales of securities from their own 
portfolios to stimulate development of capital markets. This, according 
!to Kane, was particularly important in Turkey and also in India. 
The key conclusion that.may be drawn from the above review is that
 
development banks are'an important institutional innovation whose major
 
objective is to.foster growth of private capital markets and thereby
 
mobilize private capital for economic development. Aid agencies have an
 
important role to play in the development of these term finance institutiong 
because funds from such agencies and from the publicsector act as "seed 
.money to mobilize private sector resources for industrial development" 
(Kane, 1974: 185). 
Vasant Sukhatme
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14,4 Agriculture and Rural Development
 
.1At. the time of India's independence Indian agriculture was in a sorry
 
state. Total foodgrain production had been stagnant, use of modern inputs
 
was at a low level, rural life, including education and health in the rural
 
areas, provided little reason for hope for the vast majority of the popula­
tion. But in a relatively short period of 30 odd years a great deal has
 
been accomplished. The agricultural economy in some regions of the country
 
has been completely transformed. Agriculture continues to dominate the
 
economic scene of the country accounting for over 40 percent of the gross
 
domestic product in 1979/80. Within agriculture, crop production doninates
 
and within crop foodgrains (cereals and pulses) account for 70 percent of
 
total crop production. In 1979/80 foodgrains were planted on 77 percent
 
of the gross cropped area and accounted for 79 percent of the irrigated
 
area. Rice is India's major foodgrain, accounting (in 1980/81) for over
 
40 percent of the total foodgrains produced. The second most important
 
grain is wheat which (in 1980/81) accounted for about 28 percent of total
 
foodgrain production.
 
Between the beginning of planning in India and the late 1970's food­
grain production more than doubled. The rate of growth of total foodgrain
 
production achieved between 1951 and 1977 was 2.8 percent per year, which
 
ranks favorably with the growth rates achieved in the developed world
 
(Sanderson and Roy, 1979: 2). But since population also rose the average
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yearly increase in per capital grain production was only0.6percent. The
 
history of agricultural prod.-ction in India seems to be characterized by
 
certain periods of rapid growth and other periods of relative stagnation.
 
Similarly, there have been-periods of optimismand of despair at the food­
grain production'performance and future prospects in India.,
 
Agriculture in India is in the hands of the private sector in the 
sense that the day-to-day decisions by tens of millions of farm families 
directly impact ,agricultural production. The government-has, of course, 
devoted substantial resources to agriculture as have international donor 
agencias. The ultimate impact of such resources has been to alter the 
institutiona! and technological environment, as well as the economic, 
within which Indian farmers operate. However, it needs to be emphasized 
that neither governent of India nor aid givers',agricultural development 
strategy, at least in the early years of India's economic:development, was 
characterized by a systematic, long term view of the necessary and sufficient 
conditions to effect agricultural modernization. This is partly attribut­
able to the inadequate understanding, from the perspective ,of today, of 
the ecr'nomic ,modernization process.. Even so, U.S.,I other bilateral, and 
multilateral assistance to India's agriculture sector made fundamental 
contributions to the growth of ,that sector.
 
John Me llor has argued that aid donors to India (and, presuimably, 
elsewhere in the developing world) neglected agriculture because they 
preferred proj ects with n'large foreign exchange component. There were many 
such proj ects in industry and infrastructure but few in agriculture. 
Because of "basic -sympathy" with the Indian's own planne.. approach to 
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industrialization, actions by aid donors on loans and grants tied to specific 
projects reinforced the growth strategy of India's development efforts 
(Mellor, 1976: 225). In hindsight, Mellor argues that the capital int nsive 
growth strategy pursued by India was bound-to produce lo,. rates of return 
on inqestment in the short run. The massive investments in the rural infra­
structure of-irrigation, power, and communication would not, and indeed,
 
could not, have yielded high returns until the complementary investments 
in education and research had been undertaken. 
Among.economic policy makers and also within the development economics
 
profession the complementarity nature of physical inputs and-human capital 
inputs with new inputs embodying new.scientific discoveries had not been
 
clearly and widely appreciated. There was a presumption that.investments 
in physical infrastructure were not only necessary but sufficient to generate
 
and sustain economic growth. In agriculture, the payoff to investments in
 
water, roads, and other infrastructure,, and even the payoff to farm decision
 
makers of getting price signals "right" was bound to be low until farmers
 
had access to new science-based seed varieties that could make the most
 
effective use of the fertilizers and the water. The locational specificity
 
of bio-chemical (and, also mechanical) technology in agriculture, determined
 
principally by climate and enviornmental conditions, had not been understood
 
by many economists and policy makers. The recognition of this locational 
specificity of technology implied that little success would be: achieved.in, 
borrowing technology from abroad or even from other areas in a country lying 
in different geo-climatic zones. 
These are important lessons to be drawn from the present survey of
 
assessments of the impact of development assistance to India's agriculture.
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Indian agriculture performance, policies, and prospects'have been extensively 
and intensively studied by many scholars. -For our purposes only a small. 
sample of these studies have been reviewed., Indian agriculture is massive 
and complex and development assistance from a long list of, donors has been 
large on an absolute basis. 
Just as in the industrial sector, the agricultural sector in India
 
received aid from a wide variety of sources. However, unlike industry, in,
 
agriculture there was greater specialization in the aid effort. While the
 
d'
U.S. an ,:to some extent, Canada provided assistance to a large number of 
agricultural programs and projects while-also financing food and fertilizer 
imports, development assistance from other countries was concentrated in
 
narrow areas within agriculture. Development assistance from Australia, 
New Zealand, Denmark, Switzerland, the Netherlands, and Hungary was largely 
in the field of animal husbandry, including dairy development and processing 
of animal products. •Development assistance from Norway, Sweden, and 
Finland was largely confined to forestry and fisheries. West Germany made 
significant contribution to area development programs, Japan to agricultural 
extension, and the Soviet Union to mechanized farms. India also received 
sizeable assistance from non-official sources such as the Ford and Rockefeller
 
Foundations.(Governent of Agriculture, National Commission on Agriculture,: 
1976: 666-67). 
The government of India has, of course, devoted substantial resources 
to agriculture. In absolute terms, investment funds'allocated to agriculture 
increased over fourteen-fold from the First to the Fifth,Plan (Sanderson and 
Roy, 1979: 13).. The allocation of government resources has fluctuated 
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betweenI the. variousplan periods but the share allocated, to agriculture and 
rural development never.fell significantly below: 25 percent. The accompany­
ing table (Table 14.6) from Sanderson and Roy provides details on public 
sector expenditures on agriculture in India by five year plan periods.-
Several observers have noted that since the public sector outlays on 
agriculture as a percentage of -total plan outlays fell to 23 percent in 
the Second Plan from 37 percent in the First ,Plan,.this was one measure of 
the neglect of agriculture'in the Second Plan relative to*the First Plan. 
However, if it is borne.,inmind-that some of the plan outlays on agriculture, 
in the First Plan were for completion of irrigation projects begun even before 
the First Plan, .then'the 37 percent figure'for the First Plan is an aberra­
tion and a correCtion for that aberration reveals 'that Second' Plan outlays 
as a percent of total plan outlays,were,not much below that for the First 
Plan. 
Table 14.7 summarizes the targets for agricultural production that 
were set for each of the plan periods and the achievements. During the 1950,s 
foodgrain production grew largely as a result of increases in acreage, both­
in the total-area under grains and the rate of double croppirg. During the 
1960' s and 1970's the expansion in acreage was an insignificant source of 
increased'output, the growth in output was achieved by yield increases. 
Since 1960 irri "ited land.has grown in relative and absolute importance. 
Between 1950 and 1975 the total net irrigated area increased by 65 percent, 
from'20.9 million hectares to 34.5 million hectares. 'Over two-fifths of 
that expansion, is attributable to major public (canal) irrigation systems 
(Sanderson.and Roy, 1979: 113). Also, fertilizer consumption has increased
 
Table 14.6. Public Sector Outlays on Agriculture (Billion rupees)
 
First Plan, Second Plan, Third Plan, Fourth Plan, Fifth Plan, Sixth Plan, 
1950-51 to 1956-57 to 1961-62 to 1969-70 to 1974-75 to 1978-79 to 
1955-56 1960-61 1965-66 1973-74 1977-78C 1982-83 
Sof % of - of %of -of % ofT 
Type of Outlay Amount total Amount total Amount total Amount total Amount total Amount total 
Agricultured 2.17 10.8 2.76 6.0 7.25 8.4 19.66 12.4 45.91 11.7 97.00 14.0 
Major irrigatione 21.5 4.20 9.1 6.65 7.7 13.54 8.6 34.34 8.7 79.25 11.4
4 . 3 2 f 
Fertilizer and 
pesticides 0.09 0.4 0.37 0.8 2.25 2.6 4.93 3.1 15.55 3.9 16.88 2.4 
Rural electrificationg 0.08 0.4 0.75 1.6 1.53 1.8 7.23 4.6 8.00h 2.0 14.50 2.1 
Community 
development' 0.82 4.1 2.53 5.5 3.64 4.2 3.55 2.2 5.03 1.3 6.25 0.9 
Total agricultural 
outlays 7.48 37.2 10.61 23.1 21.32 24.9 48.91 31.0 108.83 27.7 213.88 30.8 
Total plan outlays 20.13 1oo.o 46.o0 1oo.o 85.76 ioo.o 157.79 100.0 393.22 i0o.0 693.80 100.0
 
Sources: Government, of India, Planning Commission, Selected Plan Statistics (New Delhi, 1959); GOI,
 
Planning Commission, Review of the First Five Year Plan (Delhi: Manager of Publications, 1957); GOI,
 
":

Planning Commission, Second Five Year Plan, 6 vols. (Delhi: Government of India Press, 1957); GOI, Plan-

ning Commission, Third Five Year Plan (Delhi: Manager of Publications, 1961); GOI, Planning Commission,
 
The Fourth Plan: Mid-Term Appraisal (New Delhi, 1971); GOI, Ministry of Agriculture and Irrigation,
 
Directorate of Economics and Statistics, Indian Agriculture in Brief, 13th ed. (Delhi: Controller of
 
Publications, 1974), and 16th ed. (Delhi: Controller of Publications, 1978) [hereinafter, Indian Agricul
 
ture in Brief]: GOI, Planning Commission, Draft Five Year Plan, 1978-83 (Delhi: Controller of Publica­
tions, 1978).
 
a. First through Fifth Plans, expenditures; Sixth Plan, planned outlays.
 
b. See footnote 5 to this chapter.
 
c. The Fifth Plan was terminated one year early; figures are for four years. 
d. Includes minor irrigation.
 
e. Includes flood control. 
f. Includes power. 
g. Excludes institutional finance.
 
h. Estimated.
 
i. Includes cooperation.
 
Source: Sanderson, Fred and Shyamal Roy. (1979). Food' Trends and-Prospects in India. The -Brookings
 
Institution, Washington, D.C. Page 14._
 
Table 14.7. Targets and Achievements of Agricultural Production, 1950 to 1982
 
First Plan, Second Plan, Third Plan, Fourth Plan, Fifth Plan, Sixth Plan,
 
1950-51 to 1956-57 to 1961-62 to 1969-70 to 1974-75 to 1978-79 to
 
Item 1955-56 1960-61 1965-66 1973-74 1977-78a 1982-83
 
Food grain production
 
(millions of metric tons)
 
Base year (trend)b 57.2 65.6 75.1 96.1 107.1 119.5' 
Target :62.6 81.8 101.6 129.0 125.0 140.5-144.5 
Achievement 
Actual 66.9 82.072.3 104.7 125.6 n.a.
 
Trendb 65.6 75. 86.i 107. n.a.
-119. 

Additional irrigation,
 
(millions of gross hec-tares)
 
Total
 
Target 6.85 859.66 .7.o. 1197 0.80 

Achievement 5.13- 5.74 7.31 9.78 8.10 n.a.
 
Major and medium: 
Target 3.50 4.90 4.50 4.77 5.80 8.00:'
 
Achievement 1.30 2.10. 2.10 2.55 4 n. a.,
 
Minor - - I-
Target 3.35 3.64 5.16 . 7.20 5.00 9.00 
Achievement .3.83 -3.64 5.21 7.23 - 3.80 n.a. 
Fertilizer Consumption (ml-. 
lions of metric tons of NPK) 
Target n. a. o.66d ,1 .43d 750 4.80 -7.85 
Achievement 0.14 0 .2 8 d 0 7 1 d 2.84 .9n..a. 
Nitrogen consumption,, 
(millions of metric t onsi)
 
Target 0.12 0.51 1.02 3'. .40 5.25
 
Achievement 0.11 0.21 0.58 Y.ig8r3 2.89 ne,
 
Sources: First through Fourth Plan figures and Fifth Plan targets, Indian Agriculture in Brief, pp. 204­
05, 211-13; Fifth Plan achievements and Sixth Plan targets, Government of India, Planning Commission,-Draft 
of Five Year Plan, 1978-73, pp. 25, 129-30, 135, 137. 
n.a. Not available, a. Fifth Plan targets are for 1978-79; achievements for the four years (1974o-75to
 
1977-78) the Fifth Plan was in effect. b. Trend production substituted for actual foodgrain production
 
to eliminate the effects of weather fluctuations and other temporary factors. Trends are exponential.
 
c. NPK is total fertilizer consumption, by weight of principal nutrients (nitrogen, phosphorus, potassium).
 
d. Does not include potassium.
 
Source: Sanderson, Fred and Shyamal Roy. (1979). Food Trends and Prospects in India. The Brookings
 
Institution, Washington, D.C.
 
dramatically, especially since 1960. Between 1960 and 1975 fertilizer 
consumption, measured in terms of kilograms per hectare for all cereals,
 
grew at an average annual rate of over 16,percent (Sanderson and Roy, 1979:
 
132)*. 
The allocation of funds to agriculture has been'determined by the 
agricuitural and rural development strategy that India has pursued. During
 
the First Plan and even before there was substantial investment'in 
Irrigation to increase the productive capacity of the land, but the principal 
emphasis was on altering people's motivations and attitudes towards.change. 
The view implicitly guiding rural development policy was that the Indian 
farmer was a tradition-bound economically unresponsive individual who
 
lacked the motivation and ability to efficiently utilize the resources at 
his disposal. The initial approach to community development was aimed at 
changing the attitudes of the rural people toward the use of production­
increasing technology (Mellor, 1976: 26). The farmer was also seen as being
 
exploited by landowners, money lenders, and traders, and this was sought to 
be eliminated by attempts at land reform, the creation of government-sponsorei 
co-operative credit schemes, and the development of a co-operative marketing 
structure (Mellor,1976: 30-8). 
Of the efforts.at'agrarian reform, the abolition of the 'zamindari'
 
system was the most successful (USAID/India, 1982: 4). The land reforms
 
of the First Plan increased the proportion of land in owner-operated systems
 
from 40 percent to 75 percent and lowered the proportion of land worked
 
under "undesirable" forms of tenancy from 50 to 12 percent (USAID/India, 
1982: 4). Further attempts at agrarian reform were only partially successful 
as were attempts to reduce exploitation of peasants by money lenders. 
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However, by the end 'f the First Plan there were 200 000,'agricultural
 
co-operatives, 80 percent of which were credit societies and total membership
 
numbered 13 million (Mellor,1976: 34-5).
 
.The first'great and by far the most ambitious effort to tackle the
 
tremendous task of raising th6 income, productiv~ity and quality of life of 
the-rural population was the Community Development Program. It was begun 
in October 1952. The program was,a multi-purpose, broad front attack on 
every aspect of village life, including agriculture, physical infrastructure 
such, as roads and wells,,education, health, cottage Industry, the co-operative 
movement, the role and.status of women, the emancipation of the."untouch­
able!' class, and land reform. The.U.S. government and the Ford Foundation 
provided more than $100 million for the Community Development'Program 
between 1951-52 and 1960-61 (Brown,,1971: 5). 
-In the Community,Development Program the country was divided into 
"Development Blocks", each consisting of roughly 100 villages with a total 
population of around.100,000. Two new cadres of Community Development 
workers were created - the Block Development Officers and the Village Level 
Workers. Government capital was used to finance and train the new staff 
and also finance the provision of direct production inputs for agriculture, 
including :seeds, pesticides, machinery, credit, andmarketing and storage 
facilities. Foreign technicians were involved in the training of.the new 
staff. In a relatively short period of time over 100 training centers for 
Village Level Workers were set up. However, in.most cases these training 
centers were located some distance away from the .existing 'agricultural 
colleges and-research stations and only about 15 percent of the training time 
was.devoted to technical agriculture (Brown, 1971: 5). 
Several observers of the Community Development Program came to the 
conclusion fairly early on in the program that a rapid increase in agricul­
tural production would not be achieved in,a program that relied on the use 
of available agriculturaltechnology. Dorris Brown cites a report by a 
U.S. agricultural technical'study committee for the U.S . Technical''
 
Co-operation Mission in 1953 which questionned the effectiveness of then
 
known yield-increasing technology and which felt that economic incentives
 
(such as crop prices).were inadequate to motivate the average Indian farmer
 
to produce more. The study committee recommended that the Indian government
 
re-allocate some of the Community Development funds away from demonstration­
based extension activity towards agricultural research to discover new
 
agricultural technology.
 
The implications of the report were rejected by the Government of India
 
and by other supporters of the Community Development Program who felt that
 
adequate and effective agricultural technology was available but was not
 
g ud b- In 1955, however, a Joint Indo-American Team on
 
Agricultural Research and Education re-emphasized the need for improved
 
agricultural education .and research and proposed the establishment of agricul­
tural universities in India similar to the U.S. federal-state'land grant
 
universities. This proposal was accepted by the government of India and
 
initiated in five states in India during the Second Plan.
 
By the late 1950's, India's food situation was precarious and food­
grain imports were necessary to supplement domestic supplies. India's
 
foreign,exchange position was also weak and scarce foreign exchange was
 
being allocated to industrial Imports. The tight foodgrain situation,
 
coupled with some misgivings'about the effectiveness of the Community Develop­
ment appoach in raising food:output i-led the government 'to appoint the 
Nalagarh Committee to-study, the situation. The Committee issued its report 
in October 1958. It reiterated the view that the agricultural research " 
program was inadequate. At about the same time the government, through, 
the Ford Foundation, invited an agricultural production team from the 
U.S. to work with Indian agricultural experts in developing a plan for 
agriculture. In,1959 the committee issued its well-known Report on India's 
Food Crisis and Steps to Meet It. This report was accepted by the govern-.: 
ment which then invited a second group of agricultural experts to suggest,' 
' 

a.specific "action program.." The specific 10-point action program came 
to be .known as the' Intensive Agriculture District Program and was formally 
adopted by, the, government in, 1960. 
Before we turn to the IADP it is necessary to review some assessments 
of the Community Development program. It was a massive effort, but in terms 
of resources, outlays on the program were only about one-fifth of the outlays 
for.major irrigation works. The Indian government's 1976 National Commission 
on Agriculture provides an assessment of the Community Development Program 
of the 19501s. It argues that towards the middle of the Second Plan there was 
a realization among the policy makers that the (scarce) resources committed 
to the program were "being spread too thinly over a wide area and no appreci­
able increases in production were being achieved," (Government of India, 
National Commission on Agriculture, 1976: 35). The National Commission goes 
on to add "under the Community Development Program there was considerable 
emphasis on demonstration as the key element in agricultural extension. This 
particular program has generally been described as a failure. The reasons 
usually cited for this include inadequate organization and the inability to 
adopt a package approach to crop production," (Government of India, National 
Commission on Agriculture, 1976: 45).
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While the output and productivity gains coming out of the Community.
 
Development Program were small, the program did go a long way to improve
 
and uplift the village environment. As Gary Hunter points out in his
 
careful study of the administration of agricultural development in India,
 
the Community Development Program established certain administrative
 
structures which exist even today, and the program created an awareness
 
among the rural population that the government, through the personage of
 
the Village Level Worker, was a source of advice and assistance (Hunter,
 
1970: 26).
 
Another observer has pointed out-that the program activities under
 
Community Development were "useful in bringing about a greater cohesive­
ness in the village or community structure,!' but.since scarce financial 
resources were used to deal with many aspects of village life, and only 
limited attention was given to the improvement of agricultural productivity,
 
this short-sighted view tended to postpone the implementation of sound long­
range policies devoted to developing sources of "dependable technological
 
or substantive inputs" for agriculture (Moseman, 1971: 71).
 
In a 1970 review of U.S. agricultural assistance strategy in India, 
Schutjer has noted that while considerable technical "assistance and equipment 
for the Community Development Program was provided by the U.S., the U.S. 
also directed considerable effort to .increased and more effective use of 
fertilizers in India (Schutjer, 1970: 3-4). The'U.S. also provided technical 
assistance for the establishment of soil testing laboratories, for conducting 
crop response trials, and for the establishment of the Fertilizer Association 
of India. Much of the effort on.fertilizers was bound to be unsuccessful 
so long as new crop-varieties more responsive to chemical inputs did not 
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exis t. While. that is evident today, it was not so in.the early years,'of 
developIm ent, assistanc Ie to India. 
Difficulties on the foodgrain situation in the late 1950's led to greater 
attentio Into production performance and the IADP. Schutjier ha's noted that 
the,"concepts underlying the IADP represent a composite of the views of 
Indian Government officials,, AID personnel, and the members of the visiting'' 
(Ford Foundation) team," (p. 6, footnote 13, parentheses added). 
The primary objectives of IADP were to demonstrate how rapid increases 
.in production, could. be' achieved- in certain areas by intensive concentrated , 
efforts, in those areas,. From over 300 of India's districts, 15 districts,. 
one in each state, were selected for the experiment. The criteria for 
the selection of the districts were: assured rainfall and irrigation. 
facilities; well organized and operating village institutions set in place 
by the earlier Comunity Development Program; least vulnierability to natural 
hazards; and a high potential for increasing food production in a relatively 
short period of time. The aim was to concentrate scarce resources (for 
example, fertilizers, pesticides, credit, technical, water, and farm manage­
ment assistance, etc.) in the more responsive, more likely to succeed, 
districts. (The above and the next few paragraphs draws heavily on Dorris, 
Brown.):
 
The IADP was assisted by the Ford Foundation, USAID, and the Japanese 
Government. The Government of India and the state governments provided more 
than $30 million for the first five years of the program (Brown 1971: 14). Evenson 
and Kislev, however, on the basis of state budget data conclude that until 
1975 a total of aboutO$100,million had been spent. They add "It (the program) 
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cost roughly one half as much'Ias the research activities in' India devoted to
 
improved crop production for the entire country during the 1960's," (Evenson
 
and Kislev, 1975: 106).
 
Several assessments of IADP have been made-bythe Government of'India, 
and by research workers in India, the U.S., and elsewhere. The assessments, 
by the Government of India have mainly to do withphysical and administrative 
targets reached such as number of cooperative societies formed, amount of 
credit disbursed, and quantity of fertilizer used. Most of.the assessments 
by Indian research workers have tended to examine output andyield changes 
in IADP districts' compared 'to 6ther districts. For our pui-pose we will 
briefly examine. assessments by Lipton (1968) and by Brown before turning to 
the one by Evenson. and Kislev. 
Michael Lipton's assessment of IADP is qualitative and somewhat polemical. 
It predates Dorris Brown and Evenson and Kislev, who don't refer to!Lipton " 
even though Lipton's contribution appeared in an important volume entitied
 
'The Crisis of Indian Planning. Lipton questions the rationale behind IADP,
 
and asserts that the program is (was) in-egalitarian because it reduced
 
risk only for farmers already.enjoying assured water supply. He labels the 
selection of IADP areas as unsatisfactory because insufficient attention 
had been given to determine where the expected rate of return on the package
 
of practices was the highest. 
covered the period'of the first five years of IADP.D.Brown'sstudy 
In a preface tohis studyi S. R. Sen calls Brown's study an "independent 
evaluation of the IADP." Curiously, Sen adds that Brown was actively involved
 
in the implementation of the program as a.,consultant for seven years. While 
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this *close association with IADP may not have affected Brown's objectivity
 
in evaluating the program, the methodology employed by Brown was subsequently
 
adopted by many Indian research workers in the field. The Government of
 
India in its own evaluation of IADP also used the same methodological
 
approach.
 
Brown computed compound annual rates of growth of area, output, and 
yield of all,crops for the ten.year period 1956-57, to 1965-66 in :each district 
in the country. Then' he divided the rates of growth in the districts during 
1961-62'to 1965-66 by the growth rates achieved during the previous five. 
years 'and termed those "indices of change.", His methodological approach 
is stated as.follows: "If IADP has had a major Impact on foodgrain crop 
output and productivity, then the ten-year growth rates and indices of 
change calculated for IADP districts should be significantly higher than zero 
and significantly different and above-the same items-calculated for bordering 
districts and other districts in the same state,! (Brown, 1971: 29). 
This calculation showed that only 3 of the 15 IADP districts reported,, 
significantly higher rates of change of output and yield for foodgrains during 
theIADP years when compared with the previous'five years. Only two IAfP 
districts reported significantly higher changes in foodgrain output than 
did bordering areas,. The farmers in IADP districts did. somewhat better with 
increasedoutput of cash crops. However, there was no significan't difference 
between the IADP districts and other districts in the increased use of inputs. 
These results led Brown to conclude that "during the Third Plan, growth in 
output and yield per acre of foodgrain crops in IADP districts as a group 
was not significantly different from that in the previous. five years in the 
same district," (Brown, 1971: 92). 
Nevertheless, Brown attributed importantlconclusLons to the £AU, experi­
' 
ment. It helped demonstrate that most Indian farmers operate with economic 
rationality. The IADP experience guided the development of and the diffusiun 
of the then-new "Green Revolution" technology. Data from IADP crop field 
tests and other special studies helped government policy makers evaluate . 
alternativeprice policies and influenced policies regarding the efficient 
use of water in crop production and the development of irrigation resources. 
The evaluation,by Evenson and Kislev (1975) is by far: the most analytical 
evaluationof IADP. They.argue that the methodology employed by Brown was 
inappropriate lAnd, using an altogether different procedure, ~conclude that 
"the program induced a very significant increase in the use of modern 
factore of production and hence of agricultural production," (Evenson and 
Kislev, 1975: 107).; 
Evenson and Kislev argue that the-rate of measured total factor produc­
tiiygrowth is determined by the application~by producers (that is, farmers') 
of new economically relevant technology and by the reduction in technical 
choice e-rrors., The new technology can originate-.from three sources: (1) from
 
agricultural research specifically directed to producing technology suited 
,to the economic and environmental conditions in the district; (2) from agricul­
.turalresearch directed to producing technology suited to economic and 
environmental conditions different, from those of thel district, but superior 
.to existing technology in that district; and (3) from discovery activity by 
farmers themselves-when they modify and adapt new technology to farm-specific 
conditions. The improvements leading to reduction in economic and technical 
choice errot can arise" from two .sources: (1) farmers may. utilize available: 
resources in a more cost-minimizing manner, and (2) there may be improvements 
in.factorrsupply efficiency, including supply of credit. 
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Intheir view-the test of, the contribution of the IADP program has 
to be made in terms of associating increased total factor productivity wltn 
IADP activities, holding constant the contribution of agricultural research 
and other technology discovery activity and environmental factors,. and 
controlling for the initial level of economic slack. The evaluation by D. 
Brown and by the Government of India did not take into account the level 
of economic slack existing at the beginning of,the program in 1961 in the 
IADP and non-IADP.areas. The selection of the IADP districts in terms of 
the ,:riteria of ,relatively well-endowed water resouices andwell-functioning 
village institutions probably implied that the selected districts- had less 
economic slack than the other districts.: 
Evenson and Kislev set up an econometric estimating equation where the
 
dependent variable is district: total factor productivity. The explanatory
 
variables include expenditures on agricultural research in the state in
 
which the district is located; expenditures on agricultural research outside
 
the state but within the same geo-climate region; the rate of change of tota) 
factor productivity in the district in the five years prior to IADP, which 
is used as a proxy measure for the level of economic slack existing at the 
start of the program. They also include an "interaction" term to take into
 
account the fact that there frequently is technological borrowing both withir
 
andacross different geo-climatic regions.
 
The econometric estimation is made with data for 140 districts for the
 
period 1960-71, including 7 IADP districts. Qualitatively, the state and
 
regional research variables were found to be significant contributors to
 
the statistical explanation of both productivit-y change and foodgrain yields.
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The IADP effect was picked up by the. coefficient of.the dumny variable for
 
the IADP districts which had been introduced in the estimating equations, and
 
was positive. Also, the coefficient of the pre-IADP productivity index was
 
significantly negative which implied that-the higher the early period' 
productivity gains, the lower the economic slack at the beginning.of the 
IADP program, and therefore, the lower the potential for total factor 
productivity gains iin future:periods. They also examine the interactioh 
between the IADP.dummy variable and the agricultural research .variables, 
and conclude that the IADP program complemented the research inducements 
to increased yields, but substituted for research in terms of the contribu­
tion to total factor productivity . 
In summary, Evenson and Kislev conclude that the IAD? program induced 
significant increases in the use of modern inputs,.especially fertilizer. 
But when these increased inputs are "netted out" ir,the total factor 
productivity computations, thu contribution -of the:IADP program becomes. 
modest. And, because districts with relatively low economic slack were 
chosen, there was a relatively small impact. The key element was that there 
wasno new technology discovery under IADPalthough there was borrowing of 
technology across districts. In terms of economic payoff to IADF, Evenson 
and Kislev argue that "the 1ADP program probably had a payoff of approximatel 
the same order of magnitude as other. development efforts, with the glaring 
exception of investment in research," (p. 119). 
The crucial lesson that can be drawn from the iADP experience is that, 
while the use of modern inputs.(especially fertilizer) expanded, the payoff 
in terms. of increased output was small. The reason for that was that since, 
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no new ,biological sources of permanent.income were being produced'(the Indian 
agricultural research system was in its infancy), the marginal productivity 
of modern inputs was bound to',be small. The increased use of fertilizer 
and other modern inputs was not to yield large increases in output until 
new seed varieties capable of more effectively utilizing new chemical nutrients 
became available. The new biological technology could not.be brought in 
from abroad because of the location specificity of such .echnology. The 
ability to borrow such technology and effectively adapt it for use in India 
was constrained by a.relatively undeveloped,agricultural science, capacity in 
India. Further, within a country also.there are significant differences in, 
soils, weather,.and environmental conditions and these limit the possibilities 
for borrowing plant material: across different geo-climate zones within a 
country.. 
Simultaneously with the IADP program to which AID, Ford'Foundation,
 
and other agencies made significant contributions, there-was underway in
 
.India an important institution-building program which was to .lay the founda­
tion for a science-based 'agriculture in India. This institution building
 
to' serve agriculture received substantial assistance from the U.S. AID
 
and from the Ford-and Rockefeller Foundations. The physical facilities
 
for agricultural-research'and the scientific capacity to produce a steady
 
stream of.*scientific knowledge and methods applicable to Indian conditions
 
are an important prerequisite for sustaining agriculture in India.
 
'
 As John Mellor and others have pointed out, althoughIndia had a long
 
history of agricultural research, there was little cooperation, coordination,
 
or even senseof purpose within the agricultural research system.-' In a
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"very striking effort spanning more than a',decade," the Rockefeller Founda­
tion, the Ford Foundation, the U.S. government, and other agencies provided
 
scientists and technicians, financed the foreign training of Indian
 
scientific personnel, and provided the basis for a growing and rigorous 
research establishment. Mellor characterizes.the early American effort to 
introduce a system of agricultural universities patterned after American 
land grant universities as a "heavy-handed approach to- technical aid" which, 
fortunately, succeeded only when 'itwas properly adapted to Indian conditions 
by Indian administrators (Mellor, 1976: 225-29).
 
The Indian agricultural research system in its present organizational 
form isof recent vintage which only underscores its- rapid progress. M. S.' 
Randhawa, in his highly readable history of the Indian Council of Agricultural 
Research, published on the occasion of the fiftieth anniversary of the ICAR,
 
notes and mentions individuals who played a key role in the effectiveness of 
aid assistance efforts in India (Randhawa, 1979). He'singles out the 
cor.tributions of Dr. Frank W. Parker ("a real friend of India, with a 
passionate concern for its people and their agriculture"), who was the chief 
agricultural advisor in the.U.S. Technical Co-operation Mission in india 
between 1953 and 1959, in influencing the Rockefeller Foundation's involvement 
in agricultural development schemes in India. Moseman (1971) also points out. 
tha-rtParker's work in India was instrumental in changing decisions,,on kinds 
an i in India and created aq aitities of fertilizers needed base for improving 
fertilizer resources in India (Moseman, 1971: 73)., 
In recent years most observers of the Indian agricultural research 
sys'tr.m :characterize it,as ..one of high caliber relative to ,that of most other
 
developing countries and even compared to thaf of some develoPed countries.
 
For instance, Ruttan says that the system in India "is clearly one of the
 
half-dozen most significant 	national-agricultural research systems in the 
employed and level of scientific activity," • terms resourcesworld in of 
(RuttanV,1982: 95). ,The Indian Council.of Agricultural Research is the 
national apex agency which coordinates 'and guides agricultural research 
and education in the country. There are 32 central research institutes 
and 7 soil conservation research and training centers under its jurisdiction. 
There are now 21 agricultural universities, 73 agricultural colleges 
(including those at the agricultural university campuses) and 21 veterinary 
colleges. Six U.S. universities under USAID-financed contracts in, the 
1960's assisted in developing the teaching, research and extension programs 
in Indian agricultural universities. The first agricultural university 
started functioning in Uttar Pradesh state in;1960. 
In a very general sense, scientific personnel and capital and current 
expenditures arethe.inputs which go into the agricultural research system. 
The output that comes out of this system is the new knowledge that is created. 
This new knowledge,,whether it is embodied in new but conventionally defined 
production inputs or whether it serves ,to alter existing input combinations, 
must be treated,as a production input which affects the productivity of 
agriculture. The new knowledge is an intangible and cannot be measured 
directly. While a proxy measure of the new knowledge has been used-by many 
authors,.the key point is that the new knowledge is capable of sustaining a 
higher rate of agricultural growth. Randhawa argues that the "outstanding 
achievement (of the agricultural research establishment) is attainment of
 
self-sufficiency in food by the country," (Randhawa, 1979: 1ii; parent:hesis
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added)-. Most of the increase in the production of cereals has occurred after 
1965 and'is, of course, due principally to the introduction of the high­
yielding varieties of wheat, rice, and maize and their adaption to local 
Indian environmental conditions. Indian agricultural scientists "were not 
the mere recipients of.this (plant) mate'rial but they improved it significantly, 
(Randl ,wa, 1979: preface, vi). 
The investments in agricultural research in India have yielded very 
high returns in terms of agricultural productivity.. -As Ruttan has shown above 
in Chapter 10, the results of a large :number of studies of the contribution 
of agricultural research to productivity growth from both high and low income 
countriesindicate high-rates of return to investment in agricultural research.
 
The studies on India also indicate high rates of return to investment in
 
iha,
agricultural research (Evenson and Kislev, 1975; Evenson and 1974; Karam 
Singh", 1974; and Kahlon, et al, 1977). The results of these studies are cited
 
in Chapter 10.
 
Evenson and Kislev, Randhawa, and others have also argued that one 
measure of the maturity of institutions to sustain agricultural development 
is the quality and quantity of te.. scientific output of the scientists in 
the research system. A proxy measure of scientific.output is the number of 
books, monographs,, and journal articles being produced by the scientists.
 
Randhawa provides a list of all such publications since 1929. -UntiJ 1940 only
 
12 books or monographs had been published; between 1941 and 1950, 4 published; 
between 1951 and 1960, 38 publications; between 1961 and 1970, 76 publica­
tions; and between 1971 and 1978, 59 'publications. Randhawa also points out 
that the publications program. for journals has also expanded rapidly. The 
ICAR.now publishes monthly well known journals such as the Indian Journal of
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Agricultural Sciences, the Indian Journal of Animal Sciences, Indian Farming, 
Indian Horticulture, and a Hindi language magazine called Kheti. Evenson 
and Kislev show that between 1948 and 1968 the number of publications by 
research workers in India (some of whom may have been non-Indian) grew rapidly. 
There was a shift over time away. from commercial crops such as sugarcane 
and cotton toward foodgrains. 
The present position of agricultural research in India provides the 
foundation for a relatively promising outlook for,Indian agriculture. Foreign 
.
assistance playedi a crucial role in the development of the research system
 
which must be one.: of the' greatest successes of aid effort by the U.S.
 
FoodAid. Impact Studies 
U.S. bilateral and multilateral aid to India for purposes of agricultural 
and industrial development was large in absolute amounts and largely uncon­
troversial. However, food aid to India was, to say the least, the subject, 
-of 	a great amount of inquiry and debate. 'U.S. aid to. India -in the form of 
agricultural commodities supplied under PL 480 constituted an important 
proportion of total bilateral and multilateral aid to'India. 
Except during 1951-52 India did not import any significant amounts of food 
during her First Plan period. Foodgrain prices were stable during that period. 
But from the beginning of the Second Plan (1956-57 to 1960-61) India's food 
,imports began to increase. The lagging, agricultural pruduction and a growing 
foreign exchange crisis compelled the Government of India to enter into"an 
agreement with the U.S. for the import of foodgrains. Since ,that first 'agree­
ment several other agreements and supplementaries were signed between the two 
countries. The agricultural commodities that were shipped to India wee wheat,
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rice, maize, milo, cotton, dairy products, tobacco, and soybean oil. Wheat 
shipments dominated the program. Between the first Title I agreement in 
1956 'and 1978 a total of $4.6 billion worth of agricultural commodities 
were programmed for India (U.. Embassy in India, 1979: 42-3). 
Tte nature and magnitude of. these shipments, especially in the mid-1960' s, 
and their impact on the development of the agricultural sector, and on overall 
economic development of India has been the subject of numerous studies. The 
primary focus of-studies on the impact of this aid has been on the disincen­
tive effects of food aid': do increased imports of foodgrains result in a 
misdirection of investment by reducing the incentive to invest to raise. 
domestic production. The other focus of tht.se studies addresses the question: 
does control over the uses of local currency proceeds of PL 480 sales provide 
a means of influencing development policies of recipients by the U.S.?
 
As Isenman and Singer point out, in the discussion of the above issues
 
the direct purposes of food aid have often been overlooked (Isenman and Singer,
 
1977: 206). Food aid provides food for the hungry, especially target groups
 
like children., It provides financing for specific government development
 
projects, both in the rural and other sectors. Food aid can be used to build
 
up food stocks which can then be used to moderate price increases. Food aid 
can be used to permit recipient cotntries to expand employment as in'"food­
for-work" programs. 
Empirical studies of the effects of PL 480 programs have been made-for
 
several countries, .including individual country studies of India,,Egypt, Colombia, 
and Turkey. For India the best known studies are those by Rath and Patwardhan 
(1967), a Ph.D. thesisby Seevers at Michigan State (1968), and 'study by 
Srivastava, Heady, Rogers, and Mayer (1975). The last one above is-the most 
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recent monograph-length study on"the effects of food aid programs on develop­
ment, producer and consumer welfare, agricultural progress, and fiscal structure
 
in recipient countries" with special reference to India. There have also been
 
numerous Journal articles dealing with the impact of PL 480 on India, the most
 
recent' of which is the one by Isenman and -Singer (1977). 
The first to express some concern about the possible negative effects of
 
agricultural commodity aid on the recipient countries was T. W. Schultz (1960).
 
Others disagreed with him by either denying that there was any production
 
responsiveness to changes in price or that, even if there was such responsive­
ness, it would be small (Rogers, et al, 1972). 
Mann (1967) developed an econometric model to measure the price and pro­
duction effects of PL 480 imports on the Indian economy. His model consisted 
'
 of a supply,equation, a demand equation, an income-generation equation, a 
commercial import'equation, a withdrawal-from-stocks equation, and a market 
clearing identity. He estimated that an increase in per capita imports of 
cereals under PL 480 of one pound resulted in a 0.-54 percent drop in wholesale 
cereal prices in the same year and a decline in output
-
in the second year of 
about 0.5 pounds of :cereals per capita. Output tended to rise in later years 
so that the depressing impact on output was-reduced to about 0,,3 pounds per 
capita in the long run.. Mann measured only the direct impact of PL 480 
imports; the indirect impact via the effect of readily available food"on 
planners' attitude to agriculture was not estimated. 
Shortly after Mann's study, Streeten and Hill examined the PL 480 issue 
(1968). They did not attempt" to estimate an econometric model but relied on 
a "commonsense" approach.< They argued that the growing size of U.S. food ship­
ments was entirely contrary ,to U.S.. aid philosophy since it undermined Indian
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self-reliance and "India's determination to tackle its agricultural problem 
seriously" (Streeten and Hill, 1968: 342). Though weather played a role in.the 
weak performance of agriculture, at least in 1967 India had not hit upon a 
combination of policies to ensure a high and sustained rate of growth in 
agriculture. They also argue that during India's Third Plan funds arising 
from PL 480 aid financed over 10 percent of public developmental outlays.
 
Since the Indian government was aware of the dangers in excessive deficit 
financing and high taxes, the government had an interest in large PL 480 
7rai imports and sales to raise funds to finance its plans (Streeten and Hill , 
1968.: 343). 
On the question whether U.S. commodity aid may have had a direct impact 
on agricultural production via its effect on farmer incentives, Streeten.and 
Hill argued that the evidence linking PL 480 imports and lower levels of 
cereal production is "strong but circumstantial." Writing in 1968,.they came 
to the conclusion that sizeable food aid to India would continue, but that 
food aid should be used to stockpile cereals. 
The second major econometric study of the impact of PL 480 on agricultural
 
prices in India is the one by Srivastava, et al (1975). This study covered,
 
essentially the .same ground as the Mann study referred to above and the study
 
by Rogers,- Srivastava, and Heady (1972). Srivastava, et al, built amulti­
equation econometric model similar to.that of-Mann, except that they include
 
an additional equation .to separate cereal purchases on the,,open market from
 
those in the government-run concessional market at subsidized prices. Their
 
conclusions are stated as follows: "Each kilogram of PL 480 cereals is
 
estimated to have depressed production of cereals by 0.027841,kg., so for each
 
450,480 metric,tons.of imports, production was depressed by 12,600 tons over a
 
14-year period, with the major: impact coming as a result of the first and.
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second round of price changes. Comparing our estimates.of multipliers with 
Mann's, the cumulative impact of distribution through a differentiated market 
is about one-tenth the impact with a non-differentiated market" (Srivastava, et al, 
1975: 50)..The policy implicationcof this is that the negative impact of PL 480 im­
ports on domestic prices and supply can be significantly reduced if the commodities 
are distributedin the recipient economy in a way that creates new demand 
rather than substituting for existing demand. The government-run "fair price
 
shops" provided for increased consumption amounting to 93 percent of the
 
amount impo ted. Since imports -were distributed through the government shops 
at prices lower than open market prices, Srivastava, et al, argues that
 
consumer welfare was increased due to the increased consumption. Further, the 
distribution of PL 480 grain "has depressed domestic prices in the open market 
by only 0.02 percent" (Srivastava, et al, 1975: 51)., 
One further interesting finding of the authors may be noted because it is 
important to appreciate the inter-regionalvariability in the availability of 
food. Beginning in the late 1950's and continuing since then,.the country was 
divided into food zones and movement .of grain across zones was restricted. 
The idea behind this institutional arrangement was to enable the government. to 
"procure" excess foodgrains from surplus zones and distribute them in the deficit 
zones through the fair price shops. But since government procurements fell 
far short.of the distribution requirements, PL 480 cereals were used to change 
the distribution of cereals between the states. Srivastava, et al, finds that 
."the release of PL 480 food aid through the fair price shops has improved the 
interregional distribution of cereals in India" (Srivastava, et al, 1975: 54). 
Isenman and Singer,(1977),eschew an econometric model formulation in 
favor of a commonsense view on the impact of food aid. Between 1957 and 1971 
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large quantities of food aid (mainly in the form'of wIeat) were provided to 
India., Isenman and Singer find that in only 3 years of the food aid period, 
1960/61 to 1962/63, did the relative price of food fall below that in the 
reference or benchmark years of 1955/56 to 1957/58. In analyzing the impact
 
of these changes.in prices on yields, they conclude "there is surprisingly
 
little evidence of any systematic detrimental'effect on yields" of the reduc­
tion in the relative price of foodgrains (Isenam and Singer, 1977.: 234). 
Quite apart from these impacts on -prices and yields, food aid played an 
important role in providing resources to the government. Isenman and Singer 
argue that food aid provided resources equal to 10 percent or more of gross 
investment in the Indian economy in the first half of the 1960's. Earlier, 
Streeten and Hill had argued that "during the Third Plan funds arising from PL 
480 aid financed over 10 percent of public developmental outlay. PL 480 aid 
accounted for-56 percent of the external assistance to public outlay. Because
 
of the dangers of too much deficit financing and of the unpopularity of higher 
taxes, the Indian government has had an interest in-making PL 480 imports 
and'sales as large as possible to raise, funds to finance its plans" (Streeten 
and 'Hill, 1968: 343).- At a time when the government's investment effort 
was increasing rapidly and non-agricultural output'was increasing, the avail­
ability of food aid was a restraining force on wage growth and offset the risk 
that the investment program would worsen the food situation in the inevitable 
years of low rainfall (Isenman and Singer, 1977: 235-36). 
The gist of the above arguments is that the basic developmental strategy 
of the Indian government in the Second and Third Plans, with its emphasis on 
import-substituting industrialization, particularly heavy industry, was supported 
by the.food aid which India received. Such food aid enabled the government 
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"to maintain large subsidized food distribution programs while, in the eyes of 
many analysts, not adequately addressing some basic questions of foodgrain 
production and distribution" (Isenam and Singer, 1977: 213). On the other 
hand, if food aid were not available, the basic developmental strategy of the 
government :would likely not have changed. 
Revised
 
1982/JNovember 15, 
15CHAPTER 
ASSISTANCE.,TO KOREA 
Of the case 'studies undertaken in this survey, South Korea represents
 
'
 the most successful-in terms.of her overall development, and. simultaneously
 
illustrates the extreme difficulty involved in attempting (especially
 
during the aid process itself) to assess the influence of aid'donors on
 
the macroeconomic policies of the aid recipient.
 
Because of the uniqueness of the Korean experienie and the lessons
 
that are involved for the assessment of aid generally, this"case study
 
focusel.heavily on the aid experience during.the years,1953 to 1965. These
 
•were 	he years during which aid was an extremely importnt factorin the'
 
South Korean economy and the years during which the South Korean ,economy
 
was transformed from a dependent, relatively slowly-growing economy with
 
numerous distortions into the most 'rapidly growing economy in the entire
 
world. Section 15.1 provides a brief outline of the economy's structure
 
and growth during the years,under review, and also brings the reader quickly
 
up to date as to later developments.: !Section 15.2 covers the aid relationship 
during that period, and the lessons that may be learned about the macro­
economic role of aid in the development process. Section 15.3 covers,the 
relationehip between trade and aid in the Korean economy during the years 
under review. Section 15.4, finally, covers assistance to agricultural
 
and rural development. 
15.1 
15-2.
 
Economic Growth In South Korea-

Korea was a Japanese colony until l45 whenit was ioDerateo Dy une
 
Lllied military forces. The upheaval associated with the end of clonial
 
itatus was economically difficuIL". The rate of inflatio'n prior to the
 
Most businesses
rapanese withdrawal was in excess of 100 percent a month. 

;ere Japanese-owned. Normal trading ties were disrupted.. In the Korean
 
ase, these difficulties were reinforced by partition of the Korean
 
eninsula. SouthKorea was the predominantly agricultural part of the
 
:ountry.-It had relied heavily on the north for supplies ofelectric power
 
mid many manufactured goods.
 
These included
Reconstruction efforts dominated: the 1945-1950 period. 

m distribution of land which left a relatively egalitarian distribution
 
dithin the rural,sector. Major resources were devoted to developing the
 
orean educational system. During'the.Japanese period all education had
 
)een in the Japanese.language. Few Koreans had been educated beyond high
 
3chool level. These two reforms represented an important basis for later
 
growth. The American military government and ECA were instrumental-in
 
accomplishing both the land and the educational reforms.
 
By 1948-49 the South Korean economy wasbeginning to revive, due in
 
large part to the relatively sizable flows of aid under the military
 
government (until 1948) and by the U.S. Economic Cooperation Administratior
 
(ECA) after the founding of the Korean Republic in 1948.
 
By 1949, there was .amajor debate within the American administration
 
and Congress over the future of South Korea and of American assistance to
 
that country. Although assistance was continued,'it was at a substantiall3
 
lower level than had been recommended byECA. While the debate was still
 
unresolved in,the late spring of 1950, North Korean forces invaded South
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Korea andthe Korean:war began. Under United.Nations auspices, the United-

Sqtaas and other military forces joined the South Koreans in 'fighting the 
rorth Koreans. Although-there was massive assistance to South Korea during 
,hewar years (until1953), most of it was devoted to military equipment 
nd tosupplies, including- food, essential- to the war effort. 
At the end of the Korean War in August 1953, the Korean economy was
 
ven more devastated than it had been in 1945. Most of the progress that 
ad been made between 1945 and.1950 had -been undone. In addition, the 
nfrastructure of the economy-roads, ports, schools--had been.severely 
Amaged.
 
The Korean War also. left some other legacies which proved damaging 
o; the Korean economy in' the following years. Among these-were a high rate. 
f inflation. Inflationary pressure was associated with both (a) the strains 
hat had been put upon domestically available goods when the demand for them, 
welled undev pressures.of war and (b)the purchasing power of the foreign 
ilitary forces while supplies dwindled because of the war. Associated 
lith a high rate of inflation (which'was in excess of 50 percent in 1953 
,o1957) was'an elaboratesystem of exchange control and multiple exchange 
ates. 
During the Korean war, the American government had naturally wished
 
o enable their forces serving in South Korea to buy goods and services 
ocally. To dosso, it was necessary to.purchase Korean currency from the 
brean government. Negotiations over the exchange rate at which these 
,urchases.wouldbe made in the context of rapid inflation, combined with 
,heKorean exchange control system which was necessarily partly undermined 
y the emergence of a black,market, resulted very quickly in a multiple 
xchange rate system. By August 1953,.nominal exchange rates varied from 
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18 won per dollar at the official'rate (compared to an official rate of
 
38.7 won per dollar at the "U.S. greenback rate". Because the Korean
 
government wanted to maximize the foreign exchange it would receive in return 
for local currency provided for American and other U.N. troops, it was 
naturally reluctant to devalue the currency. That reluctance, coupled with 
a high rate of inflation, led to a severely overvalued exchange rate, which
 
in turn necessitated quantitative controls over most foreign exchange
 
transactions.
 
The reconstruction period in South Korea after 1953 started with an 
extreme macroeconomic imbalance. The imbalance was partly offset during 
the 1950s'by sizable. inflows of American aid (see Section 15.2). Three 
structural features were particularly important for the dramatic :difference 
in the Korean economy during the 1950s and the 1960s. 
The Korean economy, like that of most developing countries, was pre­
dominantly agricultural in the 1950s. Mason, Kim, et al., estimate that
 
44 percent of GNP originated in agriculture in1953-55, with only 13.6
 
percent in industry.- Even for the 1960-62 period, agriculture accounted
 
for 9.9 percent of GNP and industry (including construction and utilities)
 
only 18.2 percent .of GNP. Hence, while there was some change in the
 
relative importance of primary and secondary industry, .structural transforma­
tion was relatively slow during the 1950s.
 
Second, private consumption accounted for 80 percent of GNP in the
 
1953-55 period, while investment accounted for only 11.2 percent of GNP.,
 
.The average domestic savings rate is estimated to have been only 2.9 percent
 
of GNP. Foreign savings (primarily aid-'-see Section 15.2) accounted for 8.3
 
percent of GNP. This was almost three-quarters of investable resources.
 
Indeedi in1956,. net domestic saving was .negative (See Krueger (1979),
 
Table 52). Moreover, the situation was relatively unchanged by 1960:
 
foreign saving accounted for 78 percent of total savi ng, and gross invest­
ment represented about 10 percent of GNP.
 
Thirdly, due to the importance of foreign aid as a source of investible
 
resources, imports accounted for 10-12 percent of GNP throughout the 1950's,-:­
.
while exports represented between 1.8 and 3.5 percent of GNP, and their share
 
was not growing.
 
This relatively stagnant structure and dependence on aid for financing 
imports was reflected in a variety of ways. First, despite the opportunities­
for rapid growth that a postwar reconstruction period always presents, Korean, 
economic growth during the 1953-60 period was relatively slow (Table 15.1). 
Secondly, foreign exchange difficulties, which arose from the continued'reluc­
tance of the authorities to devalue the currency in the face of rapid infla­
tion and the desire of the government to increase its aid receipts, led'to 
the continuation of the complex system of multiple exchange rates and strin­
gent import licensing. The inefficiencics associated with the foreign exchange 
shortage itself, the multiple exchange rate system, and the'inevitable 
corruption that surrounded its 4administration were certainly responsible for 
the diversion of resources from the. export sector and the consequent failure 
3f resources from the export sector and the consequent failure of export, 
aarnings to grow significantly. 'In turn, the pull-of resources into import­
:ompeting sectors resulting from the sizable margin of domestic over foreign 
)rices was accompanied by pronounced inefficiencies. These phenomena we're, of 
.ourse, a large part of the explanation of. the relatively slow growth ' 
.eferred to above'and documented in Table 15,.1 . 
Statting in the late 1950'si a series of policy reforms was undertaken. 
, first step was a general tightening of macroeconomicpolicies - monetary 
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Table 15.1. 	 Annual Rates of Growth of Real GNP Components 
1954 to i960 
?rimary Industry , Services Exports GNP 
1954 6.7 20.0 2.5 -36.0 .5.5 
1955 2.7 17.1 5.7 -27.9 5.4 
1956 -5.8 13.3 4'0' 42.1 0.4 
1957 9-.4, 11.8& 5.8 1.5 7.7 
1958 6.1 8.1 3.5 -20.3 5.2 
1959 " .9 11.3 7.5 11.3 3.9 
1960 -. 5 6.7 2.8 54.1. 1.9 
Source 	 Mason, Kim, et al (1980), The Economic and Social Moderniza-.
 
tion of the Republic of Korea (Cambridge: HarvardUniversity
 
Press): Table 12.
 
and fiscal in 1958 in response to a reduction:In aid levels. This resulted
 
in a pronounced slowdown in'the rate of inflation from an average rate
-
of 36 percent for the 1953-57-period to 3.8 percent for the years 1958
 
to 1960 (Mason and Kim, 1980, Table 19). 
The second step came after the revolution and the installation of a 
military gover entl in May, 1960. There was a massive devaluation and a 
unification of the exchange rate system. The purchasing-power-parity
 
effective exchange rate for Korean exports, which was 223.8 in 1955, rose
 
to 319.6 in 1960., This represented a massive 42 percent increase in real
 
receipts per dollar of commodities exported. And it probably represented.
 
a-much greater increase per dollar of value added in export production.
 
The exchange rate reform was accompanied by the installation of additional 
export incentives, including export subsidies,, access to subsidized credit,
 
and rights to import goods without payment of duty.
 
Despite the fact that the new government was not initially able to 
contain the,rate of inflation, it maintained the export incentives through
 
changes in the subsidy rates between formal devaluations. Throughout the
 
1960's and into the early 1970's, exporters could be assured that, regard­
less of the rate of domestic inflation, the real return on their exports
 
•-ould be protected.
 
The export drive which began in the 1960's was central to-the entire 
set of policy'reforms. After his election in 1960, President Park was 
almost single-mindedly committed to economic growth. The initial success 
of the export-oriented drive led him, and the entire.government, to asso­
ciate the achievements with the success of the export drive. 
Before turning to measures of the degree of dcess, some other policy 
measures should be noted. In 1964, budgetary reforms were und,:itaken, which 
substantially reduced the government's bdgetIdeficit." The deficit, which 
amounted to about 5.2 percent of GNP in 1962 was.down to 0.6 percent of 
GNP'by 1965. This, and the credit reforms discussed below, resulted in a 
markedly lower rate of inflation than had earlier been experienced. The 
average rate of price increase-was around 10 percent annuallyin the late, 
2/
1960'sin contrast with,a rate of. about 20 percent in the 1960-64 period.-
Combined with budgetary reform were interest rate reforms* Prior to 
1964 interest rates charged on loans were subject to ceilings set by the. " 
government..- Naturally, 'there was. excess demand for credit at these sub­
sidized interest rates (although:there was also a very active-curb market 
at much higher rates of interest), and the. government was a key factor in 
influencing banks in their allocation of credit. The government's ability 
to steer credit had been an important instrument in encouraging exports. 
Although conditions after '1964 cannot be described as being a fully 
free market, the rate of interest paid to domestic .savers was increased 
substantially, and the lending rate of the banks rose markedly. This, 
combined with the substantial reduction In -the rate of inflation, signifi-:, 
cantly raised 'the cost of credit to borrowers, and greatly reduced the 
3/
subsidy element in loans from the bankUng System.-
These, then, were the major reforms. In a survey such as this, it is 
necessary to pass over many more minor actions that were undertaken almost 
continuously which permitted the efficiency of the economy to grow rapidly. 
There was a liberalization of the import system., Customs and other pro­
cedures surrounding export and import regulations and entitlements were 
streamlined. The government itself was a .major actor in the transformation 
as it sought to keep the capacity of ,ports,"communications, and tiransportI 
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equal to the rapid increase in volume. Perhaps.most significantly, govern­
ment activity in the economic sphere was almost single :mindedly devoted to 
facilitating the export,drive which was seen as the hallmark of Korea's 
dynamic economy.
 
Some indicators of the transformation are given in:Table 15.2. 'As 
can be seen, the first few years of the export drive were.only in hind­
sight "successful". Real GNP growth during the early 1960's was not 
significantly different than it had been in the late 1950's. The only real 
change that was apparent was in the rateof export growth. To be sure, 
thegovernment was somewhat unlucky in the weather. Both, 1960 and 1962 
were poor crop years, which adversely affected the overall rate of economic­
growth. By 1964, however, success.was beginning to be apparent. The only' 
question in most observers' minds was-how long such a rapid rate of economic. 
growth could be sustained. It was sustained over a period of more than 
15 years, resulting in a complete transformation of the structure and 
performance of the Korean economy.,
 
From one of the poorest countries in the late 1950's, as measured by 
per capita income, Korea became one of the richest. The share of agriculture 
in GNP fell from 37 to 16 percent (despite the fact that agricultural output 
grew at the very satisfactory rate of 4.4 percent annually in the 1960's) 
over the 1960 to 1980 period. The share of industry rose from 20 to 41 
percent (with that of manufacturing rising from 14 to 28 percent). Even 
more striking was that the ratio of gross domestic investment in GNP rose 
from 11 percent in 1960 to 31 percent in 1980, while exports rose from 3 
to. 37 percent of GNP.' 
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Table -15.2. ' 	 :ndicators ofKorean Growth During, the 1960's 
,average annual rate of growth) 
PAma Z. 
Year' secto6- Industry Services:' Exports GNP 
1960 672854.1 	 .1.9
-0.5 

1961 11.8 4.6 22.7 4.8 
1962 - 5.0 14.0 8.9 30.0 3.1 
1937.9 11.4, 7.4 53.9 8.8 
1964 15.3 12.6 3.0 36.7, .8.6 
1965' 1.6 20.4 9.9 47.06. 
1966 10.5 18.7 2.6 '44.5 12.4 
1967 -4.4 21.4 13.8 32.7 7.8 
.3.1968 29. ' 	 45.8 12.,6
15 154 
1969 12.'0' 25.5 14.6 36.9 15.0 
1970 - 0.4 15.5 8.9 33.8 7.9 
Source 	 Mason, Kim, e.tal (1980), The Economic and Social Modernization 
of the Republic of Korea (Cambridge: Harvard University Press): 
Table 12. 
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-By any 'standard the Korean story is one of success to a degree that
 
had ,previously been regarded as unattainable. Korea'has few .natural resources.;
 
Its economy was affected by the oil price increase and commodity price.boom
 
of 1973-4 to a greater extent than most other country., The government
 
nonetheless managed to pass on the price increases, encourage domestic con­
servation, respond with new export activities (such as construction in
 
the Middle East), and sustain the momentum of economic growth. The rate of 
growth of real GDP in South Korea is estimated tohave been 8.6'percent in 
the 1960's and,9.5 percent.in the 1970's. Although the economy is currently 
facing some severe difficulties (largely as a consequence of the failure to 
maintain the real exchange rate and,the real interest rate during the late 
1960's, combined.with a premature decision to develop heavy industry), the 
lessons, for aid originate-in-the remarkable change in Korean economic policies 
and economic performance between the 195O.'s and the: 1960's, and the role 
played by U.S. aid infi the process. That is the subject of Section 15.2. 
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.. * The Role. of 'Aid in Korean Economic Growth 
Tables 1.;2, 15.3, 15.4,and 15.5 provide an overview 'of the role 
play~edby foreign assistance and U.S. assistance in Korea. Foreign: assis­
tance was most important in the 1950's. and diminished in, importance there­
after. During the 1950's assisted' imports accounted for 69 percent of total 
imports, and about 77 percent of all savings (with foreign savings in 
total accounting for 88 perc.ent of all savings). The period of Korean 
growth was one of, a gradual reduction of the importance of aid (which made 
the returns, from increasing domestic savings less than they would have 
otherwise been). 
Once the Korean potential for rapid growth had been amply demonstrated, 
Korea was able to obtain foreign resources on the private international 
capital market, and thus to enhance her growth rate by foreign borrowing.-
Even in the 1965-74 period, foreign borrowing accounted for 42 percent of 
gross fixed capital formation, although capital formation as a percent of 
GNP had risen from 10.5 percent in the 1953-62 period to 22.7 percent of 
GNP over the 1965-74 period. Thus, once the transformation to rapid growth 
was well under way, South Korea could rely on the external capital market 
for add.tional resources 'so that profitable investment opportunities could 
be-exploited beyond those financable with domestic savings. 
There are two important questions on which the South Ko'±. 
experience sheds some light. The first is whether, in the light
 
of manifestly ill-advised domestic policies, foreign donors -zan
 
contribute in any manner conducive to economic development. The
 
second. is the role of foreign donors.in the dialogue. Since
 
foreign donors cannot have a role .unless they .are in fact
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Table'15.3. Ratios of Aid Imports and
 
Net Foreign Saving to GNP,
 
.,Total Imports, and Fixed
 
Capital Formation. 
1953-62 1963-64 1965-74 
Ratios to.GNP of: 
Total imports 11.7 15.1 26.7 
Fixed capital formation, 10.5 12.7 22.7 
Foreign, savings 9. 9%6 9.5 
,Aid imports 8.1 65 4.4 
Ratios to Total Imports of: 
Foreign savings 78 .64 36 
Aidimports 69 1 17 
Ratios to Fixed Capital Fornation of-
Foreign savings. 88 75 42 
Aid imports 77, r51 20 
Source: Derived fronk Tables 43 and 44., 
Source: Mason, Kim, et al (1980), The Economic
 
and Social Modernization of the Republic 
of Korea (Cambridge: Harvard University
 
Press): 185.
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'able 15.4 	 Aid=Financed Imports-
Relative to.Total' 
Imports * (m 1. and "of 
total. imports),-,,.. 
... : Total U.S. Share 
Grarta Loan' c 7t b Loan"",. 
Total Imports .Amt. Ar At. % Amt. % 
1953 345. 201 58 71 59
 
1954 243 149 61 132 54
 
1955 341 233 68 215 63
 
1956 386 320 83 304 79
 
1957 	 442 374 85 369 83:
 
1958 	 378 311 82 314 83, 
1959 	 211 69 220 72304 , . 
1960 .. 	 343 232' 68 245 71 
1961 316 197 62 199 '63
 
1962-. 422 219 52 232 55
 
1963 560 233 42 216 39
 
1964 404 143 35 25: 6 149 37 25, 6
 
1965 463 .136 29 2, 0 131 28 2 0
 
1966 ,716 148 21 50 7 103 14 47 7
 
1967 996 152 15 80 8 97 10 38. 4
 
.1968 1,463. 168 12 90 61 06 7" 70. 5 
1969 1,824 155 9 169" 9 107 6 71 4 
1970 1,984 187 9 101 . 5 82 4 51 3 
1971 2,394 126 5 . 193 8 51 2 34 1 
1972 2-522 66 3 342 14 5 0 194 8 
1973, 4,240 23 1 224 5 2 0 123 3. 
.1974 6,851 30 0 186 3 1 J 20 0 
1975 7,274 37 348 5 
Source: Suk Tai Suh, import Substitution and Economic Development in Korea, (Korca Development Institute, December 1975). pp. 221-222. U.S. grant aid 
is from BoK. Economic Statistics Yearbook. 
vot s: 'Totai grant Aid includes Js panese grant funds from 1965 on. 
"U.S. t'rant aid includes technical assistantu cuts lit aJditiun to commodity imports.
cLoan aid includes loans from international organizations and public bilateral loans.. 
Source: 	 Hason, Kim, et al (1980), The Economic and 
Social Modernization of the Republic of 
Korea (Cambridge: Harvard University Press): 206.
 
Table 15.5. 	 Relationships,of Foreign Savings, Foreign Aid,. Imports,,
 
and' Fixed Capital Formation to GNP.,-

Pertcent of Fixd 
________ PercentofCNP. ____Capital Fornintion 
., )-oreign 
Foration Imports Savmnq' inportsb Saving Imports 
Fix d Capital 	 .. F -lid Foreign tid 
i953 7.2 :. 9.7 7.7 107 79. 
1954 9.1 7.3 : 6.2 4.4 68 48 
1955 t0,;1 , 98, -8.2 6.7 82 66 
1956 10.3. 13.1 .11.7 10.9 113 106! 
1957 10.6 12.0, 10.5 , 10.2996 
1958 10.1 8.7 :7 ,&8. 86: 87': 
1959- 10.9, 0. 7.5 -7.0694 
1960, 1.048 12.6, 9.3' 8.6 86 90 
1961 116A4.8 9.5 9.0 82 78 
1962 13.9', 16 9'' ~11.71 9.5 ~ 84' 68l. 
Average 
1953-1962, 10.5s1. 9.1 88 77­
1963 13.9 16.3 11.4 .' 6.8, 82 49o 
1964 11.6 ' 13.8. 7. 6. 67- 53 
1465, 14.8 15.9 _7A 5.3 so,0 36 
Average
i963-1(141 	 13.4 15.3 .89 , 6.1 66 4 
Source: Mason, Kim, et al (1980), The Economic and Social Modernization
 
of the Republic of Korea (Cambridge: Harvard University Press): 207. 
ctributing aid, the' second'.question must be discussed, first 
here.
 
.For purposes 'o f wha can be learned about the ability of 
foreignL ,donors to influence domestic policie in the aid process., 
the South Korean example is an extremely interesting. one. During 
.the 1950s, when, the United States was a maj'or donor of aid, there 
was a continuous dialogue between the American' an'd the Kore an 
authorities over appropriate,' levels of aid and the policy choices 
that, the6 South Korean, government, was makin. The Aeia 
nego tiators fully recognized, and repeatedly pointed out, the 
difficulties associated with the. excess-demand, multiple-,exchang e 
rate, inner-oriented" "policies that the Korean Government was 
following. -here is 'little doubt that, in certain respects ,'the
 
r .negotiators won concessions from ..the Korean government (WIth 
respect, for example, to devaluing the.won and making some efforts to 
raise tax revenue or lower expenditures). 
However, the overall strategy of the Rhee government was to maximize 
:he gap between domestic resources and expenditures that aid would fill 
Cole and Lyman, 1971). Because the United States was politically comitted, 
:o the maintenance of the South Korean government, the bargaining power 
.nherent in the American position was relatively weak. 
Thus, an observer, as of 1958 or 1959, might .have concluded with some 
ustification that American aid policies were, erroneous because the Korean 
'overnment was following inappropriate economic policies.' This inter­
iretation seems to have some further support in that the policy reforms that 
rere undertaken in 1960 seem to have originated largely in'a consensus among 
;he Korean intelligentsia that changes were necessary"if the country was to 
ave any reasonable future. But the discusso withi Korea was 
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furthered-and to some extent stimulated by the fact" that thi. United States' 
had, as a policy decision, announced that aid levels Couldaot be.expected 
to increase and would, indeed, gradually decline. Given Korea's dependence 
on raw material imports, that prospect threw into sharp relief the proposi­
tion. that only sustained growth of export earnir.gs would permit, rising 
levels. of-imports, which were obviously a necessary condition forfu'rther 
growth of the economy. 
'
 
'Nonetheless, those facts alone do not prove that the aid 
ionors, and eIspecially the United States, hadnoinfluence on the 
poli cy change.s tha-t permitted South Korea's success.,, Ind 'e -ed,-there 
&re 'severa.l considerations, that point i. the. other direction.. 
Firstand foremost, there is the undeba.table. conclusion that aid-, 
had, in, the immediate recovery period (to 1956), been absolutely 'essential 
to the maintenance of the Korean economy. Given conditions in 1953, the 
tSouth Korean economy could not, without assistance, have recovered suff I­
ciently. to undertake the necessary policy reforms - or,, for that matter, 
to have achieved very much even if those reforms had been undertaken.
 
Secondly, there is a major important, but unanswerableques­
tion as to the degree-to,which the American policy dialogue in the 
1950s influenced the, thinking of Korean policy makers. There is 
substantial evidence -that ,.economists at. theAmerican aid mission 
were involved in the discussions leading to the..stabilization
 
program of 1958-59 which,
' as seen above, was a predecessor of the 
major reforms of 1960-64. Moreover, U.S. assistance had financed 
the training in theUnited States of many Koreans in the'" United 
States. Their influence in the discussion is unknown. 
Indeed, it is extremely difficult in any situation to document or
 
measure the ways in which ideas are transmitted. It was certainly thelcase
 
that it was internal Korean political discussion in support of policy­
changes that was the immediate impulse for change. But it does not follow
 
that earlier discussions had had no effect. The importance of the policy 
dialogue is further supported by the fact that in the early 1960's American 
economists associated with aid were intimately involved in later stages of 
the dialogue and policy reform. Certainly, the budget and credit reforms 
of 1964 were worked out with the collaboration of American economists 
financed by USAID (Mason, Kim, et al, (1980): 330). Later tariff liberaliza­
tion was accompanied by the same sort of collaboration between Korean 
policy makers and consultants provided by USAID. 
on
It thus seems impossible to reach a firm conclusion the
 
d-egree to which donor influence contributed to the policy reforms.
 
It seems unarguable that there was some influence, and that forces
 
.favoring reforms were strengthened by U.S. aid. Whether the
 
reforms would in any event have been undertaken in the absence of
 
American pressures is more problematic. The safest conclusions are:
 
(1) that American aid in the 1950's did not reduce the probability that 
policy reforms would be undertaken; (2) given the political interest of the 
United States in South Korea, it is remarkable that the American authori­
'ties took as strong a position as they did with regard to Korea's economic
 
policies; (3) there was surely some donor influence on the intellectual
 
atmosphere that prevailed when a political consensus was finally reached; 
(4) a contemporary observer could not, from the vantage point of 1958 or
 
1959, have perceived any influence of American aid on Korean policies; and 
(5) the fact that American .aid Officials already had experiencein, and
 
understood someaspects of, the Korean econoiy placed them in a uniquely
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favorable position to assist in'the continuation and'furtheranceof the 
policy reforms. While it would be purely speculative to attempt to analyze 
what might have been the fate of the reforms in the absence of signi ficant 
external support, the donor presence was certainly a positive factor in 
influencing their success-. Without prior experience in the Korean.ecI nomy, 
it is doubtful whether'that influence could have been as constructively 
employed. 
Given, then, that there does appear to be a basis for 
believing that donor, influence , was of some"-significance in 
affeting -the reforms when they were, finally undertaken, 'there.
 
remaints the question of the va,lue of assistance. du~rng th-e 19 504s.
 
As already indicated', the period 1953-55 can surely be regarded as
 
one during 4hich assistance-had a very high marg-inal product. It
 
is almost.unimaginable that political and economic stability could
 
have been maintained in "the absence of concess iona -assistance in
 
those years when Korea.was regarded as completelyitncreditworthv in the
 
private capital markets.
 
The real question, therefore, centers upon the product of aid during 
the 1956-60 period. Undoubtedly,,some of it had aive.ry. low, return, Aid 
financing of imports led to distortions of various kinds. However, there 
was considerable investment in infrastructure of various kinds (see Mason, 
Kim, et al (1980) for details and Section 15.4) which was undoubtedly of 
value in paving the way for the success of the export-oriented drive. 
This was certainly true of the educational reforms and assistance to. 
education undertaken under U.S. auspices -in the 1940s .and 19501s. All. 
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of Korea's 0obsderversperformance pont'- tv.y the
phenomenal 

avai lablity of a -literate labor force as, h'aV been an impor tant
 
prerequisite for the degree to which Koreacould capitalize on
 
the policy reforms. Likewise, in the early 1'960s, the rate' at
 
which the Korean eI-conomy could grow -was constrained "by. the
 
eavailability of essential-infrastructure. power, railroad' and 
port capacity, and the Ike.. Whilesome of the infrastructural 
inveistmens o f the,s1950s ".may initially have' been less than 
optimally employed, the infrastructure certainly permitted a more rapid 
acceleration of growth than would otherwise have been possible in the 
early 1960's. p
 
If, there isa conclusion that might be drawn from this., it ma)
 
,,be to osuggest thatoinfrastructural projects which enhance the
 
potentially productive resources- available to society areprobabl
 
a, wiser form of aid when governments are undertaking ill-advised
 
economic policies than is program support. But even this conclusion must
 
be qualified. The policy dialogue in Korea in the 1950's centered around 
the level of program lnding to support the import program, and not 
around individual proj ects. Whether the same intangible Influence on the 
climate, of opinion could have been realized under proj ect-only lending is 
certainly, an open question. Possi~bly, in the absence of further evidence, 
,the safest policy prescription for a donor confronted with a potential 
recipient whose domestic economic policies are suspect is to have a relatively 
higher proportion of proj ect aid than for recipients whosel domestic policies 
*..are deemed conducive to'growth. 
15.3 'Trade and Aid inKorea
 
Korea's successful experience during the, 1960!s and 1970's is "so 
intricately ,inkedto thetrade sector that much of the relationship 
between trade and aid has been discussed already. ,Certainly, the major 
factors retarding Korean growth in the 1950's 'werethe excess demand 
associated with overall budgetary and monetary policy and the exchange con­
trol regime which provided thiewrog 1signals for resource allocation within 
the domestic economy. 
For the 1955-63, and the 1963-75 periods, the fraction.of output 
growth attributable to export expansion, import substitution and domestic 
demand expansion has been calculated by Mason, Kim, et al (1980), Table 
29).- According to their estimates import substitution accounted for about 
26t percent of manufacturing output expansion in the earlier period, and 
7 percent in the later period. By contrast, export expansion accounted 
for about 9 percent of (slower) growth in the former period and 39 percent 
in the latter. These results are confirmed by every other indicator Of 
Korea's economic performance: within tradables, and especially within thei­
manufacturiug sector, resources were allocated in radically different. 
directions in the import-substitution years th'an they were under,the export 
promotion %strategy. 
.:In the former period, foreign assistance:really substituted for foreign 
exchange earnings- especially when it was in the•form of program aid. As 
such, it could not contribute as. significantly to development prospects.as 
would, have been the ecase had more appropriate policies been in place. In 
the latter period, foreign assistance (to 'an ever decreasing degree) and 
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subsequently foreign borrowing permitted the Koreans to take advantage of
 
highly profitable projects sooner than would otherwise have been the case.
 
While it therefore permitted a higher rate of investment than would other­
wise have been possible, given the domestic savings rate, it did so in a
 
highly productive manner.
 
Some of the Korean investments financed through aid in the 1950's,­
especially in the import substitution sectors such as cement - had very 
low rates of return. The lesson for aid that derives from this is,that
 
•one cannot divorce sectoral assistance programs, even if they are
 
administered under project lending, from overall macroeconomic policy 
considerations., As is discussed in Chapter 8 of Volume I of this survey, 
it is vitally important that the assessment of individual projects be 
undertaken only in the context of appropriate estimates of the international 
prices (as contrasted with the domestic prices) of outputs of various­
.alternative! rot ects. 
15.4 
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Agriculture and Rur4l, Development 
During the period when Koreatwas a Japanese colony. ,(1910 to 1945) 
Japan investedheavily in Korea , in an attempt to create in Korea a sourc4 
of food and manufactured goods-for the Japanese: homeland. The Japanese­
invested in irrigation, and in research to breed higher-yielding cold 
resistant rice varieties, and they also introduced chemical fertilizers 
(Steinberg, 1980: 14). They also developed an agricultural extension service. 
that was viewed as part of the coercive administrativemachinery by the 
Korean farmers. It was. abolished at the end of World War II (Steinberg;,. 
1980: 14)., Rice production during the colonial period increased but 
per capita..consumption :of polished rice dropped from 111.5 kg to 80.2 kg 
(Steinberg, 1980: 14). -
By the end of the Korean.War in 1953,,the Korean countryside had been 
ravaged, Japanese-built infrastructure was inoperable, and a heavy influx 
of refugees from the North had put enormous pressure on an already strained
 
food situation. The division of Korea meant a loss for South Korea of heavy
 
industry, major coal deposits, and almost all power capacity (Cole, Lyman,
 
1971: 18). Food prices increased by 100% and all industrial production waij
 
curtailed (Cole, Lyman, 1971: 18). In the Japanese scheme of development
 
for Korea, the North was to have been Japan's source of manufactured goods
 
and the South was to have been a source of food for the island. Although
 
the Korean economy had become integral in the Japanese economy, they were
 
not necessarily integrated within Korea. Thus, the division left South
 
Korea with an agricultural system to rebuild and little industrial capacity 
(Cole, Lyman, 1971: 18).' 
15-24
 
The Rhee government which was in power from 1947 until,1960 sought to
 
maximize aid and counseled ministries to understate Korean harvests
 
(Cole, Lyman, 1971: 79). His objectives were to rebuild the infrastructure
 
and industrial capacity which had been destroyed by the war, to maintain
 
a strong military, and to improve private consumption levels within the
 
limits of domestic production and available foreign assistance (Cole, Lyman,
 
1971: 164). The Rhee government's program for development favored the urban
 
sector over the rural sector. Because of the large shipments of P.L. 480
 
grains, it was able to set prices often at below production costs without
 
worrying about drops in the level of production. 
President Park, the next major leader after Rhee,.sought to neutralize 
relations with Japan in an effort to open up new non-U.S. sources of external 
financing (Cole, Lyman, 1971: 38). The Park government also adopted a more 
positive approach to agricultural development. Low interest agricultural 
credit was increased by 30 times over the pre-1961 average and the govern­
ment offered to take over the high interest loans taken on by farmers in 
bad,years to relieve them of excessive debt (Cole, Lyman, 1971: 39). By 
1970-i Korea had to pay for all P.L. 480 shipments in dollars, causing 
grain imports to become a drain on foreign exchange (Steinberg, 1980: 16). 
In the election of 1971, Park barely beat his opponent largely because 
his rural support had eroded. Thus, from the early 70's the agriculture 
sector in Korea was to get much more emphasis. Even after P.L. 480 terms 
for grain imports hardened, Korea continued to import grin. In FY .1972;-P.L 
480 grain loans to South Korea came to approximately $222 million (Wideman, 
1974: 281-282). But, in 1972 there was a grain shortage in Korea. This 
bad harvest, compounded by sharply rising world grain prices, forced Korea 
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to pay more than $100 million more for grain than they had had to in theiprevious
 
year (Wideman, 1974: 282). This was a drain on foreign exchange.
 
Movement (Sae-maul Undong - which hereafter will be
The New Community 
denoted as NCM) was an attempt in the early 70's to improve the lot of the
 
farmer after the 1971 election. Its purpose was to modernize and improvel
 
village life through self help and government grants and encouragement.
 
Its beginning coinciees with an excess of cement production in 1971 which
 
led to the donation of 300 bags of cement to each village in the country for.
 
Roads, bridges, and community
community projects. (Steinberg, 1980:17). 

Rice straw thatch roofs were replaced with cement
meeting places were built. 

tiles and hedges around houses were replaced with cement walls (Park 1982: 
40). Village roads .were improved and conditions were generally upgraded. 
Moral suasion was used in villages to assure complete participation and 
villages were encouraged to compete with one another for approval. Along 
:With the NCM, however, came a change in government pricing policy. Prior 
to the Park government's policy, grain prices were frequently below the
 
In the 60's until 1971, the
costs of production (Steinberg, 1980:15). 

purchase price of rice covered production costs with a small margin (Steinberg,
 
By.the end of the 1970's farmers had a government rice support1980:16). 

price: that was over two times the,world market price (Steinberg, 1980:16).
 
Land Reform " 
South Korea'has a land area of about 98,000 square kilometers and a
 
-population of over 38,000,000, making it one of the most densely populated
 
countries in the world, (World Development Report, 1982: 111). The U.S.
 
provided support for-.a major land reform in the 1940's and 1950's. :The
 
reform evolved in two stages. The first stage involved confiscating Japanese­
held'land and turning it over to Korean ownership. The second step involved 
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limiting holdings to approximately three he tares (Steinberg, 1980: 15). As 
a result of this program, the distribution of wealth is considered reasonably. 
equitable. "On the average...an 80 percent or so decline in income of the top 
4 percent was matched by a 20 to 30 percent increase in lLncome of the bottom 80 
percent who had been tenants or owner-tenants before 1948 if total farm output 
before and after the reform was about the same," (Ban, Moon, Perkins, 1980: 
291). In 1945, 48.4% of the land in Korea was either totally or partially 
owned, versus 48.9% that was rented; in 1965, 93.0% of the land was either 
totally or partially owned versus 7% that was rented (Ban, Moon, Perkins,
 
1980: 286). Land reform was facilitated by the fact that there was a lack
 
of class unity among the landlords. Some had conspired with the Japanese 
and consequently were in no position to oppose redistribution. 
There is considerable debate over the short-term effects of land redis­
there seems to be a concensus that long-term effectstribution and reform but 
have been posit:ive. Perhaps the most positive effect has been in the politi­
cal arena. Redistribution of land has been successful iti diffusing what 
is often a major source of friction in rural areas - landlord/tenant tension. 
are better off than others and some whoWhile there are some farmers who 
benefit more from government policies or improved techniques, rural income
 
Rural incomes are correlated with
in Korea is distributed fairly equitably. 
farm sizes but farm sizes have been maintained pretty much at a standard 
small size by law. There is the possibility in the future that this might 
change for demographic reasons. Young Koreans have been migrating to the 
cities, leaving the old men and women to run the farms. Accordingto, 
Steinberg, sale of land will probably become concentrated in the largest 
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farms and, pa,rts,,of it might be rented out (Steinberg, Morrow;3 Palmer, Dong-il,, 
1980: D-5). 
Land Development
 
'
 U.S. AID has played a part in land development in South Korea. In, ,the 
early 60's the Korean government promoted a land development program which 
aimed at adding 15% more agricultural land to the country by reclanmtl n of 
hillsides and tideland areas and by making irrigation and other improvements 
on existing farmlands (Cole and Lyman, 1971: 91). 
"The increasing demand for fruits and other crops at this time 
in addition to PL 480 support for the land reclamation 
program, provided strong incentive for accelerating the expansion 
of cultivated upland. From 1960 to 1968 the total cultivated 
land area increased at a compound rate of 1.68 percent per year. 
Since .968 the area of both cultivated upland and paddy have been 
declining at rates of 0.98 percent and 0.37 percent per year 
from 1968 to 1973 respectively. This indicates that additional 
cultivated land brought about by reclamation was not enough to 
compensate for that converted for urban development, industrial 
sites and highway construction. (Ban,.Moon, Perkins, 1980: 51-53) 
(See Table 28, Ban, Moon, Perkins, 1980: 81).
 
The land reclamation project was a labor intensive project, supported 
by over 100,000 metric tons of U.S. agricultural products per year. A food­
for-work,program, it employed hundreds of thousands of rural workers. The 
newly developed land was divided among those who had developed it or among 
those whose land holdings were below a certain level (Cole andtyman, 1971: 91) 
P.L., 480 surplus food served as payment in kindito rural workers engaged in, 
land reclamation and other agricultural projects. "Of 350 179 tons of wheat 
flour provided under,PL 480-Title. II in 1964 through 1966,for example, over,
 
110,000 tons went for upland development and tideland reclamation." In
 
addition to PL 480 support, localfarmerswere reqUired to contribute labor
 
And tool inputs equivalent to30 to 60 percent,of the total reclamation
 
investment (Ban, Moon, Perkins, 1980: 80).
 
PL 480 assistance for new land development ended in 1967. AID was critical
 
of the Korean government's failure to develop an adequate land use and develop­
ment policy and recommended that future assistance be limited to advisory
 
services (Ban, Moon, Perkins, 1980: 83). It is not entirely clear why this
 
program lasted only about 5 years. There were problems with the program.
 
It was difficult to decide who should get the improved land. It was unclear
 
whether the food-for-work programs actually had any long-term benefits to
 
the workers. They often provide short-term employment and food for the
 
laborers but often the long-term benefits of improved roads, etc. accrue to
 
others. There was also some indication that some of the improved land was
 
not all that great in.terms of productivity.
 
AID has also been involved in irrigation in Korea.. Irrigation reduces
 
the uncertainty of weather conditions and also is good for double-cropping.
 
Many agencies, including the World Bank and AID, have been involved in irriga­
tion in Korea. Table 15.6 below shows the expansion of irrieation in
 
Korea over the years.,
 
Table 15.6. 	 The Expansion of Irriaation of
 
Paddy Fields (1,000 hectares)
 
Irrigated No,.frratedj 
Benefited 
by Completely 
TotalPaddy Irrigation Irrigated Partially Rain 
Acreage Association Area Irrigated Field 
1952 	 1,226.3 183.7 351.3 278.8 412.6 
1956 1,093.2 197.8 340.8 279.4 275.2 
1960 1,202.9 236.4 392.7 285.5 288.3 
1965 1,198.9 281.2 421.1 298.7 197.91 
1970 1,183.5 304.1 543.7 223.2 112.6 
1974 1,268.9 309.1 583.5 288.6 87.8 
1975 1,276.6 
Sources: NACF, Agricultural Yearbook 1961, 1968, 1975: MAP. Yearbook of -
Agricultureand ForestryStatistics 1952, 1961, .976. 
Source: 	 Ban, Moon, Perkins (1980), Rural
 
Development (Cambridge, Harvard University
 
Press): 95.
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In the,irrigation project which began in 1974 which AID provided financ­
ing for, project design and implementation were largely Korean (Steinberg,
 
Morrow, Palmer, Dong-il, 1980: i-iii). In the "lessons learned" section of
 
the Korean irrigation monograph, the main lesson seems to be that the project
 
was successful because Itwas designed by Koreans to meet their specific
 
needs (Steinberg,.Morrow, Palmer',. Dong-il, 1980: 12-14; Chapter 10).• 
RURAL INCOMES 
Land reform after World War II by the U.S. leveled rural incomes in 
Korea and redistributed wealth in the rurnd. sector. Korean land reform
 
involved much more expropriation that compensation and when compensation
 
was made to a landlord, it was often made in the form of bonds which were.
 
By 1957 an estimated
essentially worthless (Ban,.Moon, Perkins, 1980:287). 

1.5 million farmers had acquired some 2.5 million acres of land on which 
they had formerly been tenants or farm workers - all butthe'largest and 
most agile landowners were pauperized (Aqua, 1974: 17). . Most Korean farmers, 
other than former landlords, were better off in the 1950's than they were in 
the 1930's (Ban, Moon, Perkins, 1980: 301). Throughout the Rhee period,
 
the government used grain price manipulation to provide cheap food for the
 
cities (Table 15. 7). PL 480 imports were large (Table 15-8). 'According 
to Steinberg, in no year did the government purchase price equal thecost 
of production and in six of the 13 years the purchase price was under 50% 
of the market price (Steinberg, Morrow, Palmer, Dong-il, 1980': F-2). After
 
Park took over the government, grain procurement prices rose to at least 
cover production costs although they were still usually under the market
 
price (Steinberg, Morrow, Palmer, Dong-il, 1980: F-2). See Table 15.7
 
for a comparison of purchase prices and market prices versus cost for the 
production of rice' 1948-1975. 
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Table 15.7. GovernVent Purchase Prices and Market
 
.Prices versus Cost of Production for 
Rice, 1948-1975 
(won per 80 kg) 
tirchase Cost of AMarkct a 
Price Iroducrtio Price A/B A/C 
eO (A) (B) (C) ,) () 
1948 2.47 3.72 7.10 66.3 34.8 
1949 2.67 6.71 13.21 39.9 20.2 
1950 16.40 15.88 52.30 103.6 31.4 
1951 65.37 n.a. 157.50 - 41.5 
1952 200.62 329.09 447.50 61.0 44.8 
1953 200.62 330.94 350.00 60.6 57.3 
1954 308.33 330.94 581.00 93.2 53.1 
1955 390.56 838.44 962.00 46.6 40.1 
1956 1,059.00 i,134.00 1,591.00 93.4 66.6 
1957 1,059.00 1,384.00 1,311.00 76.5 80.8 
1958 1,059.00 1,297.00 1,157.00 81.6 91.5 
1959 1,059.00 1,300.00 1,368.00 81.4 77.4 
1960 1,059.00 1,313.00 1,687.00 80.7 62.8 
1961 1,550.00 1,377.00 1,768.00 112.6 87.7 
1962 1650.00 1,422.00 2,801.00 116.3 58.9 
1963 2,060.00 1,373.00 3,470.00 149.7 59.4 
1964 2,967.00 1,936.00 3,324.00 153.3 89.3 
1965 3,150.00 2,672.00 3,419.00 117.9 92.1 
1966 3,306.00 2,495.00 3,750.00 132.5 88.2 
1967 3,590.00 2,735.00 4,289.00 131.2 83.7 
1968 4.200.00 3,403.00 5,140.00 123.4 81.7 
1969 5,150.00 3,565.00 5,784.00 144.5 89.0 
1970 7,000.00 4,642.00 7,153.00 150.8 97.9 
.1971 8,750.00 4,682.00 9,844.00 186.9 88.9 
1972 9,888.00 6,115.00 9,728.00 161.7 101.6 
1973 11,377.00 6,578.00 12,175.00 173.0 93.4 
1974 15,760.00 7,959.00 17,821.00 198.3 88.4 
1975 19,500.00 
gources: MAF, GrainStatistics Yearbook 1967-1973. 
MAF. Cost of ProductionSuvey, 1967-1975. 
N~nea. ,ralPDevelopment 
Source: Ban, Moon, Perkins .(1980), Rural Development 
(Cambridge: Harvard university Press): 240.
 
Table l5.8. The .:PL 480 Role in Agricultural Imports­
millions)
.($:.S. 

PL 480 Total PL 480 OtherTotal Total PL 480Grain PL 480 .Grain Cotton Cotton 
Year Imports Aid Imports Imports Imports Imports 
-	 20.11955 6.4 ­
8.2 4.81956 	 31.2 33.0 20.0 25.0 
1.8 10.71957 	 84.3 45.5 33.0 26.9 0.51958 	 51.1 47.9 46.9 31.7 0.5 0.11959 	 17.5 11.4 4.3 30.8 7.0 01960 	 20.6 19.9 19.2 28.6 0.8 
n.a. 215 0;81961 	 n.a. 44.9 22.6 
34.2 31.3 1.61962 40.1 67.3 34.4 
1963 107.2 96.8 62.6 38.2 31.8 2.5 
30.5 2.51964 	 60.8 61,0 28.0 37.3 
29.7 0.11965 	 ,54A 59.5 29.7 40.8 
11.2 	 42.8 26.7-. 01966 	 613... 38.0 
7.9 	 49.3 34.0 2.41967 76.6 44.4 
1968 129.3 55.9 27.3 49.1 24.7 4.0 
1969 250.3 74.8 31.6 52.0 39.0 4.2 
1970 244.8 61.7 33.0 62.7 27. 13 
1971 304.0 33.7 18.0 84.2 .15.7 0 
1972 282.7 - 85.5 - ­
-
i. ­1973 444.1 -	 112.4 
Sources: BOK,.7conomic Statistics Yearbooks, and EPB, Ko vaStatstialYearbook. 
Source: 	 Ban, Moon and Perkins (1980), Rural Development (Cambridge:
 
Harvard University Press): 30.
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In the early 1970's the Korean government changed its pricing policy.
 
It was no longer getting free P.L. 480 grain from the U.S. and grain imports
 
became a potential drain on foreign exchange. The 1971 election demonstrated
 
to Park that his rural constituency was eroding and something had to be done.
 
In 1969, the Korean government instituted a two price rice and barley
 
pricing system where they would pay relatively good prices to the farmers but
 
would also subsidize urban grain prices. As farmers' incomes rose and the
 
urban grain prices were kept down, the costs of these subsidies were carried 
as an overdraft on the central bank which increased the money supply and thus 
fueled inflation (Steinberg, Morrow, Palmer, Dong-il, 1980: F-3). 
The change in grain price policy, along with general improvements in 
rural conditions and urban demand for food and rural labor, created favorable 
conditions for rural laborers in the 70's. According to the government in 
1976, the annual income for the rural household surpassed that of the urban 
household (Kihl, 1979: 135). According to South Korea's Ministry of Agricul­
ture and Forestry, farm income per household has grown 2.5 times between 1965 
and 1971, Aqua, after adjusting for inflation, claims that in fact the real 
gain between 1960 and 1971 has been about 45.5% (Aqua, 1974: 28). In 1971 
rural households were paying higher prices for food purchases (about 6%more) 
than urban households although they paid somewhat less for housing and clothin 
(Aqua, 1974: 28). Steinberg found in his project report on irrigation that 
all rural residents believed that their standard of living would be higher in 
the cities (Steinberg, Morrow, Palmer, Dong-il, 1980: D-4), and that few 
farmers would like to see their children become farmers (Steinberg, Morrow, 
Palmer, Dog-il, 1980: E-5). 
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"The booming prosperity and industrialization of the urban areas and 
the rapid growth of the Korean economy created unusually favorable conditions
 
for the growth in both agriculture and fishing," (Brandt, Cheong, 1982:46). 
Farmers who live near cities and have access to improved transportation
 
systems, can grow vegetables and fruits and market them in the cities which 
has apparently been profitable. Their land is also worth considerably 
more as a result of improved transportation and easy access to the city
 
The demand for labor in the urban industrial areas due to the
market. 

to rural areas in searchimproved manufacturing sector has caused many leave 
an actual shortage of agricultural
of better opportunities. Today there is 

labor in South Korea (Brandt, Cheong, 1982:38-39). Increasingly, farming
 
is done by women and older men (Wideman, 1974:286). Korea is increasingly
 
being urbanized and the agriculture sector is declining significantly as
 
a percent of national income and as an employment sector. According to the 
U.N., South Korea has exhibited one of the largust urban-rural growth 
differentials in terms of migration in the years between 1950 and 1970. In
 
1915, 3.1% of Koreans lived in urban areas of 20,000 or more. By 1940, 16.0%
 
In 1955, 24.5% lived in
of Koreans lived in urban areas of 20,000 or more. 

urban areas of 50,000 or more and by 1975 48.4% lived in urban areas of 150,000
 
or more, (ihl 1979: 153).
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Transportation
 
U.S. AID took an early interest in transportation in Korea. The major
 
Paved
impetus for this interest was the Korean War in the early 1950's. 

roads made moving troops and supplies much easier and proved much less wear­
ing on machinery. Thus, good roads facilitated military actions in Korea.
 
Another reason for this interest was to rebuild roads that were destroyed
 
by the Korean War. During the period from 1954-63, the U.S. provided 18.9% 
of the funds invested in highway construction with the bulk of aid going
 
to paving and a lesser share going to bridge building (Ban, Moon, Perkins,
 
Cole and Lyman's estimates of aid to the transportation sector
1980:148). 

vary slightly (1958-1966 - 26.1%of aid went to transportation sector) but 
transportation is also the largest share of aid by any sector (Cole, Lyman.,
 
1971:193). 
Although major concern in the 50's for road building was either to
 
facilitate military maneuvers or to rebuild that which was destroyed by war,
 
in the 60's the major consideration became uniting the country for commercial
 
reasons. In the beginning of the 60's, it was clear that the lack of ade­
quate transportation facilities was the real bottleneck to growth (Hasan, 
1976:31). The railway network has been modernized and expanded by the develop­
ment of roads and coastal shipping hae been even more rapid and led to a 
substantial redistribution of passenger and freight traffic away from the 
railroads (Hasan, 1976:31). In the early 60's.there were 4,000 buses in the
 
whole country, most of which were in the city of Seoul and a few other cities
 
(Ban, Moon, Perkins, 1980:315). The development of the transportation
 
sector refl, _r.s the'early .interest in urban areas at the expense of the 
rural areas.
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The main impetus for transportation planning has been to link important 
cities within the country but it wasn't until 1969 that construction 
of
 
By 1977, 44% of national inter­expressways to link major cities began. 

city roads were paved (Ban, Moon, Perkins, 1980:148). The interest in
 
rural roads and non-linking roads didn't really begin until the 70's.
 
In 1971 only 0.05% of all roads in Korea were paved and 33% of all villages
 
did not even have access roads that could accomrodate small trucks (Wideman,
 
1974:275).
 
The NDI, which was a Korean government initiative and had little to
 
do with aid, was the main impetus for improving roads within and around
 
Bad roads were seen as a critical restricting
villages in the early 1970's. 

factor for introducing labor-saving machinery and equipment because power
 
tillers with attached trailers were difficul.t to move on narrow village roads.
 
Thus, farmers were unable to purchase labor-saving devices (Park, 1982:34, 39).
 
Road construction has been advantageous to Korean farmers for several
 
reasons. "In areas where transportation is good and access to the city is
 
easy, tne price of land has gone up considerably (Park, 1982:62). Also the
 
growth of market crops in the late 60's is in large part due to highway
 
The improvement of rural
construction (Ban, Moon, Perkins, 1980:154). 

roads and their hook-up into the national "highway" system, enabled farmers 
to reach the markets easier. By producing crops like winter vegetables
 
and fruits they were able to circumvent the govervnient's control of grain
 
prices and grow crops year round for the city markets.
 
Utilities
 
The Japanese in Korea had developed North Korea as the major manufac­
turing region while South Korea's role was food production. The division
 
of Korea in 1953 meant a loss for South Korea of heavy industry, major coal
 
deposits, and almost all developed power capacity (Cole, Lyman, 1971:18)
 
Whatever power capacity South Korea had was probably heavily damaged by
 
the war. Between 1958 and 1966, the "power" sector was the third largest
 
category of AID grant projec't assistance, comprising 11.5% of the total
 
grants to Korea (Cole, Lyman, 1971:193). Early impetusamount given in 
was to provide power for urban industrial areas and it wasn't until 1965 
that a rural electrification program actually began (Ban, Moon, Perkins,
 
1980:144). The provinces with the largest urban areas had the earliest
 
and highest rates of rural electrification. In 1964, 12% of rural house­
holds had electricity; in 1974 61% had electricity (Ban, Moon, Perkins, 
(1980: 145). The large use of electricity in rural areas rose from negligible 
levels in the late 1940's to 25.2 million kwh in 1962 to 56.6 million kwh 
'in 1973 (Ban, Moon, Perkins, 1980:9Q).
 
The goal of
Under the NCM, rural electrification was an objective. 
government policy was that by 1977, 90% of rural households would have 
Part of the push for rural access to electricity (Hasan, 1976:108). 

electrification programs comes from the hope of establishing small work­
shops in the countryside to provide profitable work for farmers in the slack
 
These workshops would produce handicraft goods for export and by
season. 

1976, the government hoped to be earning $480 million in foreign exchange 
from these exports (Wideman, 1974:300). A major problem with this scheme, 
areas and the shortage of laboris the cyclical demand for labor in rural 
in general.
 
Current Inputs
 
U.S. asistancep layed a'Throughout the 1950's and into the 1960's, 
role in imports of current inputs tofarming such as pesticides,dominant 
fertilizers, and new seed varieties.
 
These imports must be credited with providing much of the' impetus for 
use jimpedagricultural growth during this time. ,Pesticide and fertilizer 
to 1959, aid financed two­substantially during these years. From 1953 
An even greater proportionthirds of the nitrogen fertilizer used in Korea. 

of the phosphorus and potassium inputs were provided through foreign assistance
 
(Ban, Moon, Perkins, 1980: 104). While the average compounded rate of annual
 
expansion from 1946 to 1973 was 0.53 percent for land, 0.34 percent for labor
 
used, and 1.37 percent for fixed capital, the same measure for current inputs
 
was 8.59 percent (Ban, Moon, Perkins, 1980: 53). "For the whole period
 
1945-1975, total input grew at an annual rate of 1.94 percent and total
 
productivityat 1.44 percent. Therefore, according to this method of estima­
percent of total production growth is attributable to the
tion, about 57..

increase of input and the remaining 42 percent to improvement in productivity,"
 
(Ban, Moon, Perkins, 1980: 57,60).
 
The critical growth in current input use can be directly linked to the
 
foreign assistance to Korea. Through the end of the 1960's, Korea was the
 
main recipient of U.S. fertilizer assistance. The contribution of U.S.
 
shipments verses domestic production has already been noted in the previous 
During the 1970s as Korea established a
discussion and in Table 5.9. 

domestic fertilizer industry, they received AID loans to help finance these 
also helped encourage privateprojects. "The AID risk guarantee program 
Given the demands on
investment in fertilizer plants," (Libbin 1970: 20). 

foreign exchange, without the contributions of foreign assistance programs
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the supply of fertilizer and other current inputs would have been a small,.
 
fraction of the actual levels and the transition to self-sufficiency would'
 
have been much more difficult.
 
Nearly all of the fertilizer available came from imports. Without
 
American aid fertilizer consumption would have been cut to a small fraction 
of the level of actual use during this period. In 1952, for example, aid 
financed imports of 98,100 metric tons of fertilizer while Korean foreign 
During 1953, the aid componentexchange financed only 33,200 metric tons. 

was even more important. Aid-financed imports came to 111,000 of the 112,000
 
metric tons of fertilizer imported in that year (Ban, Moon, Perkins, 1980: 
102-104). 
greatly decreasedThe absence of such aid to agriculture would have 
production. Perkins estimates, "If the amount of nitrogen had been cut 
from
 
have fallen by80 to 40 kilograms per hectare, for example, grain output may 
million tons (10 percent or more of total grain output),"
well over half a 

(Ban, Moon, Perkins 1980: 101).
 
The critical role played by current inputs to agriculture during this
 
time is noted by Krueger who states, E:iutal agricultural output grew at an
 
annual compound rate of 2.09 percent from 1945 to 1953, with an annual 
rate
 
of increase of inputs of 1.50 percent. Input increases, therefore, accounted
 
for about 72 percent of output increases," (Krueger 1979: 17). Apparently,
 
the growth in fertilizer input, made possible through foreign assistance,
 
can be creditcd for a major portion of the agricultural growth througl 1953.
 
The average annual support level for chemical fertilizers was $43.2 million
 
for 1956 to 1960 (Kr,.eger 1979: 112).
 
Chemical fertilizers remained the single largest category of non-project 
support during the 1960 to 1965 period. The annual support level for chemi­
cal fertilizers during this time averaged $33.6 million. But throughout
 
the 1960's domestic fertilizer production increased so that by 1970 Korea
 
achieved a self-supporting level of fertilizer production and actually be­
came a net exporter as shown in Table 15.9. Assistance in this area was
 
then no longer necessary.
 
Several'problems with the distribution of these aid-financed fertilizer 
imports should be noted. First, the Korean government priced the fertilizer 
well below its theoretical market value. This made distribution through 
the free market impossible and the government resorted to a program of ration-

Ing. The government's distribution program was chaotic and often failed to
 
deliver the fertilizer at the proper time or to the proper place. For this
 
reason, farmers were often forced to resort to dealing in the black markqts
 
where prices reached levels of two to three times those of the government.
 
Second. farmers were frequently reluctant to use the available fertilizer
 
resources of phosphorus and potash at any price. The positive relationship
 
between the use of these nutrients and crop yields was not as immediately 
evident to the farmers as with the use of nitrogen. The reaction of the
 
farmers points to the need to conduct appropriate extension programs in con­
junction with an increase of foreign-funded agricultural inputs. 
The introduction of new higher yielding strains of seeds for cereals 
ind vegetables increased potential agricultural output substantially. The 
nternational Rice Research Institute transferred the "Tong-il" (IR-667) and 
"Yushin" rice seed varieties to Korea in the early 1970s. The first demon­
stratin .plots for the Tong-il seed were established during the 19707l :rice 
crop year . The new. rice varieties came -into widespread use during the rest 
of the decade after it was shown that crop yields could be -increased 30 to 
40 percent using the improved seed. 
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Table 15.9. Imports and Exports of Chemical
 
Fertilizer, 1951-1975.
 
Inports (1,000 mut:l tons) _ Ex;,orts 
AID Finarnced Korea ForcignExchange (1,000 nitrctont 
N P X N P K of all nutrients) 
1951 43.9 19.3 0 5.4 0 0 0 
1952 91.1 0 7.0 33.2 0.1 0 0 
1953 89.9 13.6 2.7 0.6 0.4 0 0 
1954 96.4 50.2 1.9 18.7 0 0 0 
1955 127.7 28.2 8.8 18.7 0 0 0 
1956 157.3 53.8 8.1 50.9 4.2 0.4 0 
1957 143.9 68.5 6.5 36.6 11.6 0 0 
1958 171.7 66.8 5.0 75.5 15.1 0.7 0 
1959 102.4 55.5 6.0 76.5 11.6 2.0 0 
1960 199.7 55.2. 7.3 n.a. n.a. n.a. 0 
1961 138.7 74.4 16.8 41.4 6.4 0 0 
1962 1.5 15.8 0 11.4 24.1 0 0 
113.0 161.3 5.1 0 O!1963 .4 29.1 
1964 0.4 131.5 32.7 84.9 7.2 2.8 0 
1965 27.7 161.8 82.1 145.8 3.9 3.7 0 
1966 18.8 164.2 136.5 156.2 5.2 5.6 0 
1967 5.6 179.1 110.9 127.2 6.1 6.4 9.2 
1968 1.9 70.5 68.4 111.1 3.0 10.1 11.5 
1969 0.8 46.5 21.6 35.1 2.2 58.1 45.7 
1970 0 0 0 2.4 2.4 1.9 55.8 
1971 0 0 0 16.2 12.2 63.2 82.4 
1972 0 0 0 11.3 10.1 93.4 88.0 
1973 0 0 0 9.8 13.2 106.3 27.2 
1974 0 0 0 2.8 26.1 122.3 0 
1975 0 0 0 9.9 35.0 196.0 0.5 
Sources: MAF, Yearbook of Agriculture andForestry Statistics,various years. 
USOM/K. Rural Deelopment Program Evaluatio, Report, Korea, 1967, 
p. 82. 
Korean Traders Association. Statistical Yearbook of Forei2n Trade (19,9 
through 1975 editiuns). All phosphate iatilizers imported were converted 
to nutrient (P) at a rate of 20%. Compound fertilizer. both exports and 
imports, was assumed to be 22.22.11. 
Source: Ban, Sung Hwan, Pal Yong Moon, Dwight
 
H. Perkins (1980), Rural Development,
 
Studies in the Modernization of the
 
Republic of Korea: 1945-1975 (Cambridge,
 
Mass.: Harvard University Press).
 
Research and Extension
 
Korea has had a long history of agricultural research. Its earliest
 
official demonstration station was established in 1906 and experimental
 
improvements in rice were conducted throughout the Japanese colonial period,,
 
After WWIuntil the 60's,
(Steinberg, Jackson, Kim, Hae-kyun, 1982: 4). 

the system was neglected partly because it was remembered by farmers as
 
being a coerci,,e vestage of colonial power. In 1962 the agricultural research
 
system was reorganized and the Office of Rural Development (ORD) was established
 
with the backing and financial support of AID. The Office of Rural Development
 
is one of three main divisions of the Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries.
 
Its purpose is to do agricultural research, to provide training and extension
 
to farmers (Steinberg, Jackson, Kim, Hae-kyun, 1982: G-2). AID was not
 
responsible for setting up the organization of this research system since 
it had already been in effect. What AID provided was funding to expand and 
improve research facilities, to create a larger research network,- and to 
provide increased training both to farmers and to extension workers. 
Marketing and Credit
 
The National Agricultural Cooperative Federation (NACF) is another example
 
of AID support to a government organization. The NACF is part of the Ministry
 
of Agriculture and Fisheries whose responsibility is to provide agricultural
 
credit, seeds, fertilizer, pesticides and herbicides, and agricultural
 
machinery. It is also the government arm for the purchase of crops at standard,
 
centrally set prices and quantities (Steinberg, Jackson, Kim, Hae-kyun, 1982:
 
G-2). The main criticism of the NACF (besides the fact that it is called a
 
cooperative and in fact functions more like an arm of the government) has been
 
its inability to coordinate its efforts with the ORD (Ban, Moon, Perkins, 1980:
 
278-9). The organizations have very strong hierarchical components, are
 
are driven by a need for: immediate results.competitive with one another,: and 
(Libbin, 1970:20).
 
Health (sanitation, family planning, modern medicine, nutrition)
 
The Japanese had taken measures in Korea during the colonial period to 
improve public health to increase the productivity of the Korean labor force. 
Their measures included compulsory innoculation, enforcement of quarautines 
at major seaports and the establishment, of public hospitals in each province 
and major urban areas (Repetto, Kwon, Kim, Kim, Sloboda, Donaldson, 1981:198).
 
The co!onial government also tried to improve health conditions by drilling 
community wells and developing running water systems (Repetto, Kwon, Kim,, 
Kim, Sloboda, Donaldson, 1981:198).
 
of AID grant project assistance was spent
Between 1958 and 1966, 10.5% 

As with other problems,
on health and sanitation (Cole, Lyman, 1971:193). 

urban sanitation was top priority. According to Hasan, only 7% of all vil­
lages had a sanitary water supply system in 1972 (Hasan, 1976:163). The early 
70's saw atte.,?ts being made to improve health by protecting well water 
NCM objective was thatfrom contamination (Ban, Moon, Perkins, 1980:314). 
supply by 1981 (Hasan, 1976:163).allvillagei would have a sanitary water 
and public health were in fact very minor programs in
Family planning 
in fact Rhee; who was president until
the Korean government's priorities ­
1960, was opposed to family planning (Steinberg, 1980:32-33). In the late 
1950's considerable support was being offered by members of the foreign 
sipport was helpful because'the Ministercommunity for family planning. This 
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resign in the early l~bUls because ne supporuea
of Health was forced to 
family planning. U.S. AID supported a community development program which 
started in 1958 which encouraged field workers to discuss family planning.
 
with rural villagers with whom they worked (Repetto, Kwon, Kim, Kim, Sloboda,
 
Donaldson, 1981:225-226). In September 1961, the government announced a 
family planning program (Repetto, Kwon, Kim, Kim, Sloboda, Donaldson, 1981:
 
202), The influence of AID, Planned Parenthood, Population Council and UN
 
Fund for Population Activities (UNFPA) was important during the early stages., 
of the national family planning policy formation because they were able to 
declin­
supply funding and technical expertise. Their influence is currently 
ing, but they have remained the. key providers of contraceptivei supplies. They 
also still support research and advance training in population and family 
Sloboda, Donaldson: 1981:257). Abortion
planning (Repetto, Kwon, Kim, Kim, 

was not legalized until 1973 but it was a common pradtice especially, in
 
the urban areas. 
"The development of a black market for abortion during the 
Korean War was important. Strong biases against abortion and 
illegitimate births prevailed in Korean society but the biases 
against illegitimacy were stronger. Thus, abortion beame 
socially justified with the increasing incidence of illegitimate 
pregnancies during the war. Contact with the West* through 
American troops intensified with the Korean War. These socio­
political changes constitute the major forces that cleared the 
path Vor lower fertility," (Repetto Kwon, Kim, Kim, Sloboda,
 
Donaldson, 1981: 25).
 
Birthl rates have, howeve-, gone down naturally through perceived demographic.
 
needs. 
 As farms in rural areas could not support larger families, birth_
 
,rates seem to have dropped. There is also some evidence that women tended 
to be older at the age of.marriage in 1970 ,than theyw,'ere in 1955. Delayed 
~i~raeoften results in fewer births 'per woman. 
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As is often the case, "modern" medicine has been mainly concentrated
 
in the cities. In 1970, about half of Korea's townships were without a
 
In 1967, of 8,000 registered
qualified doctor (Breidenstein, 1974:251). 

doctors'in Korea, less than 3,000 were working in rural areas (Breidenstein,
 
In 1970 there were 12 doctors in Seoul for every 10,000 people
1974:267). 

versus 2-3 doctors in rural areas for the same number of people. (Breidenstein,
 
1974:267). Of 5,400 hospitals and clinics, 2,500 were in Seoul in 1970
 
Although modern medicine has not made much
(Breidenstein, 1974:267). 

progress in rural areas there were traditional health centers and herbal
 
doctors which served rural needs (Ban, Moon, Perkins, 1980: 314). Rural healtb
 
has improved somewhat over the years. TB and parasite diseases are still
 
widespread in rural Korea (Ban, Moon, Perkins, 1980: 311) but by the 1970's
 
infant death had fallen to less than half that of the late 1940's (Ban,
 
Moon, Perkins, 1980: 312). The number of hospitalizations per 1,000 populatior
 
in rural areas appears to have doubled between 1963 and 1974 although the
 
rate is still below that of.the urban areas (Ban, Moon, Perkins, 1980: 314).
 
Eighty percent of doctors and 90% of nurses are still concentrated in urban
 
areas (Wideman, 1974: 275). According to Wideman, many of the doctors and
 
nurses have been sent abroad,to earn foreign exchange (Wideman, 1974: 275).,
 
Nutrition 
Some specialists have commented critically on nutrition levelsi,'in' 
rural, relative to urban dwellers! 
"The average daily calori,.: intake of city dwellers is 2,646, 
whereas the peasants averige 2,511. While this does not 
indicate undernourishmenc or peasants, other studies show 
that protein content is much higher in urban than in rural 
diets," (Wideman, 1974: 276). 
Wideman claims that this difference was the result of government polic.-. 
which would have been impossible without U.S. AID and P.L. 480 shipments 
(Wideman, 1974: 281-283). Measurement of caloric intake is notoriously 
difficult In rural households. And Steinberg disagrees that nutrition is 
a very telling indicator of relative wealth in Korea. In a survey taken 
by Steinberg (Steinberg, Morrow, Palmer, Dong-il, 1980: 13, D-3, D-4)I 
enhanced income has little impact on Lutritional standards of members of 
the family and no positive impact on infant nutrition. Instead, rising 
incomes were universally regarded as a means of upward social and economic 
mobility directed to the cities through higher education for children. Thus, 
while Steinberg admits that P.L. 480 may have depressed incomes in rural. 
areas nutritional standards are not a relevant measure of the P.L. 480 
effect. "The impression was gained that television and electric fans were 
ranked higher than-nutrition and consequently that the satisfaction of 
basic needs would be seen differently by villagers and development planners', 
(Steinberg, Morrow, Palmer,, Dong-il, 1980: D-4). 
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Education
 
In the 1930's less than half of the rural population wasliterate-in
 
anything except the Korean alphabet (Ban, Moon, Perkins, 1980:,,311). When
 
the U.S. took over administration of Korea after World War II,it set about
 
rebuilding and "democratizing" the educational system (Krueger, 1979: 22).
 
AID was very interested in education. Between 1952 and 1966, AID gave
 
$100 million to build 23,000 classrooms (Steinberg, 1982:29). By the
 
1960's virtually all children in app-ol-riate age groups were inprimary
 
schools and increasing numbers were going to middle school (Ban, Moon,
 
Perkins, 1980:311). For most village children, there were grade schools
 
within walking distance but sending a child to middle school, high sc1ool,
 
or college required that the family be prepared to board the child in the
 
town or city (Wideman, 1974:275). Through the 1960's this was very difficul
 
because rural incomes were so poor. The big spurt in rural middle school
 
education appears to have coincided with the rise in incomes in the 1970's
 
(Ban, Moon, Perkins, 1980:311) because of the expense of sending a child
 
to board at a school. According to Hasan, almost 90% of the farm population
 
was literate in 1974. 75.8% of the rural population went to primary school,
 
,21.8% went to middle school, and 6.5% went to high school or college.
 
Koreans traditionally place a high value on education and learning
 
(Brandt Cheong, 1982:52). Longer periods of schooling, more frequent
 
.consumption of meat, and the recent acquisition of radios, televisions,
 
rice cookers, and electric fans were regarded as indicators of improved
 
conditions of life in rural areas (Steinberg, Morrow, Palmer, Dong-il, 1980:
 
9). Farmers clearly felt that education was the key to success and made
 
sacrifices to provide their children with the best educations they could
 
afford.
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Although AID was very interested in education, the non-Korean influence 
was very limited according to Steinberg (Steinberg, 1982:28).on education 
Many Koreans were sent overseas for advanced degrees or training. When Park
 
with key policy posi­became president, he rewarded young well trained men 
Rhee had rewarded political supporters with policy appointments.
tions. 

Early planning was done mostly by foreigners but after that planning was
 
done mainly by Koreans, a number of whom had completed training programs
 
in the U.S. (Cole, Lyman, 1971:204). In all nearly 3,000abroad, especially 
persons in education, the bureaucracy, and the business community were 
sent
 
to the U.S. for training under the AID program following the Korean War
 
(Cole, Lyman, 1971:279).
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Women 
on women in rural Korea. It seemsLittle information seems to exist 
likely that the role of women has chav.eed in Korea in the last 30 jears or 
so. After World War II, AID helped rebuild the educational system and 
"democratized" it by including women in the system and by making education 
universal (Krueger, 1979: 22). Women have had access to higher educa­
tion in increasing numbers, possibly because it improves their prospects 
betterfor marriage. Many young women migrate to the cities in search of a 

life than they think they could have in the rural areas. "Some mothers 
maintained that they especially wanted their daughters to get out of agricul­
ture because it was so hard and all young unarried women interviewed by 
to marry a farmer," (Steinberg,Stednberg were adamant that they did not want 
Morrow, Palmer, Dong-il, 1980: D-5). 
The industrialization policies of the Korean government have created a
 
demand in cities for both young men and women. Perceived job availability
 
in urban areas has led many able-bodied people to leave the farms. Increasing­
ly farming is done by women and older men (Wideman, 1974: 286.. Women farm 
workers increased from 37.3% of the total farm workers in 1963 to 43.1% in
 
1971 (Wideman, 1974: 287). The gender specificity of cultivation tasks has 
given the declineled to an absolute rise in demand for female labor, and, 

in male-typed tasks, a relative rise as well (Steinberg, Morrow, Palmer,
 
Dong-il, 1980: 8). Women are stlll paid less than men are and are put out 
of work occasionally by the introduction of new techniques (Table 15.10). 
Table 15.10. 	 Rural-Urban Wage Differentials, Males and Females
 
1959-1975
 
(3) (4) (, 
Monthly
Monthly 	 Wage in Adult Female 
[Pagehe Textile Fant Wage Pei,
 
ltgeif- Mantafac- MAotil (daily
 
ar luric 	 turing X 26) '1)1(2) (3)1(4) 
1959 2,350 1,930 1,562 0.96. 1.24 
1960 2,330 2,290 1,543 0.97 1.48 
1,677 	 0.98 1.471961 2,610 	 2,470 
1,828 	 0.97 1351962 2,780 	 2,460 2,366 	 0:89 1.201963 3,180 2i830 
1964 3,880 3,440 3,224 0.78 1.07 
3,666 	 0.83 1.111965 4,600 	 4,060 
1966 5,420 4,670 4,290 0.85 1.09 
1967 6,640 6,050 5,382 0.87 1.12 
1968 8,400 7,090 6.760 0.88 1.03 
1969 11,590 9,110 8,216 1.00 1.11 
10,192 	 1.01 1.101970 14,561 	 11,223 
12,272 	 1.00 1.071971 17,349 	 13,124 1.00 1.101972 20,104 	 15,837 14,352 
16,120 	 1.01 1.141973 22,330 	 18,322 1.06 1.241974 30,209 25,756 20,748 
1975 38,220 36,675 31,255 27,144 1.04 1.15 
cc o 
and MAE, Yearbook of Agriculture and Forestry Statistics.The average number ofSources: 
(1) anti (3) EPB, Korea StatisticalYearbooks, and BOK, Economic Statistics Yearbooks. 
(2) and (4) NACF, Agricultural YVarboos 
*daysworked permonth in manufacturing was about 25, whereas in the textile industry it was about 26'days. 
Source: 	 Ban, Moon, Perkins (1970), Rural Development (Ctmbridge:
 
Harvard University Press): 78.
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Many reforms in developing countries adversely affect women without 
realizing it. Women's work in rural areas has increased over the years but
 
much of it is unpaid. The growth of almost universal primary school educa­
tion in rural areas has increased the amount of work that women do. More
 
children go to school which causes their participation in household chores
 
Women often have to do the work formerly doneand farm jobs to decrease. 

by children. Labor camps of the NCM often required women to feed the
 
workers which also increased their workload (Tinker, 1982:11).
 
Fertility control has clearly benefitted women. The better-off a farm
 
family is, the fewer children the family tends to have. This has been 
largely because they see education as the key to success and it costs money
 
to send children off for higher education. Thus, they perceive fewer
 
educated children as being as useful as more uneducated children (Steinberg,
 
Morrow, Palmer, Dong-il, 1980:D-3). The "fewer educated children" has 
been possible because of improved health standards. 
15.5 Some Conc usions 
When the U.S. accepted the surrender of Japan in 1945, South Korea 
became the responsibility of the U.S. It was therefore, the responsibility 
of the U.S. to help South Korea rebuild after 35 years as Japan's colony. 
With the departure of the Japanese, the U.S. was left with a considerable 
amount of unowned land and property to dispose of. Thus, the first thing 
the U.S. set out to do was to return Japanese-held land to Koreans and to 
bring about land reforms. The redistribution of land and the limit placed 
owned has in fact made rural income levels muchon the number of hectares 
more equitable overthe years. 
A major goal of the U.S. in the early 50's was to maintain South Korea 
War broke out between the two sections of Korea in 1950as a "democracy". 

in the form of military hardware, salaries,which led to massive U.S. aid 
food and U.S. troops (Ban, Noon, Perkins, 1980:22). The Korean military
 
force increased to 700,000, was the fourth largest military, and was
 
upported by U.S. aid (Ban, Moon, Perkins, 1980:35). Between 1946
heaviJ-

and 1975 the U.S. provided $13 billion in military and economic ussistance 
to Korea, over half of which was military assistance (Steinberg, 1982:26). 
U.S. military assistance from the U.S. has been very important to 
Korea. It has provided large sums of money directly to the government and 
has allowed the Korean government to divert money to other areas. The war
 
in Vietnam was also very helpful to Korea, although one couldn't really
 
"From 1964 increasing U.S. involvement in Vietnam
classify the gains as aid. 

South Korea. American use of Southincreasingly brought windfall profits to 
Korean mercenary troops and construction workers, as well as the purchase
 
earnings remark­of commodities for the war boosted Korean foreign exchange 
ably beginning in 1965," ?Wideman, 1974:273). The Vietnam War provided jobs 
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for Koreans and paid them in foreign exchange. The Korean army had rural
 
roots since it was mainly conscript (Cole and Lytman, 1971.:37). This use":
 
of rural labor took some of the pressure off land during the 1960's and
 
possibly diffused what might have been a conflict with the government over
 
its grain pricing policies.
 
In addition to military assistance, AID began to give large grants to
 
South Korea to rebuild its infrastructure which had been heavily damaged 
AID also helped to develop previously undeveloped sectorsduring the war. 
areas of U.S. support betweenlike the power industries. The three major 
1958 and 1966 were transportation, manufacturing, and power and these three
 
over 50% of AID grant project given by sector. Through
sectors made up 

1968, 75% of approved foreign 'Investment projects were either manufacturing
 
and mining, transportation or electricity projects (Cole and Lyman, 1971: 
196). None of these areas involved purely rural problems but all of the 
above had very beneficial effects on the rural areas of the country in later 
years. The time of maximum aid (until 1965) was the time of least growth 
in the rural sector but this was the time when many improvementsespecially 
were made which ultimately benefitted rural areas.
 
Large amounts of P.L. 480 grain shipments were given to Korea as grants 
until the late 1960's. This was initially given to prevent starvation
 
during and after the Korean War when agricultural production was inter­
rupted. It was also, however, given to benefit U.S. farmers who had a
 
large surplus of grain and neededto dispose of it. This grain wis given as a grant
 
until the late 1960's. The late 1960's marked the end of food grants to South
 
Korea, but the Korean government continued to import grain using foreign
 
to pay for it. 1972 was a bad year in Korea for farmers. Thatexchange 
coupled with bad harvests worldwide, the 1973 sale of wheat to Russia, and 
the increase in the price of energy and fertilizer made the costof grain 
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imports to Korea higher than ever before (Wideman, 1974: 282). 'It was
 
around t.iat time that te Korean government realized that it would have to 
provide more support for the rural sector. 
Free P.L. 480 grain allowed the Korean government to pursue a policy
 
of urbanization without the uncertainty of bad harvests as a constraint. 
It also allowed the government free reign on grain price manipulation.
 
It could pay farmers at below production cost prices and still have enough
 
grain 	to feed its citizens. As the P.L. 480 program declined in importance
 
Korean government anticipated that commercial grain imports would represent
 
a serious foreign exchange drain. This led, under the Park government,
 
to stronger programs of agricultural and rural development. The hardening
 
of terms and decreased rural support in the 1971 election acted as spurs
 
to the South Korean government to pay more attention to agricultural produc­
•tion 	 and to improve levels of living in rural areas. 
AID spent a good deal of its money on infrastructure in Korea. After 
a lag in the 60's, the benefits of this investment were seen by Korean
 
farmers. The pull of cities and industry has iade rural labor scarcer and
 
thus 	 more costly (Steinberg, 1982:18). In 1960, 28% of the total popula­
tion 	lived in cities; in 1982, 55% lived in cities. Now there is an actual 
shortage of agricultural labor in South Korea (Brandt and Cheong, 1982:
 
38-39). Improved roads have allowed many farmers who live near cities to 
grow 	 fruit and vegetables as cash crops which they market in the cities 
(Aqua, 1974:33). Industrialization has led to a demand for labor both 
male 	and female which has provided alternative occupations for people who
 
otherwise would have been farmers. Development of electricity, which was 
assisted by AID, has led to improved lifestyles in rural areas as evidenced
 
by the appearance of radios, T.V.'s, rice cookers, electric fans, and
 
refrigerators.
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One must keep in mind that the bulk of aid given to Korea was given 
when anti-Communist inspired military,assistance was something that the
 
American people could understand. Infrastructure made sense too because 
the Marshall Plan had successfully helped to rebuild Europe. Education 
was important because it taught democracy and in general it was felt an 
educated populace was better. Many classrooms were built by AID and many 
for post-high school training. KoreaKoreans were brought to the U.S. 

pursued a development policy which in many ways fit early aid hopes.
 
While it basically ignored human considerations like welfare and human
 
rights, it built an internal structure which in the Inng run benefitted Its
 
the "basic needs" to aid becar'e Korea wascitizens. When element the mode, 
where it could afford to pay more attentionat a point in its development 
to the "needs" of its citizens. In the rural areas, the NCM (New Community
 
Movement) was the Korean counterpart to rural "basic needs" strategy. The 
central government in Seoul would decide what needed to be done and the 
villagers would do it. These projects included such things as building
 
better village roads, communal meeting halls, tiling roofs which had been
 
rice thatch, increased electric use in villages, modern houses, and improved
 
health conditions- all the "basic needs". Thus, rural development in Korea 
has fit in nicely with the swings in U.S. foreign aid considerations. 
Korea is.considered one of the major success stories of the developing 
world. This success is partly a result of unique aspects. It is homogenous 
and it is a Sinitic society. China, Japan and Taiwan are also successes and 
are also Sinitic societies which leads one to think that perhaps there is 
something about the society itself which is important for success. Policy
 
implementation is felt to be a key factor in Korea's success. According 
to Steinberg, its policy formulation was probably no better and no worse
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than any other developing country's, but its ability to formulate a , 
policy and have it followed was important (Steinberg, 198,2: 43). Orders 
were given from the central office and they were carried out exactly as­
directed at the local level.
 
Korea's history is also somewhat unique,' Land reform was carried 
out by U.S. military occupation after World War II with relative ease. 
When the Japanese surrendered to the U.S., 40% of Korea's land was 
Japanese-owned. This left a large amount of land unowned which had to be 
distributed. Landowners had often beeni co-opted by the Japanese and thus: 
were in no position to resist the reforms. Land reform has been important 
to income distribution in Korea but it was carried out under unique cir­
cumstances. The Vietnam War was also a boon to Korea. It brought in foreign 
exchange through purchase of goods but it also employed Korean soldiers 
and workers at a time when a military force of 700,00, could have been a.
 
problem. The Korean War was heavily subsidized by the U.S. as was the'. 
rebuilding process afterwards. Finally until the 1970's, aid to Korea 
was mainly in the form of grants. This meant that the Korean goveriment 
was virtually debt free in the beginning of the 1970's. 
It has been difficult to separate the impact of AID programs initerms 
of rural and urban development. It has also been very difficult tofigure 
out exactly what AID did in Korea on a project-by-project basis. General 
information is available. AID financed infrastructure early on. Specific 
details about various projects are much harder to find. Thus the lessons 
which seem to come from rural development in Korea are general ones which 
encompass the whole economy. They asare follows: 
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1. 	Early emphasis on urbanization and industrialization caused 
a demand
 
More
for agricultural produce which in turn stimulated agriculture. 

emphasis was placed on the urban sector and manufacturing. Agricultural
 
laborers left the countryside to work in cities where incomes were higher.
 
This led to a scarcity of labor which is partly responsible for improved
 
Urban demand for food also stimulated agricultural production.
rural incomes. 

2. Free P.L. 480 grain shipments are not always detrimental in the long run. 
In the short run, most people agree that the free shipments of grain from 
the U.S. allowed the Korean government to pursue a policy which neglected 
agricultural production and rural welfare. If farmers came up short in a 
harvest, the Korean government knew it could get free grain from the U.S. 
In the late 1960's the terms of trade hardened and the Korean government
 
realized that it would have to spend foreign exchange on grain if harvests
 
were poor. From that time on, the Korean government pursued a policy 
which put emphasis on agriculture. Basically P.L. 480 shipments bought 
time during which the government was able to concentrate (successfully in 
Korea's case) on its urban export-oriented manufacturing sector. Terms
 
a catalist for either ignoring agriculture or
of trade for grain acted as 

aiding it.
 
3. "Basic needs" came as a result of successful economic policies. The
 
Korean economy developed with little consideration for the basic needs of
 
the people. Rural people's needs were largely ignored before the 1970's when
 
the NCM (Saemaul Movement) began. Although education, medical facilities, housing,
 
etc. were of more interest in the urban areas, these were not high priority
 
any place.,. In.rural areas, increased income has meant improved living con­
a result of improved employment opportunities.
ditions and the increased income is 
4. Training abroad seems to have been important. According to Cole and Lyman,
 
approximately 3,000 Koreans have been trained abroad, many in the U.S.
 
(Cole, Lyman 1971: 279) :We have not seen a systematic analysis of the
 
impact of overseas training in Korea, but certainly Cole and Lyman and
 
Steinberg feel this was one of the greater impacts that the U.S. has had in
 
Korea. Early planning was done mostly by foreigners. By the second round
 
of planning, however, trained Koreans were very involved. (Cole, Lyman 1971:204)
 
in his pro3ect imnact stiAv of Korean irrigation, Steinberg concludes that the
 
general success of the project is the result of policy formulation and
 
implementation by Koreans themselves. (Steinberg, Morrow, Palmer. Dong-il 1980:A)
 
In this project the U.S. mostly provided the funding. Training abroad gave
 
Koreans the skills needed to make decisions and adapt policies for Korea.
 
The Park government gave these foreign-trained people key policy positions
 
in the government and expected them to encourage long-term development.
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Footnotes
 
'All data cited in this and the subsequent two paragraphs are from 
Mason, Kim, et al, 1980, Chapter 4 except as otherwise noted. This 
chapter also draws heavily on Krueger (1979). 
V 	 It isperhaps noteworthy that, even during the very rapid growth years 
from 1960 to 1978, South Korea never achieved full control over domestic 
inflation. During most of that period, however, the rate of inflation 
was fairly stable, not accelerating, and significantly below the rates 
of earlier years. 8outh Korea's inflation rate rose in the 1970's as 
did rates in the rest of the world. Overall, however, one would judge 
the South Korean inflation experience in the 1970's to be no worse than 
that of many other countries. 
Unfortunately, the nominal interest rate was not permitted to rise­
as much as the domestic inflation rate in the 1970's. By the late 1970's 
the negative real interest rate was once again an identifiable source 
of major distortion within the system. 
A thorough analysis of the role of aid in Korea's growth over the period 
1945-75 was undertaken jointly by the Korean Development Institute and 
the Harvard Institute for International Development. For a detailed 
analysis of the role of aid in Korea's development, see Mason, Kim, 
et al, (1980). 
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CHAPTER 16
 
ASSISTANCE TO TURKEY* 
An examination of the history of aid to Turkey is instructive for a 
variety of reasons. Turkey has one of the longest histories as a U.S. aid 
recipient of any country in the world. As a member of NATO and immediately 
on the Russian border, there are important American strategic and political 
inte'rests in the country,. along with the strong interest in economic 
development concerns. 
There is also an interesting contrast with Korea, another country whose
 
history with foreign assistance is surveyed in this volume: from the
 
perspective of the early 1960's, most observers would have concluded that
 
assistance to Turkey had been highly successful (because of her relatively
 
high rate of economic growth) whereas that to Korea had been somewhat less
 
so. Viewed from the perspective of the 1980's, however, the Korean economy,
 
despite its current problems, has had enormous success in achieving develop­
mental targets and in eliminating any need for concessional finance. By
 
contrast, Turkey continues to be an aid recipient, and her economic progress
 
over the past two decades has been far less impressive than that of South
 
7:orea. 
16-2 
To understand some dimensions of the aid experience in Turkey, it is
 
necessary first to provide a brief sketch of Turkish economic growth. That
 
is done in Section 16.1. In section 16.2 a history of assistance, and
 
its interaction with that growth, is provided. In Section 16.3, the trade­
and-aid interrelationship is examined in somewhat more detail. Section
 
16.4 is devoted to a review of assistance to Turkey for agricultural and
 
rural development. The conclusions that flow from our review of development
 
assistance to Turkey are summarized in Section 16.5.
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16. Turkish Growth Performance 
There have been three strikingly similar cycles of growth in Turkey
 
-/
over the period 1950-1982 (Table 16.1).- An understanding of those cycles
 
is perhaps the simplest means of providing a sketch of Turkey's growth
 
experience, and is simultaneously necessary for analyzing the aid experience.
 
It is simplest to start, therefore, by providing the "stylized facts"
 
of the cycles, and only after that to consider the progress that was made
 
during, and the special characteristics of, each cycle. Each cycle starts
 
with a period during which growth is fairly rapid, generally as a consequence
 
of some external stimulus. These covered the post-war reconstruction and
 
the commodity price boom of the early 1950's; the advent of program aid in
 
the early 1960's; and the large expansion in output following upon the
 
success of the 1970 devaluation. Inflationary pressures arise, the exchange
 
rate becomes increasingly unrealistic, the government responds with a variety
 
of ad hoc measures to "patch up" the situation, and the economy becomes 
increasingly distorted. Meanwhile, little is done to curb the sources of 
inflationary pressure. The limited actions that are taken, such as imposing
 
price controls on state economic enterprises and financing their deficits
 
through central bank credits, have often actually intensified inflationary
 
pressures
 
As distortions mount, either through a rising rate of inflation or through
 
increasingly scarce foreign exchange, the rate of economic growth declines.
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Table 16.1. Growth and Sectoral Composition of GNP in Turkey: 1950-1980
 
(TL million in 1968 prices) 
As % As% As % Emport 
Agriculture GNP Industry GNP Services GNP Taxes 
1950 15,867 41.2 5,054 13.1 15,761 40.9 1,915 
1951 18,998 43.7. 5,192 11.9 .6,955 39.0 2,390 
1952 20,856 42.9 5,763 I1 8 18,844 38.7 3,275 
1953 22,668 41.9 6,872 12.,7 21,331 39.4 3,339 
1954 19,607 37.5 7"7,514 _ 14.3, 22,427 42.7 3,106 
1955 21,483 37.9 8,382 14.8 24,097 42.5 2,950 
1956 22,553 38.6 9, 192 ' 15.7 24,619 42.1 2,399 
1957 23,985 38.1 10,260 16.3 26,874 42.7 2,298 
1958 26,182 39.8 10,858 16.5 27,190 41.3 2,078 
1959 26,258' 38.3 " 11,250 16.4 28,826 42.1 3,039 
1960 26,836 37.9 254 15.9 30,276 4.7 3,025 
1961 25,549 35.3 12,472 17.3 - 319393 :43.4 3,206 
1962 26,740 34.8 13,017 17.0 33,312 43.4 3,961 
1963 29,344 34. 8 14,597 17. 3 36,208 43.0 4,142 
1964 29,224 33.3 16,225 9 18.5 38,231 43.6 4,102 
1965 28,101 31.0, 17,761 19.6 40,155 44.4 4,061 
1966 31,128 30.'8 :20,469 20.2 44,389 43.9 4,643 
1967 31,205 29.6 22,196, 21.0 46,874 44.4 4,883 
1968 1969 31,699 28.2 24,677 21.9 50,862 45.25. 4,952493332 
1969 32,110 27.1 127,654 23.3 54,070 45.6 4,333 
1970 32,870 26.2. 28,032, 22.3, 58,692 46.8 4,355 
1971 37,209 26.9 30,557 221.1 62,994 45.6 4,421 
1972 37,372 250 33,661 22.7 68,365: 46.0 4,965 
1973, 33,443 21.4 37, 711 24.1 74,1251 47.5 5,023 
1974 36,887 21.9 40,628,,. 24.2 80,499 47.9 5,223 
1975 40,889 22.5i '44,268 24.4 86,953 47.9 5,651 
1976 44,025 22.5 48,387 24.7 94,582 ..48.3 6,213 
1977 43,506 21.4 51,766 25.5 99,871 49.1 6,434 
1978 44,745 - 21. 53,546 25.6 103,659 49.6 5,364 
1979 45,989 :",22.1- 51,050 24.5 103,998 49.9 4,450 
1980 46,766 1 221.7 49,549 .24.0 103,968 50.5 3,613 
Average Annual 
%Increase: 
1950-60 5.4 8.3 6.7 
1960-70 2.0 9.6 6.8 
1970-80 3.6 5.9 5.9 
1950-80 3.7 7.9 6.5 
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Table 16.1 (continued) 
GDP Net factor GNP Populat GNP 
(purchaser income froi (purchaser4 Index (millio per head 
prices) abroad prices) (1950=100) mid-ye (TL) 
1950 38,598 -.92 38,506 100 20.9 1,842 
1951 43,536 - 89 43,446 112.8 21.3 2,040 
1952 48,738 -117 48,621 126.3 21.9 2,220 
1953 54,210 -120.. 54,090 140.4 22.6 2,393 
1954 52,655 -174 52,480 136.3 23.2 2,262 
1955 56,912 -270 56,642 147.1 2.3.9 2,369 
1956 58,763 -335 58,428 151.7 24.4 2,394 
1957 63,417 -422 62,995 163.6- '-.25.3 2,490 
1958 66,308 -463 65,844 171.0 26.0 2,532 
1959 69,373 -852 68,521 177.9 26.7 2,566 
1960 71,391 -522 70,869 184.0 27.5 2,577 
1961 72,619 -334,1 72,286 187.7 28..2 2,563 
1962 77,030 -276, 76,754 199.3 28.9 2,656 
1963 84,291 103 84,188 218.6 29.7 2,835 
1964 87,782 -163 87,619 227.6 30.4 2,882 
1965 90,078 +290 90,368 234.7 31.2 2,896 
1966 100,629 +576 101,204 262.8 31.9 3,172 
1967 105,158 +302 105,460 273.9 32.7 3,225 
1968 112,190 +303 112,493 292.1 33.6 3,348 
1969 118,168 +426 118,594 308.0 34.4 3,447 
1970 123,949 -1,477 125,425 325.7 35.3 3,553 
1971 135,181 -3,004 138,185 358.4 36.2 3,817 
1972 144,063 "4,414 148,476 385.6 37.1 4,002 
1973 150,428 "6,029 156,458 406.3 38.1 4,106 
1974 163,237 -4,776 168,013 436.3 39.0 4,308 
1975 177,761 -3,623 181,383 471.1 40.1 4,526 
1976 193,207 .2,544 195,751 508.4 40.9 4,784 
1977 201,577 -1,781 203,358 528.1 41.8 4,869 
1978 207,314 -1,869 209,183 543.2 42.6 4,906 
1979 205,487 -2,857 208,343 541.1 4 . 5 4,786 
1980 203,896- -2,165 206,061 535.1 44.4 4,637 
Average Annual 
1950-60 6.3 6.3 2.8 3.4 
1960-70 .5.7 5.9. 2.5 3.3 
1970-80 5.01 -5.1 2.3 2.7 
1950-80 5.7 5.8 2.5 3.1 
Table 16.1 (continued)
 
a Includes construction, wholesale and retail trade transportation, storage,
Notes: 

communications, banking, insurance, and related financial activities,
 
business, social, personal, and governmental services, minus imputed bank
 
service charges.
 
b Preliminary figures (SIS)
 
Sources: Turkish State Institute of Statistics (SIS), National Income and
 
Expenditures of Turkey, 1948-1972 (Ankara, SI, 1973), pp. 36-37, 143;
 
SIS, TiYrkiye Mille Geliri, 1962-1977 (Ankara, SIS, n.d.), Table 5; SIS,
 
Statistical Yearbook 1981 (Ankara, SIS, 1981), Tables 20, 398, pp. 29, 400.
 
16-7,
 
And this in turn induces a new reform program. The period surrounding the 
reform program has typically been a period of slow growth. In the two 
earlier cycles, the reforms were successful in stabilizing the economy and 
reducing the degree of distortion. -It- is-still too early to pass judgement"
 
on the success of the 1980-81 reforms.
 
With this overly-smplified pattern inmind, the economic history of 
each of the three subperiods can be briefly recounted. The first such 
period, which began during the worldwide bo,atof the early 1950's, ended 
with a devaluation-reform program in 1958. Turkey's economy had been dis­
located during the Second World War. The post-war period was one of recovery 
spurred by relatively high commodity prices for Turkey's exports and by Point 
Four and Marshall Plan aid. The short-run expansion in real output was 
impressive, with rates of growth of real GNP estimated to have been almost 
10 percent annually from 1950 to 1953. Turkey even became the world's 
largest exporter of wheat in the 1951-53 period (see Section 16.4 for an 
analysis of the role of aid in the expansion of grain production in the 
Anatolean plateau). 
By 1953, however, difficulties were arising as the increase in resources
 
permitted by high commodity prices,' rising real volumes of exports, and
 
foreign assistance, were not sustained. Inflationary pressures within the
 
domestic economy mounted. Export earnings fell due to a worsening of the
 
terms of trade, to a poor harvest, and to the decline in the real value of the
 
Turkish Lira.
 
The Turkish government's response was to improve surcharges on imports,
 
to require import licensing, and to permit resort to suppliers' credits and 
bilateral arrangements to finance needed imports. My 1958, however, the 
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situation was desperate. Additional credits became virtually unavailable as a
 
result of many arrears in indebtedness. There was insufficient foreign 
exchange available to permit the petroleum imports needed to harvest the 
crops-and transport-them to port. A devaluation-stabilization program 
was finally entered into with the IMF and donor countries (see Section 16.2
 
..
 
for.more details), and major domesticeconomic reforms were undertaken.. 

By"1960, the response to the reforms whs being felt, and the ground 
was laid for the next cycle, which lasted over the decade of the 1960's. 
During the,1960's growth'was rapid - averaging just under 7 percent annually 
in real terms. From the vantage point of the late 1960's Turks could justly
 
point with pride to their cumulative growth rate s!ince 1953 as being one of
 
the highest in the world. The retardation of the late 1950's appeared to
 
have been a temporary aberration.
 
The 1960's witnessed the start of major governmental investment programs
 
and intervention in the economy in support of development objectives. In
 
particular, major emphasis was placed upon the development of a "modern"
 
industrial sector. Measures were taken to encourage the growth of domestic
 
industry (see Section 16.3 below). This had several effects: (1) it
 
placed heavy demands on imports for both investment goods and for .inter-,
 
mediate goods to permit existing import substitution activities tocontinue
 
,-.
producing;, (2) it intensified inflationary pressures within the domestic 

economy; (3) It placed incentives on production of import substitutes at
 
the expense of expansion of capacity to produce goods for export.
 
Unlike the 1950's cycle, the cumulative effects of 'theses
Strains were
 
most gradual in developing. The government acted to avoid the extreme
 
dislocations of the 1950's., However, by the late 1960's delays in obtaining
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f oreign exchange and import licenses were again mounting. The black market 
exchange rate was again soaring well above the official rate and dislocation 
was emerging in many economic activities. While the.rate of economic growth 
slowed down somewhat, -action-was-taken before-diffiulties were severe.- I n... 
August 1970 a devaluation-cum-stabilization, program was again announced. 
.The response to that'program was immediate and pronounced: partly 
because Turkish workers in Europe. had been channeling their funds through 
informal channels (or holding their savings in deutschmarks or other hard 
currencies),.and partly for other reasons, export earnings and other foreign. 
exchange..receipts rose sharply. Turkey's international reserves, whichhad 
stood at $-221 billion in-1969, rose to a peak of $484 billion in 1973. 
Meanwhile, imports had risen markedly from $948 billion in 1970 to $2086 
billion in 1973. Again, the economy also responded markedly, as-real GNP
 
rose 10.2% in1971, 7.4%'in 1972, and 5.4% in 1973 (Table 16.2).
 
However, this third cycle, which culminated in the reform program begun 
in January 1980, also contained the seeds of its own self destruction. The 
initial contributing factor was the success of the devaluation-stabilization 
program itself. The sharp increase in workers' remittances and other­
foreign exchange could not be sufficiently contained by the Central Bank 
of Turkey. As a consequence, inflationary pressures were released within 
the economy. The.rate of inflation, which had fallen to an average of 
less than 8 percent in the 19601s, rose to over 25 percent by 1973. 
Although Turkey produces very little oil'and was thus adversely affected
 
by the oil price rise of.1973-7,4, theGovernment's initial response was to 
borrow from abroad and to run down foreign exchange reserves. This strategy 
was moderately successful in 1974 and,1975. Real GNP rose 7.4 percent in 
Table 16 2. Trends in Trade D elopment Ass istance, and :Balance of 
"CURRENT ACCOUNT 
Visibles Invisibles NATO 
Infrastructure 
Imports EkpbortS .. id 6f fsh6re' 
(CIF) (FOB) receipts Balance 
1950 " 286 263 - - 27 - - 50 
1951 402, 314 - - 6 - - 94 
1952: 556 363: - -5 - - 198 
1953 533 396 - - 27 - -­ 164 
1954' , 478 335 -­ 34 -­ 177 
1955 498 313 - -35 43 -177 
1956 40 -400305 67 - 75 
1957 97 345 -­ 47 4 59 
1958 315 247 I - 4 52 ' 64 
1959 470 354. - 64 . 35 145 
1960 :468 321 - 44 52 -139 
1961 510 347 - - 55 48 - 170 
1962 622 . 381. - -41 40 - 242 
1963" 688 368 - - 29 49 - 300 
1964 537 9 51 59 - 109 
1965 572 .464 70 60, 20 - '78 
1966 718 490 115 70 l9 - 164. 
196761968 " "10 523 :93, 59 80 
14 -114­
198 764 496 107 -810-2131 
19,69' 8011* .523, 141 -106 8 - 221 
1970 ',948 588 273 -92 .8, - 171 
1971: 71 677 471 -105 6 - 122 
1972 L563., 885 740 -100 ' 30 - 8 
1973 Z086,' 1317 .183 70 - 84 
1974 3777 1532 .462 63 - - 720 
1975 738 -1401 .312 146 - -1879 
1976 5129 1960 982 -114 -2301 
1977 5797.,-,, '1753 982 -364 .- 3426 
1978, 599 2288.. 983 -191 -1511 
1979 5069 2261 .694 -589 -1703 
1980 7909. 2910 .671' -733 -3661 
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Table 16.2 (continued)
 
CAPITAL ACCOUNT 
Other Project and PLO Amor- Net 
Direct Capital b Programme 480 tisation Capital 
Investment govements Aidc Imports of "debt Inflow 
-19.50. 7 2- 103 -15 90. 
1951. 7 21' 113 -. -18 123 
1952 10 85 72 - . - 22 -145 
1953 8 105 6--2C 155 
1954 8 126 '65 - 7 126 
1955, 3 127' 81 -105 106 
1956 2 143 103. 14: 89 173 
19-57 -17 87 75 32 - 82 128 
1958 13 45, ,105 421 -'69 ,"136 
1959 ..7 28 169 :27 -6 171 
1960 24' 30 118' 22 65 129 
1961 . 34 15 151' 65 - ,8 181 
1962 36 26", 163 71 - 97 199 
1963 21 15 247 88 -103 270 
1964 25 17 190 31 -114 149 
1965 22 5 274 :29 -17C 160 
1966 30 11 238 • 17 -124 172 
1967 17, 1 246 7 -10E 169 
1968 13 22 274 - - 94 215 
1969 24 20 279 41 -11! 249 
1970 58 -.34 337 83 -197 315 
1971 45 27 343- 55 -12! 345 
1972 43 39 304. 16 " -127 275 
1973 79 50 381 -,. ­ 7 433 
1974 33 113 269 - -15f 259 
1975 -55 348 322 - -147 578 
1976 27 236 391, -1. 535 
1977 .67 1162 503 - -211 1518 
1978 47 733. 855 . -45 1.184 
1979 86 -246 ML887 94. 782 
1980 36. 37 808 - -1551 2325 
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Table 16.2 (continued) 
UVEKALL 1$ALA_ UL" 
Net IMF Net Errors Change in 
Position Short-term and Reserves 
and SDR's Capital Omissions - = Increase) Balance 
1950 ' - "2 !12 30' 40 
1951 3 21 29, 
1952 5'i 11 62, 99: 53 
.1953. 20 10 :48, 69' 91 
1954 :66 6 6 51 
1955 *9- '61' 52 71 71 
1957~ 7 11 '58 7 6 
19~S -'15 45 38 9 
.1958 17 7 15, 67 72: 
1959 3 10 44 31 26 
1960 .3' J18, '851. 10, 
S1961 0 39 97 l7911 
S1962 6 15 ,22 30 43 
1963 4 -22 '83 
1964 3 - 80 37 40 
1965 -15 67 82 
196.8 '18 10 8' 
1967. . '' 8. 121 55 
1968 27 18 .25 . "16 
1969 41 !29. 76, 1122 28, 
1970 .48 2'184 *18W: 144 
.1971 2 61 .60 !3466 223 
1972 -61 332 228..566 267 
1973 . -224 ,35 -728 917 
1974.. '22.1 
197 5. 01 558', 25 417 1301 
1976 149 1520 15 112 1766' 
1977 14 1554 220 560 1908 
1978 .75' 844 .536 148 335:, 
1979 3 94 808 -84 921 
1980 502; 128 -580 L336 
Table 16.2 (continued) 
Notes: a Includes tourism, interest payments, profits transfers and other
 
invisible transactions: for 1973-80, includes NATO infrastructure
 
and offshore receipts.
 
b Includes 	suppliers and commercial credits and direct imports
 
with waivers.
 
c Includes debt relief.
 
d For 1967-77, mainly convertible lira accounts.
 
*!Sources: 	SPO, Yeni Strateji ve Kalkinma Plani, Ucuncu Bes Yil, 1973-1977
 
(Ankara, SPO, 1973), p. 52; SPO Dorduncu Bes Yillik Kalkinma Plani,
 
1979-1983 (Ankara, SPO, 1979), p. 71; OECD, OECD Economic Surveys,
 
Turkey 1978 (Paris, OECD, 1978), p. 55; Turkiye is Bankasi, Economic
 
Report 1978 (Ankara, Turkiye is Bankasi, 1978), p. 34; Briefing, 17
 
March 1980, p. 18; SIS, Statistical Yearbook, 1981 (Ankara, SIS, 1981).
 
OECD, OECD 	Economic Surveys, Turkey 1982 (Paris, OECD, 1982), pp. 23,, 62.
 
Singer, Economic Advance, p. 392.
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1974 and 8.0 percent in 1975. However, the rate of inflation rose further,
 
accelerating from 14 percent in 1973 to 21 percent in 1975, 26 percent in
 
1977, and finally reaching 100 percent in 1980. By the end of the cycle in
 
1979 - and despite several "programs" that had been announced designed to
 
rectify the situation - real GNP was declining. In 1980 real GNP stood
 
only 5.3 percent above its 1976 level--an average rate of increase of less
 
than 2 percent annually - less than the rate of growth of population over 
the same period. 
As this brief description indicates, macroeconomic difficulties have 
plagued the T.rkish economy throughout the period during which foreign
 
assistance has been a factor in the economy. Although 3atisfactory economic
 
growth rates were achieved for part of that period, those rates proved
 
unsustainable because of macroeconomic difficulties. As will be seen in
 
Section 16.2, much of aid policy toward Turkey, especially in the 1960!s
 
and the late 1970's, has been strongly conditioned by the presence of th se
 
difficulties.
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16.2,, Macroperspectives on Assistance" 
Turkey,is,one of the oldestw-recipients of, aid and has, throughout 
most of.the period, been a major recipient of-American aid. Evenduring 
the Marshall Plan period, Turkey was a major recipient. There are few 
lessons from that period, however, for development assistance and this 
review therefore starts with the first of the three cycles. 
Despite the similarities of the cycles in Turkish economic development,
 
the role of foreign assistance has been somewhat different during each.
 
During the 1950's, the United States was virtually the only donor country
 
(until 1958). Most assistance was intended to be project assistance. It
 
was directed primarily at infrastructure and agricultural development.
 
During the second cycle, American assistance efforts were generally
 
shifted toward "program", rather than "project" support. In the case of
 
Turkish program assistance was undertaken in conjunction with a consortium
 
of donor agencies. In the third cycle, American assistance was greatly
 
reduced in scope in the early 1970's in response, in part, to the apparent
 
success of the 1970 devaluation. It was resumed again in response to the
 
difficulties encountered by the'Turkish economy in the late 1970's.
 
In the 1950's, assistance centered primarily upon infrastructure. 
Special emphasis was given to the construction-of a road network deemed 
desirable for NATO-military purposes as well as for economic development. 
This nationwide network of paved roads has been of major significance for
 
2/

regional and agricultural development.­
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.Infras.ructure investment and other development assistance activities
 
3/
 
were also undertaken in a number of other sectors.-

For present purposes, however, focus must be on the interaction of
 
American assistance with the Turkish macroeconomic difficulties of the late
 
1950's. American authorities were well aware of the problems inherent in
 
Turkish macroeconomic policy. An American assistance-sponsored analysis of
 
the Turkish macroeconomic problems was conducted by Chenery, Brandow and
 
Cohn (1953). It is of interest that the Turkish reaction to the study was to
 
refuse permission of the authors 	to enter the country. However, given the 
American political interests in Turkey, American policy was torn between a
 
desire to provide political support to the Menderes government and the desire 
to have Turkish macroeconomic policies corrected.
 
The consequence was a difficult and tense period in Turkish-American
 
relations. Starting in 1956, the Menderes government several times requested
 
continuation of American project 	assistance and an American program loan
 
4/

to provide financing for imports.-
The American authorities refused those requests based largely on their 
recognition that the Turkish government's policies were unsustainable. By 
the summer of 1958, the Menderes government was willing to accept the 
restrictions placed upon it under an IMF-led consortium that was clearly 
strongly influenced by the American position. Whether the change came about 
because of the increased difficulties experienced by the Turkish economy 
(there had even been a Turkish mission seeking Russian assistance prior 
to that time) or whether the American positi'on softened somewhat (the Iraqi 
revolution took place two months 	 prior'to the stabilization plan).is an open 
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question. But the episode well illustrates Lh--c dilemma of assistance in 
the context of strong political interests in the recipient country. 
The 1960's cycle represents yet another type of experience. By that 
time, the focus of American aid had shifted largely toward "program", 
rather than "project", assistance. Although Turkey received assistance from 
several donors the United States was by far the largest source of assistance
 
in the early 1960's. But the United States' relative importance as a donor
 
to Turkey declined sharply in later years as Turkish Associate Membership 
in te EC led. to stronger economic ties with the European countries. The 
dilemma of U.S. program aid to Turkey centered upon how an individual donor 
could influence macroeconomic policy. The solution in the Turkish case was 
the formation of a "consortium", which met with Turkish planners and other 
officials to discuss budget plans and go over the "import requirements associ­
ated with it (White, 1967). This led to a focus on overall development 
efforts, and particularly on investment plans. The donor agencies were 
concerned with allocational issues including the distortions caused by 
the trade regime and the sectoral allocation of resources. Bargaining, 
however, tended to focus on the degree of emphasis and the rate of investment 
in import-substitution sectors rather than on the strategy itself. Perhaps 
this was because, in the context of the 1960's, the long-run consequences 
of such strategies were less well appreciated than they are today (see 
Chapter 13). It is,also true, however, that a bargaining process itself 
implies some degree' of "give and take" on both .sides, 'which meant that the 
fundamental premises of Turkish planning could not be challenged., 
Two other lessons from the experience of the 1960's may be mentioned. 
First, the "program". emphasis focussed on investment plans', foreign exchange 
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allocations, and, to a certain extent on the related macroeconomic issues.:
 
However, since the "foreign exchange shortage" associated with a given plan
 
the level of assistance to be
was what determined, at least in principle, 

extended by the Consortium donors there was some conflict on the part of the
 
to the extent to which it was in their self-interest
Turkish authorities as 

to minimize the gap. Secondly, the consortium model was in itself somewhat
 
unwieldy. Multiple donors with different emphases among themselves probably
 
limited the effectiveness that might otherwise have been achieved in influenc­
ing Turkish policy. There was also a problem with delays. The fact that
 
Turkish plans first had to be formulated and then discussed with donors.
 
Th4''difficulty of reaching a consensus among all donors on assistance levels
 
made the process a difficult one for donors and recipient alike.
 
Despite the above, which may be regarded as "lessons" learned from
 
seems likely that the "program" approach to development
the 1960's cycle, it 

assistance was probably a significant factor in limiting the distortions to
 
which the Turkish economy was subject before remedial actions were taken.
 
There was a continuing dialogue between A.I.D. and the Turkish government 
officials (inwhich Krueger was occasionally a sideline observer). There
 
were attempts to persuade the Prime Minister and his cabinet that a change 
in macroeconomic policies, especially the exchange rate, was desirable,long
 
before the decision was taken.- It is in principle unknowable whether the
 
devaluation of 1970 would have been delayed even longer in the absence of
 
donor pressure. What is clear, however, is that remedial action was taken 
in 1970 at a far earlier stage of the cycle than in either,the 1950's or 
the 1970's.
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The third cycle is in a way the most interesting. With the exception
 
of the multilateral lending agencies, there was far less involvement of donors
 
in the process than had been the case in the earlier cycles. American assis­
tance resumed when severe balance of payments difficulties and other symptoms
 
of extreme dislocation reemerged. Then, starting in 1978, there were repeated
 
"programs" announced to stem the difficulties. An IMF stabilization program
 
of 1978 of U.S. $450 million, combined with an OECD-consortium debt re­
scheduling provided about,$.2 billion over a two-year period in balance of
 
payments support. There were, of course, conditions attached ,to the stabilize
 
tion-program and these were generally underachieved in 1978 and 1979.
 
Despite changes in the exchange rate, the rate of inflation was sufficiently
 
high that the real rate became increasingly overvalued and export earnings
 
faltered.
 
From hindsight, there were two major mistakes in the 1970's. First,
 
Turkish borrowing, primarily from commercial sources, in the mid-1970's
 
postponed adjustment thereby making it more difficult when it did ,come.
 
Second, when the imbalances were finally apparent in 1977, their severity
 
was underestimated. The lending to Turkey in 1978 and 1979 did little to
 
rectify the underlying difficulties, while simultaneously insuring that
 
Turkey would have an even bigger debt-servicing burden when a genuine
 
reform of'economic-policies was undertaken in January 1980.
 
It seems clear that a maj.or lesson for development assistance is that,­
when the macroeconomic policy signals are massively out of line lending to 
support the country in question will only make'the cost of adjustment even 
high-r unless sufficient remedial actions are undertaken. There is, however,. 
no widely accepted technique for estimating when the policychanges are 
L6-20 
sufficient to remedy the underlying difficulties. At least until knowledge
 
improves, advice on policy reform will continue to contain a large element
 
of judgement.
 
16.3 
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Trade and Aid' in Turkey
 
In any country-which maintains a fixed exchange rate while experiencing
 
a rate of inflation in excessof the,rate"in the rest of the world, the 
.first symptom of'real difficulty, other than the inflation itself, generally 
.arises in its balance of payments and in mounting debt-service obligations. 
It is: therefore: inevitable that countries with expansionary policies and 
fixed exchange rates will seek support from donor countries und institutions. 
When the macroeconomic policies are appropriate, such support can be used 
in highly productive ways in support of economic development. When they, 
are inappropriate, however, ,they can be"largely dissipated in support of 
policies which must, at any.. event, be remedied if growth is to resume or 
continue. 
The Turkish experience amply demonstrates this. While many.ofthe 
,,individual~projects' financed by the United States and other donors have had 
a high rate of return, and more will have' if present economic reforms 
succeed, the United States and other donors were three times caught in a 
weak bargaining position on economic reform by their political interest in 
Turkey at times when Turkish macroeconomic policy was unsustainable. In 
the 1960's, corrective measures were taken re]atively early in the cycle.: 
In the 1950's andr1970's, however, donors were induced to provide support 
(in 1956-58 and again ii.1977-79). despite the fact that the underlying 
programs had not been sufficiently changed to offer promise of great macro­
economic relief..
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The fact that trade, can,"substitute for aid means that the dangers of 
supporting inappropriate macroeconomicpolicies inherently affect the trade 
sector of the domestic economy. In the:Turkish case the most vivid illustra­
tion of this lesson arises from the cycle of the 1960's. Even when broad 
macroeconomic policy was not highly out'of line, the fact of an aid inflow 
helped to mask the underlying distortion in the trade regime, as between 
import-substitutes and exports. Krueger (1974) has estimated that while 
almost all exports were receiving only TL9 per U.S. dollar the implicit cost 
of many import-competing goods was TL20 or more per dollar. 
This situation could not have persisted as long as it did had it not 
been for aid flows.. Although aid officials correctly pointed to the distor-; 
tions resulting from overvaluaion"they nonetheless persisted as a major 
stumbling block to expansion of export earnings. In Turkey's case, this 
difficulty was compounded by the fact thatTurkish workers' remittances 
also provided a major source of foreign exchange. Nonetheless, a major 
lesson from the Turkish experience is that aid's effectiveness is greatly 
diminished unless it is administered in the context of a fairly realistic 
exchange rate and a liberal trade policy. 
The relationship between trade policies and aid does not end at the
 
macroeconomic level. It also affects the effectiveness of assistance
 
at the individual project and sectoral level.. Two episodes in Turkey
 
will'serve to illustrate the link. The first is the Eregli Steel works
 
and the second is the experience of.the Turkish Industrial.Development
 
'Bank. 
In the 1960's, when there was automatic protection to new industrial
 
activities, the U.S. government decided to provide the major part of 
financing for the Eregli Steel Mill., This was a massive undertaking 
by Turkish standards of-the early.1960's. For present purposes, the 
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important point is that the feasibility study the proj'ect,,used anticipated 
domestic price, rather than the internationalprice, to evaluate the 
event, the Eregli plant had numerous technicalproj ect. prospects. In the 
problems but, in addition, resulted in a substantial increase in the Turkish, 
that the tinplate cost ofdomestic price of steel. The price was so high 
a liter can of processed tomatoes in Turkey exceeded the retail price of a 
the development
comparable can in Germany., Thus, during the late 1960's, 

of any food canning activities for exports was unprofitable and hence 
not undertaken., An: inappropriate set of trade policies induced an initially 
uneconomic steel mill, which in turn prevented the development of more 
economic food processing industries..
 
The Turkish Industrial Development Bank was founded in the early 1950's 
to lend money to private sector industrial activities. It received loans, 
primarily from the World Bank, which provided it with foreign exchange., 
Because foreign :exchange was scarce its loans were eagerly sought by the 
Turkish business:community. 
The Bank has undoubtedly made maj or contributions to the economic and 
technical efficiency of Turkish Industry:.chrough its technical assistance, 
project appraisal, and other activities., It adopted shadow pricing and 
cost benefit analysis early in its history (Chapter 6 ). However, in-its 
first ten years of existence, its project appraisal was basedon market .prices. 
Many of* the projects which it funded were very profitable at market prices, 
but uneconomic at international prices. When the Bank began using international 
prices in its:.project appraisal it was able to weed out loan applications 
from some high cost industries. But the policy did not induce loan applica­
tions from those activities (especially for export) that would have been
 
profitable at a realistic exchange rate but were unprofitable at the actual
 
exchange rate.
 
The benefits accruing from assistance to the Turkish Industrial 
Development Bank were less than they might have been, even when the Bank 
used appropriate appraisal criteria, had Turkish trade and exchange 
rate, policies been more realistic. 
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. :Assistance or ricultural Development-, 
,
There are several reasons why a review of U.S. assistance t:i agricul­
tural development in'Turkey is particularly relevant. 'One is that Turkey, 
along with Korea, was among the earliest recipients-of U.S. agricultural 
development assistance. U.S. assistance for agricultural development in 
Turkey began.during.World War II and continued until 1976. A second 
reason is that in the process of acquiring ,experience in development assis­
tance*in Turkey the U.S. made almost all of the false starts and committed
 
most of the development assistance errors that were possible. In spite of
 
the false starts and errors there have been a number of success stories.
 
U.S. development assistance has made an Important contribution to expansion 
of- ,the agricultural sector's productive capacity and to the economic well-' 
being of rural areas in Turkey. 
In this review we.give special attention to four areas of development 
assistance: (a) agricultural inputs (tractors and fertilizer); (b) land 
and water development; (c) agricultural education, research and extension; 
and (d) wheat production campaigns.,, (Other rural development programs 
designed to Improve the :quality of life in rural areas are discussed in 
Section 16.5). We devote primary attention to the U.S. development.assis­
tan.-e programs. Reference is made to the activities or other donors only 
astheir programs interactwith U.S. development rsistance. The FAO has' 
been active in support of development of the forestry sector, in the promo­
16-46 
tion of fertilizer use, "in supporting the-development of-animal health and 
production programs and in crop introduction and research. The World Bank­
has been active in soil and water oaservation and irrigation development-." 
and in the development of -the livestock :industry. 
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Agricultural Inputs: Tractors and Fertilizer 
After World War II use of tractors diffused rapidlyin Turkey. Ferti-lizer, 
use. expanded steadily from very low levels in the., early 1950 'S&to the mid­
1960's,. The largest increases in fertilizer use-came after the-introduction. 
of the new higher yielding fertilizer responsive varieties in the mid-19601's,. 
U.S. assistance played a very important role in the rapid post-war introduc­
tion of tractors. It. played a much, smaller direct role. in the growth of 
fertilizer use.
 
Tractors: During the Marshall.Plan period (194&-52) and during the first
 
several years under the Mutual Security Act, support for agricultural develop­
ment represented a very large share of U.S. agricultural development assistance 
to Turkey (Wilson, 1971: 2, 3). And a major share of this assistance was in, 
support of agricultural mechanization (Table 16.3).. Nearly 40,000 tractors 
were importedwith U.S. assistance during the Marshall Plan, Period.. After the 
mid-1950's assistance by the U.S. for mechanization declined but mechanization, 
as indicated by the growth in tractor numbers has. continued (Table 16.3). 
A major effect of the mechanization effort was to expand the land under 
cultivation. New land was opened up to cultivation. The replacement of 
draft animals by tractors released land previously used to produce' animal 
feed for other purposes. Wheat production increased rapidly during the 
1950's and into the early 1960's. Almost all of the increase in wheat produc­
tion during this period was a result of expansion in the area cultivated, 
rather than"increase in yields.­
Table, 16.3: 1, Mechanizatio Inin: Agriculture 
1950, 1955 1960 1965, 1971 197! 1.980 
r 55 1 6.l' 14-Tractors ('000) I 4b. 42' 
Area cultivated: with 
tractors (mn.. haT.) .1 3',& 3:2 4-"..l, 8'7-
Draught animals 2495 256 2648 264 209 
('000 pairs) 2, 5i 2564, 267 2099 
Area cultivated, with :,
 
draught animals. .
 
3;.3 18'.0 20.1 19.5 150,.8
(mn. ha.) 
Total cultivated, 
area
 
(inn. ha. 14.5T 2L4 23'.3 23.06' 24.5 24.1' 240.9"
 
SouY rces Turkish Government, State Institute of Statistics, Summary of
 
. . Published annually.
Agricultural Statistics. 

OECD (1974), Agricultural Policy in Turkey.
 
IBRD/World Bank (February 18, 1982), Turkey Industrialization
 
and Trade Strategy: Methodological and Statistical ,1,nex
 
Vol. 3.
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1.hnspite of the mechanization programs' initial impact on,production,. 
substantial questions were raised regarding its longer run viability-. A 
1951 m ssion from- the World- Bank criticized the number of tractors being 
Iported. The- misson estimated tha-t the, number-of farms , on. whch, tractor 
cutitivation. was, economically viable was only in thei neighborhood of 10",000f 
(IBRD,. 1951)-. It also seems apparent that land was. converted to cotton and 
grain production that should have remained in pasture. In some-areas the.
 
productive capacity of the: new lands brought under*:cultivation deteriorated. 
rapid1y.-., There were a-iso serious; income distribution. effects. Ownership' 
of resources at the.village.level became more concentrated and large numberst 
of peasants: were pushed into the migration stream (Ankara University Faculty, , 
of Political Science, 1953; Robinson, 1952 and 1958; Mann, 1980).-
It! is hard,, ir.retrospect, to escape the conclusion that a slower,pace:-,. 
of mechanization in,Turkey would have-been- desirable. Both the negative 
effects of: conversion. of land use and' the impacts of income distribution 
would'have been -mitigated if tractor cultivationIhad been introduced.more 
slowly.. And there seems little doubt that, in the absence of external 
assistance, the pace-of mechanization would have proceeded more slowly. It 
also seems apparent that the excessive rate of mechanization and land conversion 
did not represent a failure of analysis. Our review suggests that very little 
.naljsistook place.,, It-reflected instead an intuitive identification, on, 
the part of U.S. assistance personnel and the Government of Turkey (GOT), of 
mechanization with the modernization of agriculture (Chenery, Brando " and, 
Cohn,...1953;' Aresvik, .1975:..76-81; Mann, 1980). 
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Fertilizer: Efforts to expand the use of fertilizer have represented 
a major focus of several U.S. assistance projects. ,The Mission's extensive 
AID-supported team of six fertilizerinvolvement in fertilizer began with an 
experts from the Tennessee Valley Authority. This team spent two months 
Out 
advising the State Planning Organization in the early part of 1966. 
of this association came a detailed fertilizer study, the conclusions Of 
Since,

which were incorporated into the-Second Five Year Development Plan. 

the completion of the report,,the' Turkish government worked extensively with 
AID in seeking to develop a suitable fertilizer project. In the end, however, 
the Turkish authorities did not seek AID financing for any fertilize,. project 
to work with the Turkish government onalthough the Mission continued 
fertilizer-related questions. 
An AID fertilizer advisor spent about four years (1967-1971) working
 
with the State Planning Office, the Ministry of Agriculture, Donatim (the 
and Turkish industryAgricultural Supply Organization), the Agricultural Bank, 
trying to 'coordinate the development of a fertilizer industry., The fertilizer 
advisor wrote several reports, which were well received by the Turkish govern­
ment, in which he made several rec'mmendations about several possible areas of 
U.S. foreign assistance to Turkey, including the following: (1) technical
 
assistance in helping Turkey develop a plan of reorganization and the :establish­
ment of policies for Eertilizermarketing and distribution; (2) technical 
assistance in developing a sound economic marketing and promotional organiza­
tion; (3) establishment of in-country training programs to help solve the Turkish 
fertilizer industry's problems. Even without U.S. assistance, the AID fertilier 
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advisor suggested that the Turkish government reorganize and consolidate
 
all government fertilizer functions under one organization: production,
 
credit, research, soil testing, marketing and fertilizer production (Hill,
 
1969).
 
One major? change that took place in Turkish agriculture in'the late 
1960's as a result of the recommendations of the U.S. AID fertilizer advisor 
was the acceptance by the Government of the use of nitrogen fertilizer on 
wheat. The excellent results of phosphate with nitrogen on high yielding 
wheat varieties encouraged the (overnment to take a new look at.the situation, 
and to recommend'the use of nitrogen on wheat. This practice was begun with 
the introduction of Mexican wheat in the fall.of 1967.. 
'
The results from following the U.S. AID fertilizer advisor's recommendations 
of applying nitrogen on high yielding winter wheat varieties on state farms 
convinced government research workers of the merit of using nitrogen fertili­
zers in addition.to phosphates. The outcome,of these experiences also., 
resulted in thi first nitrogen recommendations for winter wheats' grown on 
the Anatolian Plateau in the spring of 1969. The amount of fertilizer used. 
for wheat in Turkey increased dramatically after 1966 with the introduction 
of the high yielding winter and spring wheat varieties (Table 16.4). 
The government has a virtual monopoly on the production, import, and 
sale-of chemical fertilizers, except for raw materials which can beimported 
under license for domestic manufacture. The Agricultural Supplies Organization 
(TZDK) is the principal agencyinvolved in the distribution of fertilizers to
 
farmers. Successive governments have given priority to fertilizer imports in
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Table 16.4'0 .nsumPti On Of Commercial Fertilii n TUrkey,
 
1950-72 (tons of' nutrients) 

Pbtassium .Year Nftrogen Phosphorus 	 ai.a 
1950-54 5,722 	 4,708 3'),158 1"3567' 
1955-59 12,365- :7$,234-. 1 4 	 I,9I 
1964 51,-000 42,,.400! 	 98.,320
 
1969 23,100 200,600 ".'14,300 446,000 
1972: -354,353' .245,,999 ''27,173 627,525 
1978 776,000, 635,000 21,000 1,,432',000, 
Note:. The figures for the. 1950-54 period and the 1955-59 period are 
averaaes. 
Source: 	 FAO (1950-72), Production Yearbook; Government of Turkey, State
 
Institute of Statistics. Statistical Yearbook of Turkey 1973
 
for 1972 figures; IBRD TWorld Bank (February 18, 1982), Turkey
 
Industrialization and Trade Strategy: Methodological and Statistical
 
Annex, Vol. 2 for 1978 figures.
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the allocation of foreign exchangeandfertilizer is.the. secondlargestimport
 
after fuel.,: At the same time-,. fertilizers.benefitted from generous.govern­
ment subsidies.,
 
Fertilizer prices,have been subsidized in three,waysi. First, by.distribut­
ing the' commercial product- at. below. cost directly- to individual farmer's and­
farmers" cooperatives; second, by providing credit at subsidized rates, for 
the purchase,of agricultural inputs including, fertilizers; and third, by 
subsidizing domestic manufacturers., As a result, fertilizer prices were,kept. 
low and. declining, in real terms. For example, the official price-of ammonium. 
nitrate (26% N) was fixed from 1975 to 1979 at TL 1400 per ton, despite the 
fact that the currency was rapidly depreciating. By 1979-subsidies to. 
fertilizers amounted to between 60% and 80% of product cost. 
In 1980,, retail prices of fertilizerswere raised and'subsidies to 
fertilizers were reduced to 20-45% of the product cost. Nevertheless, 
subsidies tofertilizer remain substantial,. amounting to about, TL 35 billion 
(U.S. $460 million) in 1980. The governmentindicated its intention-to phape 
out .the.remaining subsidies on fertilizers over the next fiveyears, concomit­
ant with the introduction of cost reducing innovations in TZDK's fertilizer 
handling and distribution network. 
Fertilizer consumption has increased very rapidly in part because 
farmers have purchased it much below cost. At this low price, excess demand 
conditions have prevailed, and therefore a non-price allocation mechanism. 
has been used to distribute fertilizer to farmers and to specific crops. There 
has been an uneven distribution of available supplies. A World Bank simula­
tion based on its agricultural sector model'for Turkey indicated substantial' 
malallocation of fertilizer use among crops and regions due to pricing 
policies (WorldBank, 1982, Vol. 2, 252). 
1&6-4 
a. necessary induce­in- retrospect it seems doubtful that subsidies were 
to more Intensive fewtilizer- use-. Befored the introducti"on. of' the. newment 
littlle economic return: to, higher levels of fertii.'zexwheat, var eties there, was: 

use on., most crops. When. the, new- fertilizer respons.ive varieties were,, intro­
duced, the economic incentive for fertilizer use was very large.. The primay,
 
effect of fertilizer subsidies was to distort use patterns.
 
Land and'Water Development
 
Both- the U.S.. AID' (and'its predecessor agencies). and the Wr d Bank 
have- provided, substantial assi'stance, for- land' and water develo'pment im Turkey 
The Seyhan Proj ect - a large muti-purpose flood control and irrigation, 
project was' a major focus, of assistance by both agencies for ove'r- 30" yeas,!---
The project is of interest because it illustrates the difficult. problems 
that both institutions have'faced repeatedly'in the, development of: large, 
multi-purpose.: projects. Many of these problems have centered Cround the 
difficulties of articulatig the irigation phases -ofthe project with. the 
power ,and flood control phases.-
In 1948.theMinistry' of:Public Works comm ssioned a-design study for' 
the-Seyhan Project:. In 1950 a request, was: made for a loan: from the World'. 
Bank,for the, construction of the' Seyhan'., Dam;., An economic , study ws, also 
commissioned to' support. the, loan' application. In' spite of serious reser­
vations by the bank's. own survey mission the.bank agreed to .participate in 
the financing of the.cons truction of the dam. The loan agreement was' signed' 
in 1952., The dam-and hydroelectric plant were completed in the early 1960's,., 
In spite of the fact that the realization of all three objectives of 
the project was necessary for the project to be economically viable, it was 
not until 1958, after the dam was completed and the hydroelectric plant 
came on line, that a design study for the irrigation and drainage phase-was. 
commissioned., When the irrigation studies were completed in 1961 it was' 
estimated that the cost of the irrigation phase of the project would cost 
several times as much as,the cost of the hydroelectric and flood control 
phase it did not include the even larger cost of on-farm land and-and 

water development work that would have to be carried out in order to realize, 
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was not u'til the early 1980.'s that a largethe. irrigation benefits. It 
portion of the,*-irrigation, system.was completed. It seems. apparent- that 
during- much. of the, periodbetween, 1950,and 1980 the project was more of a 
burd'ent tothe Turkish economy than, a source of growth,. 
".asec on 'its-.exeriene i-n, the, Sta,ge I phase of the S Proeche 
Bank decided:. that special attention needed" to be given'to an, intensive 
to ensure effective: utilization of drainage : andextension' effort. in,order 

irrigation facilities once. construction was.completed. The extension,
 
servIcesi prdvided.by: existing government agencies were thought to be rela­
tive.ly: ineffective, The,new "training and visit, program, developed with 
the assistance of a specialist consultant, Mr. Daniel Benor, differed from, 
the,existing program in several respects: .-it offered more.intensive assistance 
to farmers; activities of the different agencies.were coordinated under a 
single,program.;, it used village level "contact" workers, contact workers
 
were-trained at regular.sessions and made scheduled visits to farmers;
 
the contact workers were backed up by a hierarchy of specialists; its
 
autonomy enabled it to concentrate on farm training rather than on data 
collection. The-success of the,training and visit (T & V) system-in the
 
Seyhan Project area led to its adoption in several other Bank assisted
 
projects. It.has also served as a model for Bank-sponsored extension programs
 
in a number of other countries (Benor and Harrison:,.1977: Chapter 10).
 
The ini response by the government of Turkey was less enthusiastic
 
than that of the Bank. The T & V system.was expensive for the government to
 
operate and maintain. There was considerable animosity by the regular,
 
extension agency to special implementation units. Following completion of
 
Bank assistance to.the project the personnel connected with the T & V system
 
were, reabsorbed into: the regular extension; service or left government service. 
The long run, demonstration- effect may, however, have been, rather substan­
tIa'I. i1n" 1981 the Ministry of Agriculture announced that the, T & V system. 
would be!institu-ted nat-ionwide- over the next five years. This w11 require 
a, dub ing: of ext.enson personnel.. AssI'stance agency advisors, including 
Bank- personel. ave,. expressed" concern. as.to whether such an intensive 
system will, be. cost-afffective. 
Substantial U,.S. assistance was also directed%toward strengthening the 
capacityl of the Turkish government.to ensure more effective.utilization of 
its investment in!land.and,water.resource developments 'This involved the 
assistance in: the establishmenti of a Department of Land and Water Resource 
Development (Devlel Su Isleri.- DST) in the Ministry of Public Works modeled 
on the-U,. S'.i Bureau,of'Reclamation,: A isecond agency- TOPRAKSU , modeled on,' 
the. U.S'.. Soill -Conservation, Service',, was established'in the Ministry of Agricul­
ture; inl- 1960 and later moved to the Ministry of Village Affairs in 1964. 
It was .organized to assist farmers with problems of soil and water management. 
Aid, funding,. was provided to train DSI and TOPRAKSU staff and to finance 
irrigation development and soil conservation investmnts,by'farmers. 
Both the DSI and TOPRAKSU programs were designed to be national in 
scope. Major effort was placed on the training of personnel. An internal 
AID evaluation in the late 1960's indicated that DSI has become a highly 
professional and technologically proficient agency. 
TOPRAKSU resources were, however, concentrated primarily in two major 
State Project Areas (Seyh&d, and Gediz). In these two areas a force account 
approach to land and water development - financed by the government and 
carried out by TOPRAKSU - was developed. This proved effective in bringing 
rapid on-farm developmentwithin the project areas but it did nothing for 
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hectares , of irrigated landthe divelopment-of the more than ail.. 

outside State Projlect areas. The force account approach (Seyhan strategy)
 
was strongly supported by the World Bank and the European Investment Bank
 
because it seemed to promise rapid realization of the irrigation potential
 
In; the,State Project areas. It was criticized by the US/AID because it
 
did nothing for the development of the more than a million hectares .of 
irrigated land outside the.State Project areas (US/AID, 1969; Mann,. 1972).. 
Thus', by 1970 it was becoming increasingly clear that after two decades 
of very substantial investment in facilities and institution building, Turkey
 
still had not developed the capacity to et.ectively deliver-irrigation water
 
to farmers and to assist them in making effective use of, the water except
 
in a few state managed projects. There was a major imbalance in'DSI and 
TOPRAKSU capacity. The capacity of DSI for the design and construction of , 
irrigation facilities exceeded the capacity of TOPRAKSU to manage the 
delivery of' vater and provide technical assisteLice for development and use 
7/

of water at the farm level.-
In 1969 U.S. AID assisted in the development of a new "On-Farm Water 
Development Project" designed to (a) increase TOPRAKSU's capacity to carry out 
on-farm water development and (b)support the"developmentof private sector 
capacity to carry out on-farm development outside of the 6tate-run water 
8/

project areas.- An initial pilot'.de'onstration of this new 'approach, carried 
out in: he' zmir region, was regarded'as highly successful (Mann, 1972; OECD, 
1974:'26). The diffusion of, the new "Izmir model" was, however, slowed by 
(a)shortage of credit to farmers, contractors and equipment suppliers and"
 
(b) the limited engineering and 'agronomiccapacity of TOPRAKSU . 
The initial, although partial success of the new proj ect has provided 
Turkey with two models:- the Seyhan 'intensive" model and the -more "extensive" 
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Izmir odel- of water resource development. The following comparisons 
have been madelof the l two models " ( amn, 1972): 
(1) The older Seyhan model resulted in, rapid and intensive development 
in some state managed proj ict areas but its impact was more con­
strained-by budget limitations. Since the Izmir model draws much 
more heavily oni private than public resources, budget limitations 
are: a' lessserious constraint. There has been delinking of the 
pace, of irrigation development from the size' of the TOPRAKSU budget. 
(2): 	 Returns to public investment are higher under the Izmir model since 
most of the costs of land development are borne privately. The 
cost to the governmentis only for the technical assistance. 
(3) 	 The Izmir model is more labor intensive.. Greater use was made of 
'local 	resources. It provides more employment and greater oppor­
tunity for the development of local private sector entrepreneurship. 
(4) 	 The- Izmir strategy has had more' favorable distributional effects. 
There was a tendency in the Seyhan Project for large farmers to 
receive a relatively large share of the land development-subsidies 
and technical assistance. In the Izmir approach public resources 
were spread more broadly. 
In view ofth frequentdcy 	 between'initial projectt projections 
and longer-term projectaccomplishments it is probably premature to accept
 
all of the claims regarding the superiority of 1,he Izmir model.-' What
 
can 	 be said is that Turkey has accomplished, over a period of 30 years, 
the institutionalization of substantial capacity to develop, implement,
 
-
and manage land' idwater resource development activities. There is also
 
at least a presumption that the availability of two competing models, each
 
with somewhat differed strengths and weaknesses, may become an important
 
factor leading to better bureaucratic performance. Finally, it does appear
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that Turkey has, during.the. last decade,begun: to realize some of the returns. 
investments in both the large multi-purpose water resourcefrom its maj or 
development proj ects, and its smaller investments in land :'and water develop­
ment outside of the major proj ect areas. 
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Agricultural Education, Research and Extension 
A third maJor area of assistance by the U.S. AID agencies was.to, 
strengthen Turkish capacity in agricultural education, extension and re.­
search. It was clear., inthe early 1950's, that Turkish agricultural educa­
tion,,extension and research institutions were exceptionally weak. Turkey 
did not establish a' Ministry of Agriculture until 1931. An extension 
service was-not established until 1943. Agricultural research was highly 
fragmented and the research system was typically staffed by technicians 
rather than scientists., 
Extension: Assessments by U.S. technical assistance missions in the 
early 1950'S suggested an ,pportunity for substantial short-run gains in 
agricultural production.by strengthening agricultural extension.: Initial 
efforts to strengthen agricultural extension focused on the training and 
technical assistance to strengthen extension capacity at the field level 
(Horton, 1964). Later efforts were focused on extension planning and
 
administration.'
 
By the mid-1960's, however, it seemed clear that the .extension develop­
ment effort had been much less successful than anticipated'. Much of the 
frustration and lack of accomplishment has been attributed to the inability 
to resolve the differing conceptions of the role of extension held by. the 
Turkish bureaucracy and the U.S. advisors. In the Turkish view agricultural 
extension agents were regarded as part of the staff of the country administra­
tor (the Kaymakan) and responsible primarily for regulatory and administrative 
functons. The objective of U.S. technical assistance was to reform the system 
to make it primarily responsible for carrying out the educational and tech­
nology transfer Eunction of thelMinistry of Agriculture. By the mid-1960's 
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was redirected ,'these issues: remained unresolved and U.S. assistance effort 
the direct support oftoward the strengthening of agricultural services and 
agricultural production.
 
in, the progrm. to strengthenOne response to the, limited, success achieved 
a, new, approach to providingagricultural, extension was, the search- for 
and' the GOT initiated an Inte­services to farmers. In 1966 the U.S. AID 
Denizli Provincegrated Agricultural Services Project on a pilot basis in 
(Wilson, 1971). The objectives of the project were. in southwestern Turkey 
(a) to move agricultural planning. to the provincial and county levels and' 
(b) to achieve inter-agency coordination for agricultural development 
activities: at the local level. Three major activities were'initiated under 
the pilot'project:. (a) the developmenU of a coordinated support system 
that would integrate the supplies and services necessary to increase agricul­
tural production; (b) to make available increased,supplies of fertilizer and 
credit, better seed and breeding stock, and improve'land and water manage­
ment; (c)local testing and evaluation of new technology. Although many of 
the individual sub-proj ects were effective in increasing production, the 
proj ect was not able to establish the coordination among agencies necessary 
for an integrated approach to agricultural development. In June 1970 AID 
terminated support for the Integrated Agricultural Services Project and
 
'
 
initiated a new project to deal with.the problems that resulted in the 
limited success of the Denizli Project - lackof .policy and planning coordina­
tion at the national -level. 
There are .some indications that in the early 1980's, the government
 
of Turkey was, beginning to face up to the problem of the 
ineffectiveness: of its agricultural extension system, - weaknesses 
that. had lon, concerned both. he Wrld Bank and: the U.S. a 
A decision has. apparently been made to, institute the training, and, visit' 
(T & V)! s,stem?,. first developed during.'Phase- II of the. Seyhan, Proj~ect 
as the' pattern for all extension work. , 
1960."s the U, assistance,".Agricultural research: During. the' 195&s. and 
program was much less actively involved' in, strengthening the Turkissh- agricu1' 
tural research system than i.- strengthening the Turkish extens.ion; service. 
Research,. like extension,. tended to- be fragmented among the several ­
departments' ard.agencies with agricultural program activities. Although 
the ineffectivmeess of agricultural research was recognized-by both the GOT 
and U.S. AID, thefirst development assistance. project in support of research, 
was not ilmplemented. until 1963 (U.S. AID,. 1965). This initial project had 
the provision of technical assistance- for' the- .reorganIatio:
ni 
as its objective 
of the Turkish agricultural research- system. ItL was. complemented by-'a 
second- project designed, to strengthen agricultural planning andeconomic 
research (U.S. AID, 1968). Neither project was able to overcome'-the 
obstacles-of ' the- fragmented approach that continues to characterize 
Turkish agricultural programs. 
A somewhat more successful effort in support of agricultural extension
 
and research 4was the es ablishment, with U.S. AID support, of Ataturk 
University in eastern Turkey. , Beginning in 1955 the U.S. AID provided 
support, through a contract with the University of Nebraska. The University 
included an extension training institute and an agrculturl -exp erime 
straton,., By, the early IWO!'& the new: im'versit appeared to be effectively 
ins,t._-utionalized: (Wilson ,,. 19:71,'-. 
Wheat.. Production, Campaigns, 
' 
rin. the late 1960'"sF and ea -i970 "s'r AID shlfted. its development ass ­
tance! support away from:. genevalzed; institution' bu&lding to, direct support 
for agicultural production. During. this period support for agricultural 
training,, research and extension continued. But the support was directed 
toward the achievement of much more specific production objectives than 
the programs of the 1950's'and 1960's. This.shift in emphasis was associated
 
with, the demonstration of the- dramatic yield increases, that were potentially 
feasible from,. the' introduction. and./or development of new. highyielding 
wheat varieties,.-­
The:.potential of the new. wheat varieties was f irst demonstrated in 
Turkey in 1965.. The U.S. AID imported seed from two0-varieties developed in. 
near 
on Turkey'.s Mediterranean coast, yields in the 4.0 tons per hectare range ­
roughly double the yields of the best local wheats were obtained. On' 
the bases of somewhat broader experience in 1966 the Turkish Ministry of 
Agriculture decided to undertake larger scale dissemination of the new 
wheat varieties in the 1966/67 season. Economic and technical assistance . 
from U.S. AID was obtained (a) to import 22,000 tons of 'Mexicanseed to.be 
planted in the Mediterranean, Aegean and Marmara regions and (b) to conduct 
an educational program to acquaint farmers with the production-practices
 
Mexico,-' Sonora 64, and Lema Rojo:. When planted by a farmer Adana 
production campaignneeded to obtain high yields from the new ,seeds. The I 
Lnvolvead, higher rates! of feartilizer: application~ better seedbed pre'paratin 
md& more deff ctive' wee&~ control.. 
The economc' results of£ the. Mexican. varieties, were. highly. favorable. 
,Vstudj by the, Agtcultural Planniing and, E'conomic- Research Department of the 
suikish Ministry of Ag,*iculture, Showed&tha't net income from land and; manage­
nent per hectare increased- in the first year (1967-68) about 150 percent with 
:he, introduction of the new technology (see Table 16..5)-.. The: Mexican; wheat 
Lmport program probably had:one of the' most" favorable- cost-benef it' ratios 
,.f any, U-..S,. A.I)progra to, Turkey (Ars.vik. £64),.,. 
There were also many indiect beniefits-from! the- program. A number, of' 
igencies (Agricultural Bbnk,, Governent Supply,Agency, Soils Products Office, 
)tate Farms.,, and' others) learned!.- --hat by coordinating their efforts in 
,upport, of the, wheat production' campaign,,. they, could., each. demonstrate 
rogram success.- There- were, mafor' improvements , in, the: technical capacity 
and. morale- in. the Tur:icsh Extension, Service- itself. The staff became, more, 
zooperative andi willing. to change their- techniques, and procedures and to 
revamp their education approach., The fac . that they had something of. value 
to demonstrate to farmers induced greater interest in field demonstrations. 
By the early 1970's what was missing in Turkey'for wider success with 
the Mexican wheats was locally developed'replacement varieties that had high 
7ielding potential and adequate disease resistance. As a result, the produc­
tion-potential of the Mexican wheat varieties reached a maximum and then 
3tagnated. A cooperative research program withCIMMYT and the Rockefeller 
roject was working on the development of such "replacement varieties", 
)ut better varieties did not become available until 1975-76 (CIMMYT Spring
 
1976). Nonetheless, the planting of Mexican varieties on 600,000 hectares
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Tib 1e 16..5., Income and Cost Comparisons of Mexican 
ieatWh and a Native Variety Grown in 
Denizli Province of Turkey, 1967-68 
Mexican Wheat Native Wheat 
Number of farms 55 44 
Hectares per farm 3.2 2.5 
Costs per 	hectare- (dollars) 
Family labor 3.54 2'. 60: 
Hired labor 7.56 5.27 
Seed . 18.33, 16.90 
Watera 3.62" 0.87 
Fertilizer 37.58 12.56 
Power and implements, 
Interest (7.0 percent) 
Totalb 
46.79 
8.22. 
125.64 
32.71., 
4.96 
75.87 
Production and income-

Grain (kilograms) 	 3,643r 1,572 
Price per 	kilogram (in 10 • 
kurus.) 8.88 9.89 
Total value (dollars) 323.44,, 155.43 
Net income (dollars)C 197.80 79.56 
aMost of the producers did not use irrigation for
 
wheat.
 
bNot including land rental.
 
cFrom land and management. 
Note: Data for Mexican wheat are simple averages
 
for three varieties: Super-X, Lerma Rojo 64, and Penjamo
 
62. The native variety (073-44) is one of the better 
native varietie- for this area. Dollar values arc co.­
verLed from Turkish lira at nine TL per dollar. 
Source: 	 Oddvar Aresvik (1975), The Agricultural Development
 
of Turkey (New York: Praeger): 167.
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of., land, annually duringe tthe early and mid-'100'1'ihelp raise' average wheat 
yields ,in Turkey from-i ton to l.8.tons per hectare between 1966 and 1979. 
The widespread adoption of the.Mexican wheats in coastal Turkey under­
sco.red" -howl rapidly farmers would,respond to profitable new ideas. However, 
whiile ,the' coastal. regions: had benefitted from the Mexican wheats, the 
Anatolian,Plateau,,, with three quarters of Turkey's wheat land, was unaffected 
because it requilres' cold-tolerant winter wheats. The introduction inTurkey 
of the: Turkish Government-Rockefeller Foundation-AID-sponsored.program for 
developing high-yielding winter wheat varieties, which has been referred: to
 
as the! "High-Yielding Winter-Wheat Proj ect," coincided with the program for
 
theeintroduction of Mexican .spring-type varieties. However, the winter
 
wheat program was: much more,modest and was developed more gradually
 
(Johnson.,. 1971). 
In 1970; a. program was initiated bythe Turkish Ministry of Agricul­
ture,,with support from AID, to increase winter wheat yields in selected 
provinces: of the Anatolian Plateau and Thrace. Most wheat scientists 
believe that the factor which most seriously limits wheat production in the.,
 
dry areas of Turkey is the management of the soil during the fallow period
 
and the subsequent management of the wheat crop. This was recognized at an 
early stage, since the traditional summer fallow tillage method produces
 
relatively low unit yields and sharp variations in annual production. By
 
1974,. the Turkish and.Rockefeller Foundation scientists of the Wheat Project
 
-
were able to recommend a set of practices that' they felt confident would 

give farmers yields of at least 2,000 kg per hectare in all years except
 
those of unusually low rainfall.- The extension service put out 10­
hectare demonstrations of the recommendations-in 10 locations in Ankara
 
Province in 1974/75. These trials yi2elded2,530 kg per hectare while adjacent
 
farmers' fields averaged,1,810 kg per hectare. The demonstrations were''
 
expanded to five provinces in 1975/76 and seven more provinces were added
 
in 19,76/77.
 
Charles Mann, a Rockefeller Foundation economist assigned to the wheatl 
proj ect, found that all demonstrator farmers (those who used the recommcmded 
set of practices) "realized substantially higher returns than did farmers 
whose fields served as controls (Mann, 1976: 15). The recommended ,practice 
cost only 25 percent more than usual farmer's practices, but output Increased 
so much that the ratio of increased benefits to increased costs averaged over 
5 to 1. Mann tentatively concluded that the impressive yield increases 
appear to be due not to large amounts of costly physical inputs but rather 
to modest amounts of additional inputs combined with better management. 
The success of the wheat programs could not have occurred without a
 
major-commitment by the GOT. When the Project was beg'in, several dozen 
government wheat scientists were promptly transferred to it. The Government-, 
provided offices and experimental land at the Ankara Agricultural Research 
Institute. The Gov,-ment also established regulations that.permitted
 
foreign scientist trainees to enter and leave Turkey-easily. It maintained
 
a.favorable price ratio between wheat and agricultural inputs that created
 
incentives for farmers to find ways to expand their wheat production. 
The Government of Turkey-Rockefeller.Foundation Wheat Project resulted
 
in a major reorganization of wheat research in Turkey. One improvement was
 
the Project's.gathering of scientists with.different,specialties into a
 
multidisciplinary staff. Plant pathologists worked closely with the breeders
 
to select resistant strains, Another change was the creation of a truly 
national wheat improvement program. ,TheProject provides for 11 research 
stations in the major wheat-growing areas of Turkey. There are three 
principal breeding stations--two in Ankara and Eskisehir for winter wheat 
and one in Izmir for spring wheat. The eight 'remainingstations are largely
 
r
selecting and testing sites.. In addition, off-station tests are performed
 
on.farmers' fields and off-season breeding nurseries are operated for spring 
wheat. Basic:to the integration-.of wheat research is an annual meeting at 
Ankara during which wheat scientists from all,of the experimental stations 
review the year's results and plan the next year's work. 
Shortly after the Project was established in 1970, it sent half of the
 
nation's wheat scientists abroad to study. For example, six scientists went
 
to the U'.S. to study for advanced degrees and three were enrolled in CIMMYT's
 
nine-month in-service training course in Mexico. Since then, most scientists
 
have been sent to the CIMMYT training program first. At CIMMYT the scientist
 
works in the. field alongside 'its staff members, gaining first-hand experience
 
in one of the world's largest crop improvement programs. After,returning
 
to Turkey and working for a time, some are sent abroad,again for graduate
 
studies.
 
By 19.76, 22 Turkish nationals from the Wheat Project had completed
 
Master's degrees, mostly at Oregon Sta-te" University. -Twenty-eight Turks
 
had completed the:CIMMYT wheat%,training program. The Project envisions the
 
implementation of its training program in three steps. First, the Project
 
trains and national- and provincial-level wheat specialists. These special­
ists will then train county extension agents and village technicians for
 
local work; the local agents will in turn carry on the farmer training
 
program. This "filtering down" process of education has only worked slowly.-'
 
Plantrbreeders in the Wheat Project make over 5,000 crosses each year
 
and test the Icrosses by passing them through several generations of.selection
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at different stations around the country. The tests in diverse ecological 
..zones provide data on disease resistance and overall adaptability of the
 
line that would take years to equal if testing wIwere restricted to the -station, 
at which theIoriginal selection was made. In addition.,, the nationwide'test­
ing gives. scientists. at. one station. access to the best line-, from el1sewhere,. 
In February 1982, the Turkish Ministry of Agriculture, with the assis-. 
tance of the Rockefeller Foundation and CIMMYT, completed a comprehensive '• 
review of the 12-year old cereals project and made "plans for the future
 
direction of the ProjOect under solely Turkish auspices (Mann and Wright, 
.1982). The-Project was unanimously judged to be highly successful. It
 
represents the first important demonstration of the Green Revolution in
 
rainfed agriculture. Turkish wheat production moved from approximately 
10 million-tons per year at the start of the Project in.1970, to five
 
About 50 percent of Turkey's
consecutive years of over 16 million tons. 
present wheat area, both'irrigated'and rainfed, is planted with high-yielding
 
varieties and Turkey again became a wheat exporter in the mid-1970's
 
(World Bank, February 1982: 244-293; Nyrop, (ed.), 1980: 154). In addition
 
to the success on the production side, the project has also provided a model.
 
for research organization and management that has now been extended to all
 
of Turkey's agricultural research.
 
The projects success does not mean that there are not continuing
 
problems that need to be resolved. The project review noted some:
 
(1) There is an inadequate pipeline of well-trained young scientists.
 
This has been exacerbated by a drop in Overseas training opportuni­
ties under the AID "new directions" guidelines. The Turkish Govern­
ment will need to fund more of its own scientific training.
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(2.): .The Project has,'not developed effective :research., teams , in several. 
:important areas: (a) the high' potential Cukurova. (southwest); the 
southeast (a huge .area.. which, has experienced. very litt-le yield 
change in the past 25 years); and, (c), eastern. Turkey-. which-has also 
been, relatively unaffected by the :improved, technology. 
(3) 	 Effective working. relationships had been. attained at the,height of 
the Proj ect between the. extension service and the, wheat research 
group. There had.been a team of '"1ectmatter specialists who 
had been assisted-by the extension service to: work with the research 
,group'. They functioned quite, effectively in organizing farmer 
demonstrations and, training the extension service,. Several years 
ago a-number were either hired away by World Bank Projects or
 
relocated within, the extension service.., This resulted in a'sub­
stantial breakdown in communication between research and extension'. 
(4) 	 The Project has been, unable to hold economists in the research 
team. The Project's recent agronomic experiments have not been 
analyzed from an economic point of view. On the positive side, 
there is wide recognition of the need for an economics dimension. 
Economists,,could be transferred to the Pr Ject from other Government 
agencies, but hitherto the bureaucratic obstacle of such a move
 
has not been surmounted.': 
(5)- Turkey progressed from a wheat importer to an exporter of substantial 
quantities of wheat with very little structured planning of national
 
policies to address the problems and opportunities created by
 
becominga surplus producer. Wheat production in excess of domest-ic
 
needs presents, several.policyy.I options. These: include.: expozt 
read., wheat and. f lour;,. export. dunn wheat seoia.nd6at'; 
shcft some wheat area to; other crops. (suchl as forage' on',the . plateau)1;,­
or.,, derease the.. ares of wheat production, in, the. coastal- zones thus, 
IneeLng. areas. for alternative crops:. Thre: stil 's not: close 
relationshlp between the research group and the macro-policymakders. 
One. problemi,. for example, is that the cereal quality, price,, 
Sd'fferentials established by t',e Cereals Purchasing Office were 
inadequate, to encourage, production' of export.quality grain:. 
i6~ Assistance LIie'rin"_Rtizal Tuixake""5; to. improveteQ3atyo 
Ui.S,O. as,. lstance for~ural development, has..been, d&1rected' prihatily. to. 
programsi designed to provide diect: input for agr&icultura production,. 
(machinery, fertilizer,, water) andi to. strengthen the institutions whose 
purpose was, to provide, direct support for agricultural pro',uction (agricultural 
research and extension). To the extent that these programs have resulted in 
Improvementis in rural incomes they have also resulted in the improvement in
 
the quality of life in rural areas. U.S. assletance has also been directed
 
toward improvements in rural education, rural health, family planning and 
nutrition. The resources directed to these activities have been smaller than 
for support of agricultural production and less attention has been given to
 
impact evaluation.
 
Rural education: During the late 1950's and 1960's U.S. assistance
 
has been provided for educational planning, for school design and construc­
tion, and for mass literacy programs. During the late 1960's attention
 
shifted more heavily toward the support of technical education and the moderni­
zation of university level education.
 
It was clear in the early 1950's that the low level of rural literacy 
represented a major obstacle to improvements both in the efficiency of agricul­
tural production and to improvements in the quality of rural life. Two 
literacy projects - the Literacy Training in the Armed Forces Project (1959­
62) and the Adult Education Resources Development Project (1960-65) - were
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regarded as reasonably successful. But rural education, and lfteracy projects 
were apparently not as effective in capturing, the interet;t or support of the 
Turkish educational bureaucracy as the later programs -to reform and develop,
 
higher education (Price, July 1970). 
Rural health and family planning,: Several U.S,. AID sponsored studies, 
beginning with a survey by the Population Council in 1963, indicated that
 
a high percentage of the population, in both urban and rural areas and in 
all economic classes had favorable attitudes toward family planning methods 
but lacked appropriate information and technology.
 
Since the mid-1960's U.S. AID has made several loans to support inte­
grated family planning and rural health programs. Much of this support was
 
directed to the more disadvantaged areas of eastern Turkey. One of the more
 
interesting results of these programs was the demonstration of reinforcement 
resulting from integrating the health and family planning education with
 
literacy improvement programs (U.S. AID, 1974).
 
Nutrition: Early efforts toward nutrition improvement focused on home 
economics, education and extension. Between the mid-1950's and the .rly 
1970's support for food imports was provided through the PL 480 program. 
School feeding programs were also developed with PL 480 support. There 
has not, however, been any strong integrated approach to nutrition planning 
or nutrition'programs on the part of either the U.S. AID or the GOT. 
E6.": .5
 
Sbie' ,Conbclusitons. 
During much of its history, American economic assistance to Turkey 
has been confronted with difficult trade-offs between economic and political 
objectives. At several critical periods political concerns clearly limited 
the ability of the assistance program to pursue accurately diagnosed economic 
reforms. En retrospect the failure to carry out needed monetary, fiscal 
and trade reforms, particularly in the late 1950's, and the late .970's, 
seriously weakened the Turkish economy. As a result the Turkish government 
is,now in a weaker position to pursue either economic or political objec­
tives than if the reforms, that eventually became necessary, could have 
been carried out in a more appropriate and timely manner.
 
There is a general presumption, based on the Turkish experience, that 
a substantial "program" component in the development assistance package 
can represent a useful instrument for inducing effective dialogue about
 
development policy between donors and recipients. The policy dialogue
 
between donors and the Government of Turkey during the mid and late 1960's
 
was an important factor in assuring that the reforms undertaken toward the
 
end of the 1960's growth cycle were both earlier and more effective than
 
the more belated reactions to the cycles of the 1950's and 1970's.
 
A closely related lesson is that when macroeconomic policy is resulting
 
in severe economic distortions lending to support the country in question is
 
both costly and unproductive unless effective remedial actions are taken
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simultaneously. When macroeconomic policies are inappropriate, assistance 
resources will be largely dissipated until the remedial policies are
 
accepted and implemented. This conclusion must be tempered by a recognition
 
that there are no widely accepted techniques for determining whether particulal
 
policy changes will be adequate. Until knowledge improves, advice on policy
 
reforms will continue to be weighted heavily by judgement.
 
There are also some rather strong conclusions that have emerged from
 
our review of assistance to agricultural development in Turkey. One is that.
 
allocation of development assistance funds for the purchase of material
 
inputs such as tractors and fertilizer rarely amounts to a highly productive
 
use of the resources available for development assistance. At best, such
 
material transfers are an indirect method of overcoming foreign exchange
 
limitations. When appropriate, the economic incentives exist for the use of
 
such inputs they will be rapidly adopted by farmers even in the absence of
 
subsidies.
 
A second lesson that both the U.S. AID and the World Bank should have
 
learned in Turkey is that building the physical infrastructure for irrigation
 
development is much simpler than building the institutional infrastructure.
 
In retrospect both the World Bank's commitment to physical infrastructure
 
development and the USAID commitment to institutional infrastructure develop­
ment in support of land and water development appear highly successful.
 
But the economic returns to both efforts would have been greater if atten­
tion had been given earlier to the institutional innovations needed to
 
realize the production potential opened up by the physical infrastructure­
development.
 
A third lesson is that institution building proceeds most: effectively
 
where such efforts are motivated by an opportunity for high economic returns.
 
This is the lesson of the wheat programs. Generalized efforts to reform
 
and develop effective agricultural extension and agricultural research
 
programs were largely ineffective until the new high yielding wheat varieties
 
offered the possibility of very large gains from institutional innovation.
 
We have also been impressed that the impact of development assistance
 
efforts has often appeared much more impressive a decade or more after
 
completion than in the development comvletion reports. A major contribution
 
of all development effort is the building of human capital through learning
 
by doing. Many of the younger professionals who have participated in policy
 
development and in project planning and management became, later in their
 
careers,the architects of the reforms that are leading to more effective
 
macroeconomic and sector development policies and to more effective program
 
design and management. 
Footnotes
 
For 	a fuller account of the economic history of Turkey in the years
 
since the Second World War, see Hale (1981), Hershlag (1968), and 
Krueger (1974). 
- rhere is some reason to believe that the Turkish construction activities 
aow going on in the Middle Eas- may owe their origins to U.S.-supported 
construction activities of the earlier years. While such a conjecture 
cannot be documented, it can plausibly be argued that the experience 
gained in those endeavors was invaluable for the development of Turkish 
enterpreneurs. 
/ 	 See section 17.4 for an analysis of assistance to the agricultural sector. 
In the early 1950's, a parallel emphasis to that on roads was for agricul­
tural mechanization. It should be noted that there have been many worth­
while projects in individual sectors which are not covered here. For 
example, American assistance to the educaticnal sector of the Turkish 
economy has had a large number of intangible payoffs, but evaluation of 
those payoffs is outside the scope of this survey. See Sheetz (1982) 
for a survey of the literature on some of those aspects. 
American aid did not cease. Project aid continued but the American 
government simply refused an additional program loan. From 1948 to 
1958, United States economic aid to Turkey totalled $764.6 million dollars, 
of which $172 million was PL 480 commodity aid (Burke, 1977). 
.	 rhis section draws on a much more complete set of notes and bibliographical 
references prepared for this project by Sheetz (1982). It has also benefit­
ted from the very complete bibliography by Gorun and Somel (1979). 
6/ 	The review of the development of the Seyhan Project presented in this
 
section is based largely on IBRD (1951), US/AID (1969), and Wilson
 
(1970).
 
This imbalance has become almost a classic syndrome in large scale irriga­
tion development. It has been much easier to develop the engineering
 
capacity for the design and construction of irrigation systems than to
 
develop the institutional infrastructure needed to effectively deliver
 
and use the water and to maintain the system. See Chapter 10.
 
8/ 	During the 1970's the US/AID has given increased attention to on-farm
 
water development and use in a number of countries (Easter, 1982).
 
The US/AID provided support for the "On-Farm Water Development Project"
 
only from 1969-1975. There was a decline in support by the Turkish government
 
in the late 1970's. This trend has been reversed in the 1980's
 
(World Bank, 1981: 291-293), Vol. 2.
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0/ 	The opportunity to realize the potential gains from yield increases led,
 
to a similar refocusing of research and extension efforts in a number of
 
countries (see Wortman and Cumings, 1978: 186-226).
 
U_/ 	A general outline of the recommendations of the Wheat Project for the
 
Anatolian plateau included the following-:
 
(1)special tillage practices during the fallow season; 	 ­
(2)planting seed of a high yielding variety treated for disease i nd: 
insect control; 
(3)early planting with a deep furrow drill where there is moist,soil,
 
for seed germination;
 
(4) adequate fertilization with nitrogen and phosphorus;
 
(5)early herbicide application in the spring.
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ASSISTANCE TO, GHANA, AND .VORY.COAST. 
The experience of Ghana and the Ivory Coast with respect to the
 
impact of development assistance could hardly be more varied. At independence
 
V 
in 1957, Ghana had a well established export sector, including cocoa,
 
timber, and minerals, which permitted the accumulation of substantial
 
foreign exchange reserves. Its physical'infrastructure and educational
 
establishment were reasonably well developed and its per capita income
 
was the highest in black Africa. Two and one half decades later, the
 
Ghanaian economy was in ruins, with cocoa exports cut in half, a black market
 
exchange rate fifteen times the official rate, an extensive and complex
 
system of trade and exchange controls, and real per capita income substantially
 
below the level 25 years earlier. Foreign aid by this time was almost totally
 
ineffeetive in stimulating development because of the absence of an appropriate
 
policy environment.
 
The Ivory Coast, on the other hand, began its history as an
 
independent nation in 1960 far behind Ghana in roads, schools, agricultural
 
production, per capita income, and practically every other indicator of
 
levelopment. By the early 1980s, however, the Ivory Coast had one of the
 
best rural infrastructures in Africa, had made substantial progress in
 
educating and improving the health of its population, had a relatively
 
#ell developed and diversified agricultural sector, and had experienced
 
an annual average growth of real per capita income over the period of
 
close to 3 percent. Concessional foreign aid, which was fairly important:
 
in the early years after independence, had become much less so by the 1980si
 
as the Ivory Coast was able to finance more of its development out of its
 
own resources and by borrowing from abroad on. co-mmercial terms., 
The difference between the experiences of these two neighboring
 
countries is the subject of this paper. A major thesis is that the
 
effectiveness of foreign aid has been conditioned in each instance by the
 
economic policy environment in which the aid has been administered. This
 
policy environment had been the result of many factors. Initially it was.
 
strongly influenced by the opposing directions taken by the two leaders, 
Kwame Nkrumah and Felix Houpouet-Boigny. Whereas Ghana chose the. path 
of socialism and state control, the Ivory Coast saw the role of the state
 
more as one of influencing the private'sector, and,taking the investment
 
lead only where necessary. A second factor affecting economic policy has
 
been the political turmoil that has characterized Ghana in comparison with
 
a relatively high degree of political stability in,the Ivory Coast. Finallyj
 
there has been an important difference in the degree of openness of the two.
 
countries to foreign trade, investment, atd financial flows.
 
A second major theme is that under the right circumstances foreign
 
aid can be very effective in promoting and enhancing the impact of policy
 
reform. This is especially true if given in the'form of program assistance
 
in support of broad sectoral or macroeconomic policy changes, but project
 
aid can also be useful in helping to identify issues and in developing the
 
mutual trust and confidence necessary for major reforms. The contrasting
 
experiences of Ghana and the ivory Coast in this respect are remarkable.
 
The next section of this paper discusses foreign assistance to Ghana
 
ard the Ivory Coast within the historical context of development in these
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two countries. This is followed by a macroeconomic assessment of foreign
 
ai&dand its contribution to prowth through the transfer of resources
 
available for increasing investment and improving the balance of payments.
 
Mhe roie of foreign aid in facilitating the transfer of specific
 
technical-organizational packages in the form of particular projects is then
 
examined, with special emphasis on agriculture and rural devalopment.
 
Following.this,. there is an analysis of the economic policy environment in
 
each country and of how foreign aid has 1-en used to help improve that
 
environment.- A final section summartz.s the principal conclusions of ths
 
analysis. 
17.1 
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Aid in a Historical Context
 
Foreign aid in Ghana and the Ivory Coast must be seen within the
 
historical context of development in these two countries. Much of this­
development in Ghana occurred during the colonial period, though not
 
'

all of it was due to the initiatives of the colonial government.- / The rapid
 
expansion of cocoa farming prior to World War I, for example, occurred'
 
spontaneously without substantial government intervention (Hill 1963).
 
Furthermore, investment was financed largely out of local resources since
 
it was a basic policy of the British government that colonies should be
 
financially self-sufficient. Nevertheless, there was major investment
 
in infrastructure and an important beginning in the provision of education
 
and health services, paid for largely out of export earnings from cocoa.
 
With the depression and decline in world cocoa prices during the 1930s,
 
however, most of this investment came to a halt.
 
Development in the Ivory Coast during this period was much less
 
important than in Ghana. Cocoa was a realtively minor crop at this time
 
and coffee, which contributed most to exports after World War I, was largely
 
in the hands of European planters many of whom did not survive the depression.
 
Like the British, France also contributed little to its colonial empire
 
during this period. Since Ivory Coast exports were not nearly as well
 
developed as those of Ghana, few resources were available for investment
 
I 
in infrastructure and human services.
 
The Post-World War II Colonial Period
 
World War II marked an important turning point for the Ivory Coast.
 
France at last abandoned its policy of financial self-sufficiency in its
 
colonies and created in 1946 an overseas development fund, the Fonds
 
d'Investissement pour le Dgveloppement Economique et Social (FIDES). From
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1946 to 1959, this fund provided close to 70 billion CFA francs in grants.
 
Of this, about 9 percent went directly into agriculture, 29 percent was
 
for bridges and roads, and 37 percent was used for construction of the port
 
at Abidjan. The FIDES was succeeded in 1959 by the Fonds d'Aide et de
 
Coopfration (FAC). FIDES and FAC grants were managed by the Caisse Centrale
 
de Coopfration Economique (CCCE), which also provided loans and advances
 
as well as sometimes taking an equity position for its own account. These
 
public capital flows totaled almost 40 billion CFA francs by the end of
 
1958 (Ivory Coast 1960: 238-40).
 
This aid was instrumental in improving infrastructure in the Ivory
 
Coast. Of greatest importance was the opening of the Vridi Canal and the
 
construction of a protected, deep water port at Abidjan. Some progress
 
was also made in road-construction. By the end of 1958, there were over
 
10,000 km of all-weather roads, compared with less than 4,000 km in 1947.
 
Only 600 km of these were paved, however, and many villages were not served
 
by feeder roads of any kind (Ivory Coast 1960: 118). Educational and
 
health facilities and personnel, especi.ally of local origin, were also very
 
meager. On the other hand, agricultural research had been undertaken
 
in the Ivory Coast for many years by a number of French research
 
institutes.
 
Ghana also benefitted from foreign assistance resulting from the
 
Colonial Development and Welfare Act that was passed during the interwar
 
period. Ghana's first Ten-Year Development Plan, published in 1946,
 
called for the expenditure of about one million pounds, one third of which
 
was to be financed through Colonial Development and Welfare grants, another
 
third from the London capital market, and the last third out of domestic
 
surpluses. 
 These were booming years for cocoa, however, and the accumulation
 
of reserves soon led to a series of plan reformulations to increase the
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level of iuvestment. Despite this, the government at the time of
 
independence in 1957 held about £ 250 million in foreign exchange reserves
 
(Rymer 1971: 166, 67). Foreign aid at this time thus offered relatively
 
little in comparison with Ghana's own resources. This windfall for the
 
colonial and post-independence governments was possible because of the
 
decision not to transfer the profits from high cocoa prices back to the
 
farmer. Instead, the Cocoa Marketing Board accumulated these as sterling 
balances.held abroad.
 
Overall, the level of development in Ghana at the and of the colonial
 
period was considerably higher than in the Ivory Coast. At the time of
 
independence, per capita GDP at market prices was $181 in Ghana compared
 
with $157 in the Ivory Coast at official rates of exchange. Ghana, with
 
only three-quarters of the land area of the Ivory Coast, had three times
 
the length of roadsof which nearly 4,000 km were paved. The primary
 
school enrollment ratio in 1960 was 59 percent in Ghana compared with
 
46 percent in the Ivory Coast (World Bauk 1976).
 
From Independence to 1966
 
This was a critical period for both Ghana and the Ivory Coast. During
 
these years, the leaders of each country created the particular ideological
 
and policy framework in which development was to take place. Strategies
 
were formulated and the first steps towards implementation were undertaken.
 
These proved so economically disastrous in Ghana that Nkrumah was deposed
 
in 1966, leaving a legacy of debt and distortions from which the country
 
has yet to recover. In the Ivory Coast, on the other hand, 1966 marked the
 
turning point from a period of strong, concentrated econcmic management to
 
one in which decision-making became much more diffused and decentralized
 
in keepin --4th the growing complexity of the economy.
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Ghana under Nkrumah embarked on a radical structural transformation
 
of the economy, giving priority to import-substituting industrialization
 
and capital-intensive, state-managed agricultural development. There was
 
heavy emphasis on socialist ideology, decreased external dependence,
 
Ghanaanization of the economy, and the public sector as the leader in
 
promoting development. The Ivory Coast, in contrast, concentrated more
 
on small-farm agriculture and exports, created an atmosphere conducive to
 
private foreign investment in industry, and maintained close links to
 
France, the European Economic Community, and neighboring francophone
 
countries. The state was active in influencing and promoting development,
 
but as a partner with rather than a replacement for the private sector
 
(Berg 1971).
 
From 1960 to 1964, Ghana received $68 million in net foreign aid from 
OECD countries and multilateral institution,, of which $18.53 million was 
in the form of grants, primarily from the United States and the United 
Kingdom. Official bilateral loans, mostly from the same sources, amounted 
to $29.82 million and loan repaybLents equaled $1.38 million. Multilateral
 
borrowing totaled $25.6 million, primarily from the World Bank, and
 
repayments amounted to $4.74 million (OECD 1966).
 
The Ivory Coast received $70.16 million in grants during the same
 
period, of which $34.34 million were from France and the rest from the
 
European Development Fund. Offlcial bilateral loans during this period
 
equaled $82.26 million, two-thirds of which were from France. Total
 
official capital flows during the first five years of independence thus
 
totaled $152.42. (France 1976: 139). This was over twice the amount
 
received by Ghana from these sources.
 
These aid flows, however, are only partial. In Ghana's case, they
 
do not include the numerous bilateral arrangements made with eastern bloc
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countries, some of which contained concessional elements. Nor do they include
 
direct French budget subsidies for agricultural research, mineral exploration,
 
and technical assistance. If all of these were included, the figure for the
 
total foreign aid received by the Ivory Coast from 1960 to 1964 would be
 
considerably greater.
 
The contribution of this aid was heavily influenced by the course
 
of development in each of the countries. Gross domestic product in the
 
Ivory Coast, for example, increased in real terms at an annual rate of about
 
six to seven percent; in Ghana it increased at only two to three percent.
 
Low rates of inflation and balance of payments surpluses in the Ivory Coast
 
contrasted with rapid price increases and mounting deficits in Ghana.
 
With exports stagnant, imports rising, and foreign exchange reserves
 
falling, the government of Ghana resorted to short term suppliers' credits
 
and to deficit financing, borrowing heavily from the banking system and
 
social security fund. At the beginning of 1966, consumer
 
prices in Ghana were 75 percent higher than in 1960 and
 
imported goods were in very short supply due to import quotas and exchange
 
controls. As a result, industrial and other enterprises, which were heavily
 
dependent on imports of capital equipment and intermediate goods, were
 
forced to operate substantially below capacity because of their inability
 
to acquire these inputs (Berg 1971: 188). In addition, large sums had
 
been allocated to prestige products with very low rates of return.
 
Most significant for the future, Ghana by 1966 had acquired an
 
enormous medium- and long-term external debt of about $500 million, wheras
 
its foreign exchange reserves had fallen from $481 million in 1957 to $50
 
million at the time Nkrumah's government fell. About 80 percent of this
 
debt consisted of costly suppliers' credits. Debt service obligations rose
 
to 20 percent of exports in 1965 and were estimated at 25 percent in the
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following year. In addition, the system of import quotas and exchange
 
controls, introduced to try to reduce imports in the face of an overvalued
 
exchange rate, was a bureaucratic nightmare and gave rise to severe
 
distortions in domestic prices.
 
The development strategy of the Ivory Coast was conceived during
 
the first six years after independence. A key man in this process was
 
Raphael Saller, an Antillean with considerable experience in Africa, who
 
served as the first Minister of Finance, Economic Affairs, and Planning.
 
This was an extremely powerful position and enabled Saller to put hJ.s
 
"pragmatic, modern, liberal and disciplined" stamp on the economy with the 
full approval of the President (Woronoff 1972: 201). The incentive code
 
to encourage private foreign investment, which had been adopted in 1959,
 
was revised in 1962. It provided tax holidays, guaranteed the transfer
 
of capital, and provided for repatriation of profits. Foreign trade and
 
domestic marketing were left in private hands, and government investments
 
in industry generally involved minority participation. Public enterprises
 
were created primarily for infrastructure development, to expand housing
 
and the provision of utilities, and to introduce new crops such as rubber
 
and oil palm into agriculture (Woronoff 1972: 204).
 
It was perhaps in the area of economic planning that the Ivory Coast
 
was most innovative as an African nation. 
A series of Commissions de
 
Dgveloppement, composed of public and private representatives were created
 
to determine production targets, desireable reforms, and the general
 
orientation of their respective sectors. 
On the basis of this information,
 
a Comitg Interministgriel du Dveloppement examined the broad economic
 
situation and established the general framework for development and the overall
 
rate of growth. Frequent contacts between government and the private sector
 
were also maintained through the Conseil Economigue et Social and the
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Chambers of Comerce, Industry, and Agriculture. Using these guidelines,
 
technical elaboration of the Plan was carried out by the vast Ministry of
 
Finance, Economic Affairs, and Planning, with heavy input from French
 
technical assistants. The plan was then incorporated into annual development
 
budgets detailing how money and manpower would beused in a given year,
 
As part of the planning process, numerous studies were carried out, which
 
provided a solid foundation for the plamLning process. The government was
 
therefore well placed to direct the country's development efforts (Woronoff
 
1972: 206-8).
 
In 1966, the economic super-ministry was divided into separate
 
Ministries for Finance and Economic Affairs and for Planning. Substantial
 
power was retained by Plan, however, since it continued to have primary
 
responsibility for managing the special development budget (Budget Sp4cial
 
d'Investissemant et d'Equipement, or BSIE), funded by earmarked receipts
 
from taxes, duties, loans, and surpluses from the state's operating budget.
 
The prioritics laid down by Saller were retained, but there began to be a
 
decentralization of authority that has continued until today.
 
From 1967 to the Present
 
By the time the Nkrumah government was replaced and economic decision­
making in the Ivory Coast became more decentralized, the basic pattern of
 
economic development in these two countries was pretty much established.
 
These first years of independence thus proved to be critical for a much
 
longer period of time.
 
Ghana
 
Ghana since the Nkrumah era has been characterized by succeeding
 
phases of devaluation, import liberalization, austerity, inflation, and
 
political turmoil. The real value of exports (in 1968 prices) fell from
 
398 million cedis in 1966 to 154 million cedis in 1977. From 1970 to 1977,
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this value declined at an annual rate of 10.6 percent. Cocoa and ite
 
products comprised 71 percent of the value of those exports from 1974 to
 
1978, and cocoa production decreased from 538,000 metric tons in 1965 to
 
265,000 tons in 1979, primarily as a result of a 50 percent decline in the
 
real value of the producer price after 1963.
 
The NLC government devalued the cedi by 30 percent in 1967 and
 
rescheduled the country's short-term debt. An austerity program and a brief
 
increase in cocoa prices in 1967/68 permitted a liberalization of the
 
exchange control system. Imports rose, but were not taxed adequately, and
 
investment programs designed during the period of high cocoa prices were
 
continued after prices declined, putting pressure on demand. The system
 
collapsed and Busia's civilian government elected in 1969 moved towards
 
a massive devaluation of 80 percent in late 1971. Before the devaluation
 
could have effect, the government was replaced by a military coup of the
 
National Redemption Council (NRC). The NRC proceeded to revalue the cedi
 
so that the final devaluation was only 40 percent. Debts were unilaterally
 
rescheduled, and some'short-term debts, purportedly incurred under irregular
 
circumstances, were repudiated (Leith 1974: 5-8). This prompted the
 
donors to begin negotiations on an overall settlement. This was not reached,
 
however, until 1974.
 
The NRC managed during its early years to curb demand for imports
 
through strict, less corrupt licensing. Imports remained inflexible, however,
 
due to arbitrary licensing procedures. Inflation accelerated and the cedi
 
became increasingly overvalued. It was devalued again in 1978 from 1.15/$
 
to 2.75q/$ but continued to depreciate on the black market until by mid-1982
 
the rate was about 35./$. By this time, the government's budget was almost
 
totally out of control, with the deficit being financed by borrowing from
 
the central bank, lending to an annualized increase in the money supply of
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261 percent and triple digit inflation. In December 1981, the civilian
 
government installed by Jerry Rawlings after his ousting of the NRC in 1979
 
was once again replaced by the military (Economist Intelligence Unit 1982(1).
 
10-12).
 
The major form of foreign assistance that Ghana received following
 
the Nkrumah period was debt relief. A series of early bilateral agreements
 
culminated, in March 1974, in a multilateral arrangement calling for repayment
 
of the debt, afrer a 10 year grace period, in 36 equal instal).mnts, with an
 
interest rate of 2.5 percent. The grant element of this repayment scheme was
 
estimated at the time at $178 million, or 61 percent of the present value of
 
the debt relief. In fact, rising world inflation considerably increased
 
the relative importance of the grant element.
 
Gross official disbursements to Ghana averaged about $48 million a
 
year during 1967-69, but few new loan commitments were made until 1974
 
because of the outstanding debt dispute. Public transfers received by
 
Ghana at that time in the form of grants and technical assistance equalled
 
about $30 million a year (Appendix Table A-1). By the end of the 1970s,
 
Ghana was again receiving a substantial amount of foreign assistance, as
 
shown in Table 17.1. Approximately 60 percent of this was bilateral in
 
nature, mostly from West Germany, the United Kingdom, and the United States.
 
Of the $581 million in investment grants and loans received during 1977-80,
 
18 percent was in the form of grants and 62 percent in the form of
 
development loans with a grant element of at least 25 percent. As a result
 
of debt rescheduling, the debt service averaged only about 3 to 4 percent
 
of the total value of exports.
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Table 17.1. Official Foreign Capital Flows for Ghana,
 
1977-80 
($ million) 
19,77 1978 1979 1980 
Grants 
Investment 23.7 29.4 31.7 20.0 
Technical Assistance 29.2 37.5 35.4 44.9 
Total 2.9 66 .-9 67-.1 64.9 
Loans 
Concessional 47.3 55.7 114.6 140.9 
Other 19.0 34.1 34.9 30.5 
Total 66.3 89.8 149.5 171.4 
Debt Service 13.1 15.4. 20.6 22.9 
Net Official Flows 106.1 141.3 196.0 213.4 
Source: Appendix Table A-1. 
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Ivory Coast
 
The Ivory Coast economy after 1966 became increasingly diversified.
 
The.share of primary production in total GDP continued to decline during
 
this period from 34 percent in 1966 to 24 percent in 1977. Even within
 
agridlture there was a marked increase in the production and export of a
 
range of crops inaddition to coffee and cocoa. These included palm oil
 
and kernels, coprah, rubber, bananas, pineapples, and cotton. Real annual
 
growth of GDP remained high, but declined from 7.3 percent in 1965-70 to
 
4.9 percent in 1975-78. Prices also accelerated from 4.2 percent per annum
 
in 1965-70 to 17.7 percent in 1975-78, though this may be attributed more
 
to worldwide inflation than to growth in the domestic money supply. Gross
 
Domestic Investment continued to increase at a rapid rate, rising from
 
20 percent of GDP in 1966 to 29 percent in 1978.
 
Nevertheless, there were some disturbing trends. The balance of
 
tuade, which had been in surplus in every year prior to 1971, moved into
 
deficit during the 1970s. There was also evidence that the Ivory Coast
 
was running out of its most profitable investments in agriculture and
 
import-substituting industry and was having to accept lower rates of return.
 
Greater decentralization in decision-making was creating problems of
 
coordination and government control of foreign borrowing by parastatal
 
enterprises. At about the same time, the government undertook some very
 
costly investments in the southwest region of the country, in the Kossou
 
dam and its area of resettlement, and in some large sugar complexes in the
 
no7,th. This necessitated substantial additional foreign borrowing, much
 
of it at relatively high commercial interest rates. As a result, the disbursed
 
outstanding external debt of the Ivory Coast rose from $256 million in
 
1970 to $2,667 million in 1978. Preliminary estimates put it at $4,062
 
million in 1980. The debt service ratio rose from 6.7 percent in 1970
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to 14 percent in 1978, with preliminary estimates for 1980 at 23 percent.
 
The capacity of the Ivory Coast to continue borrowing from abroad had reached
 
its limits.
 
This is especially important because foreign assistance was increasingl3 
in the form of relatively hard loans rather than concessionary grants. DurinE 
1960-66, grants comprised 49 percent of project-related official capital 
flows,, and loans had a large concessionary element. From 1967 to 1973, 
however, grants amounted to only 11 percent of these flows (Appendix 
Table A-3). In 1977-80, as shown in Table 17.2, out of $907 million in 
official flows related to investment, only 9 percent was in the form of
 
grants and 31 percent in the form of development loans with a grant element
 
in excess of 25 percent. The increasingly hard terms applied to these flows
 
was a sign of the creditworthiness of the Ivory Coast, as well as of the
 
perception among international donors and lenders of its lack of need for
 
concessionary aid. One result was that the Ivory Coast paid out $131 million
 
in debt service payments during this period, reducing net capital inflows
 
to $776 million. Technical assistance, however, was valued at $304
 
million, giving an overall net official flow for the four years of $1,080
 
million. 
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Tble. 17.2'. 	 Official Foreign Capital Flows for the. i
 
"V.ory Coast, 1977-80
 ((6 n4 114'nn I
 
1977 19,78 1979 1980
 
Grants
 
11.8 	 25.1
Investment 17.4 24.1 

Technical Assistance 57.3 61.6 83.7 .101.4
 
Total 74.7 73-.4 107.8 126.5
 
Loans
 
42.4 73.3 67.8 100.0
Concessional 

Other 136.2 117.8 102.3 188.4
 
Total 178.6 191.1 170.1 288.4
 
Debt Service 	 22.2 29.7 34.5 44.8
 
Net Official 	Flows 231.1 234.8 243.4 370.1
 
Source: Appendix Table A-2.
 
7-17
 
j71.2' APMacroeconomic Assessment 
Theoretical Perspective
 
ram.the macroeconomic point of view, foreign aid is seen as filling
 
a. esource gap that permits a country to attain higher levels of investment 
or to import more goods required for development. A rigorous formulation 
of this view is the "two-gap model" of the demand for foreign aid (Chenery 
an Strout 1966). In this formulation, the ability of a country to use 
foreign aid is determined by the following parameters: the capacity to 
absorb investment, the target rate of growth, the ratio of savings to 
income, the capital-output ratio, the marginal propensity to import, and 
the rate of growth of exports. The model assumes that these parameters are 
fairly constant over extended periods of time and that during any 
particular period there will be an ex ante gap both between investment and 
savings and between imports and exports. The role of foreign aid is to 
fill the larger of these two gaps, permitting the country to grow as rapidly 
as it can absorb investment funds, or when that is no longer an important
 
constraint, to grow at its desired target ':ate.
 
The two-gap model has been critized on many grounds (Fei and Ranis
 
1968; Burton 1969), There is the question for example, of what happens to
 
the smaller gap when the larger has been filled since ex post the two must
 
be equal. This does not pose any fundamental problem since, should the
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larger gap be filled, the smaller gap can always be made larger by increasing
 
consumption, using capital less efficiently, importing more consumer goods,
 
or decreasing the growth rate of exports (Chenery 1969).
 
Much more serious is the issue of how the ex ante gaps can be measured
 
when only the ex post gap is actually observed. Since foreign aid is
 
always limited, it is highly unlikely that it will be sufficient in any
 
particular instance to fill the larger ex ante gap. This means that
 
accommodation will have to be made,by lowering the target growth rate,
 
increasing the rate of domestic savings, making more efficient use of
 
capital, decreasing the marginal propensity to import, or increasing exports.
 
What we view in the data, therefore, is not so much the demand for foreign
 
aid as it is the result of compromise because the supply of aid is
 
inadequate to satisfy ex ante demand.
 
A third criticism of the two-gap model is that it igncres the fact
 
that the parameters of the model are variables amenable to policy change.
 
The target rate of growth, for example, is obviously a policy variable.
 
The savings rate and capital-output ratio can be.altered by tax and
 
interest rate policy and by encouraging the establishment of financial
 
intermediaries. The marginal propensity to import and the export growth
 
rate are both influenced by trade and exchange rate policies. Foreign
 
aid could be used, therefore, to avoid difficult policy choices such as
 
devaluation. The counter-argument, of course, is that policy change is
 
economically and politically very difficult in any case and that foreign
 
aid, if appropriately employed, can reduce those difficulties and make
 
policy change feasible. Program aid, for example, may be highly useful
 
in moderating the adverse short-run impact of devaluation (Krueger 1978).
 
This question will be discussed later in the section on aid's relation
 
to policy change.
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5tatistical Analysis
 
A statistical analysis oas conducted to test the stability of the
 
principal parameters of the twa-gap model in Ghana and the Ivory Coast
 
using data from the national accounts for 1960 through 1977 (World Bank
 
1976- 104, 105, 132,'133; World Bank 1980: 86, 87, 112, 113). Estimates
 
were maia of the marginal propensity to save, the marginal propensity to
 
import, the growth rate of exports, and the incremental capital-output
 
ratio using the following equations:
 
S/P - a + b Y/P .00(1) 
H/P - c + d Y/P ....(2) 
Ig (X/P) - lg A + e T (3) 
f + g (L(Y/P)t - (Y/P)t-I t-'Lt'1Y
 
h ( tIP)t-l .
 
where S. is gross national savings (excluding net current transfers) 
P'is the GDP deflator
 
Y is gross domestic product at market prices
 
M is import of goods and nonfactor services
 
X is exports of goods and nonfactor services
 
T is time (year)
 
I is the gross domestic investment 2/
 
L is the agricultural labor force
 
t is th year to which the relevant values of the variables refer.
 
Ubere t does not appear, all variables in the equation refer to the
 
same year.
 
b is the marginal propensity to save
 
d is the marginal propensity to import
 
e is the growth rate of exports
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h is the marginal change in the -ncremental capital-output ratio
 
holding labor constant.
 
The results of these regressions are given in Table 17.3.
 
The major econometric problem posed by the regression results is positive
 
serial correlation in several instances, shown by relatively low values
 
of the Dubin-Watson statistic. This implies that some of the estimates
 
are blaued, given the small sample of observations. The bias is not
 
particularly distu!:bing, however, because the conclusions drawn from
 
the analysis are very rough and therefore insensitive to large errors
 
in the estimates.
 
Most important among these conclusions is the high degree of
 
responsiveness of savings and imports to changes in income in the Ivory
 
Coast compared with Ghana. This is shown by the large and statistically
 
highly significant slope coefficients for equations (1)and (2)in the
 
Ivcry Coast compared with the same coefficients for Ghana. The Ghanaian
 
savings coefficient is not significantly different from zero and the
 
imports coefficient is negative, reflecting the major influence of
 
trade restrictions and exchange controls. There was, in fact, a steady
 
reduction of the ratio of imports to income from .35 in 1960 to .08
 
in 1977.
 
The growth rate of exports for Ghana, shown in equation (3),
 
is also negative, though not significantly so. For the Ivory Coast,
 
this growth rate is positive and fairly high, but its standard error is
 
also quite large and there is very high positive serial correlation,
 
shown by.the low value of the Dubin-Watson statistic. The regression
 
results are thus quite difficult to interpret-given the limited number
 
of years for which data are available. This should not obscure the fact,
 
however, that the real value of exports for the Ivory Coast practically
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Table 17.3. Regression Results for Key Macroeconomic Parameters
 
Equation Constanta Slope Coefficients" R2b DW. 
Ghana 
(1) 0.814 0.057 -0.006 1.578 
(1.289) (0.060) 
(2) 8.501 -0.185 0.112 1.046 
(2.242) (0.104) 
(3) 1.397 -0.016 -0.035 1.734 
(0.270) (0.025) 
(4) 1.150 0.011 -0.452 0.947 1.125 
(0.972) (.001) (0.309) 
Ivory Coast 
(1) -0.130 
(0.107) 
0.190(0.026) 0.753 1.890 
(2) -0.387 0.460 0.975 0.945 
(0.074) (0.018) 
(3) 0.256 0.051 -0.006 0.128 
(0.121) (0.054) 
(4) 0.118 (0.001) (0.043) 0.850 2.427 
(0.101) (0.000) (0.115) 
Notes: 
a 	Figures in parentheses are standard errors of the coefficients.
 
b 	Coefficient of determination adjusted for the number of degrees of
 
freedom.
 
c 	Dubin-Watson statistic.
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tripled from 1960 to 1977, generating increasing amounts of foreign
 
exchange with which to finance the rapidly rising level of imports.
 
With labor held constant, the influence of investment on changes
 
in output, shown by the second slope coefficient in equation (4), appears
 
to have been negative in Ghana. In the Ivory Coast, the results suggest
 
nn statistically significant relation. The reasons for this are unclear.
 
They may have to do with the particular lag structure used in the equations,
 
or there may be other statistical anomalies.
 
In any event, some insight into the relationship between income and
 
investment in Ghana may be gained by looking at Table 17.4, which shows averag( 
annual rates of growth of the real value of output and investment over
 
each of the past three decades. During this period, the growth rate of
 
output steadily declined but remained positive. The growth of investment,
 
on the other hand, was quite rapid during the 1950s but became increasingly
 
negative after independence. By the 1970s, gross investment averaged only
 
8.9 percent of GDP, and net investment may even have been negative.
 
Certainly this was true in the cocoa industry, where replanting had ceased
 
and trees were rapidly going out of production because of their advanced
 
age. The decline in investment was associated more with restrictions on
 
imports of capital goods and replacement parts than with the relatively
 
modest drop in domestic savings that occurred. The binding constraint on
 
development in Ghana from a macroeconomic point of view, then, was foreign
 
exchange rather than resources for investment. This was clearly related
 
to stagnatiol in the export sector. It was also due to the failure
 
of foreign aid and capital inflows to fill the ex ante foreign exchange
 
gap, which was undoubtedly much larger than the ex post excess of domestic
 
investment over domestic savings.
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t-ble I7.4. Average Annual Growth Rates, of Gross Domestic 
Product and Gross Domestic Investment for
 
Ghana in Constant 1968 Prices (%) 
1950-60 1960-70 I970-77
 
GP 4.1 2.1 0.4 
GDI 8.9 -3.2 -8.6
 
eIurce: World Bank 1980: 86.
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The reasons for this difference between the ex ante and ex post
 
foreign exchange gaps were multiple. They had, first of all, to do with
 
the basic constraints that existed on the total amount of foreign aid made
 
available by donors ax,d how that aid was parceled among countries. Second,
 
Ghana's debt problem greatly complicated its access to loans, whether
 
commercial or concessionary. Only after its debt was rescheduled in 1974,
 
was it possible for Ghana once again to have access to the international
 
capital market and to concessionary financing on a large scale. Finally,
 
there remained the critical question for donors as to whether or not foreign
 
aid in Ghana would contribute to filling the gap in such a way that this
 
would lead to increased investment and economic growth.
 
The sitLation in the Ivory Coast was, of course, quite different.
 
The real value of exports grew at an average annual rate during the 1960s
 
of 5.5 percent, and this increased to 5.8 percent from 1970 to 1977. The
 
real value of imports grew even more rapidly, at 6.8 and 11.0 percent per
 
annum during each of these respective periods, because of official borrowing
 
and private capital inflows. As a result, the real value of domestic
 
investment increased at 12.7 percent per year during the 1960s and 12.1
 
percent annually from 1970 to 1977 (World Bank 1980: 113).
 
This favorable picture, however, may be changing. A sophisticated
 
two-gap macroeconomic model has been estimated for the Ivory Coast by
 
the World Bank (den Tuinder 1978: 160-86). The conclusions resulting
 
from the use of this model to analyze the effects of the 1976-80 plan over
 
the 1980s suggest that despite its past success, the Ivory Coast is now
 
having to invest in projects that yield a lower rate of return. Further­
more, without substantial policy changes, the Ivorian economy is unlikely
 
to be able to generate sufficient domestic resources to finance the
 
investment required by its growth targets. Since tax revenues in relation
 
to income are already high in comparison with other countries, additional
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savings will, unlike the past, have to be generated by the private sector.
 
In addition, recent increases in foreign borrowing cannot be sustained
 
because of rising debt service payments and their potential for lowering
 
the Ivory Coast's credit ratings abroad.
 
The major implications of this simulation exercise are: (1) that the
 
Ivory Coast has in the past been constrained more by domestic savings than
 
by exports; (2) that it has been highly successful, however, in generating
 
a large amount of savings in the public sector and in mobilizing additional
 
resources from abroad; but (3) that this strategy already is becoming more
 
difficult and will continue to do so in the future. If plan targets are
 
to be achieved, therefore, either additional foreign aid will have to be
 
forthcoming or the parameters of the model will have to change.
 
PROJECT AID: AGRICULTURE AND RURAL DEVELOPMENT
 
Most foreign assistance is offered in the form of specific projects
 
embodying technical-organizational packages in 'he design of which donors
 
usually play a very significant role. With this form of aid, the resource
 
transfee may be of less importance than the package itself, though the
 
host government's acceptance of the project is generally conditional upon
 
the donor furnishing the bulk of the financing. In effect, the donor buys
 
the right to influence how its resources are to be used to promote
 
development. The effectiveness of this form of aid is thus measured
 
by the degree to which project objectives are attained.
 
This section examines the effectiveness of project aid in promoting
 
agricultural and rural development in Ghana and the Ivory Coast. It
 
begins with a historical overview, followed by a description of foreign
 
assistance programs and projects in the rural sector of the two countries.
 
A discussion of the constraints on project design and implementation then
 
precedes the concluding section, which assesses the usefulness of
 
project assistance in an unfavorable policy environment.
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17-' The History of Rural Development
 
Ghana
 
Cocoa, the mainstay of the Ghanaian economy,was introduced in the
 
latter part of the 19th century. With scant assistance from the colonial
 
administration, cocoa grew to become the principal export, with 270,000 mt
 
being shipped abroad in 1935 (Gordon 1974: 71). In 1947, the
 
Ghana Cocoa Marketing Board (CMB) was established to stabilize farmer
 
incomes and real prices through the operation of a buffer stock and by
 
shielding domestic prices from those on the world market. This yielded
 
substantial public savings since on average one-half of export receipts
 
were withheld as taxes or CMB surpluses, permitting the accumulation of
 
large sterling reserves. World prices were sufficiently high, however,
 
so that strong incentives could also be offered to farmers, with the result
 
that production averaged 320,000 mt from 1954/55 to 1964/65, an increase
 
of 40 percent over the previous decade. World prices continued to fluctuate,
 
however, and, as seen in Table 17.5, Ghana's export earnings varied as well.
 
Until the mid-1960s, though, shortfalls were compensated by drawing on
 
the country's large reserves.
 
Starting with the seven year plan in 1961, the Nkrumah regime
 
emphasized rapid, state-led industrialization. The government had little
 
confidence in private, small-scale agriculture and felt that agricultural
 
productivity and output could only be increased through large collective,
 
motorized farms. By 1966, there were 135 state farms and about 35 Workers'
 
Brigades employing a total of 21,000 salaried workers. The results of
 
tnese projects were disappointing. The program cost $21 million in
 
capital expenditures, imported farm equipment, and current operating
 
expenses, while output was valued at only $4 million (Woronoff 1972:
 
186-187). 
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Table 17.5. World Prices, Production, Exports, and Export Receipts 
of Cocoa
 
World Pricesa Production Exports Export Receipts 
($/000'mt) (000 mt) (000 mt) (million $) 
719.2
1950-54 3185 230.1 225.5 

1955-59 2643 254.3 233.3 616.6
 
1960-64 1722 449.7 410.1 708.7
 
1965-69 2091 389.8 375.8 785.8
 
1970-74 	 239E 403.6 380.7 b 912.9 b 
3751 360.0 339.6
b 1273.8b 1975-77 

Source: Commodity Trade 1980: 36.
 
Notes: . In 1979. constant prices, Spot New York.
 
b .Estimate. 
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There were no gn- -nment programs to assist the small farmer.
 
Indeed, government policy penalized smallholder agriculture. Activities
 
of the extension service, which were crucial to the cocoa subsector, were
 
suspended in 1962 for about 5 years (McMurtry 1974: 219). In addition,
 
marketing services were further centralized. The CMB purchasing monopoly
 
was extended to other crops and private licensed buying agents (LBA)
 
wer3 replaced by the United Ghana Farmers Council (UGFC), which reduced
 
the marketing system's flexibility and increased its costs.
 
The government's ambitious development and industrialization plan
 
coincided with a slump in world cocoa prices in the early 1960s. To
 
maintain its export revenue needed for growing import requirementsGhana
 
cut the cocoa producer price. By 1965/66, the nominal farmgate price of
 
cocoa: was only one-half of the 1951/52 price (Bateman 1974: 318-319).
 
In real terms, the decline was even more severe as inflation accelerated
 
from about 2 percent in 1960-63 to over 20 percent in 1965 (Leith 1974:
 
93). Output, however, continued to rise until the 1964/65 bumper harvest
 
of 549,000 mt in response to plantings in the 1950s. No additional
 
plantings occurred thereafter and plantations were allowed to deteriorate.
 
By the time the National Liberation Council replaced the Nkrumah regime
 
in 1966, cocoa exports had declined and food production had dropped
 
drastically.
 
Administrations after 1966 sought to redress the distortions
 
accumulated over the early years of independence. All governments espoused
 
the objective of self-sufficiency in food and Industrial crops and the
 
rehabilitation of the cocoa subsector. Increasing funds were allocated
 
to the agricultural sector. The agricultural extension service was
 
reestablished in 1967/68. Operation Feed Yourself (OFY),launched in
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1972,sought to raise food production. Because of distrust of the
 
innovative capacity of the small farmers and the overvalued cedi, which
 
made imported inputs artificially cheap, OFY stressed motorized, large­
scale production techniques. Motor services (land clearing, plowing,
 
and combine harvesting) were heavily subsidized for these farms, as
 
were intermediate inputs such as seeds, fertilizers, and insecticides.
 
Overall, about 100,000 ha were put under mechanized cultivation, but
 
yields remained low and economic costs very high (Winch 1976).
 
In the meantime, there was an acute scarcity of agricultural inputs
 
for the small farmer. Furthermore, import restrictions on consumer goods
 
resulted in few of these reaching the countryside, and those that did
 
were very expensive. Cocoa farmers, already suffering from low producer
 
prices, began to shift toward foodcrop production and to neglect their
 
plantations. The age of cocoa trees rose, but little replanting occurred.
 
Production declined by about 3 percent per annum from 1965/66 to 1972/73,
 
and fell further by about 5 percent per annum to 230,000 mt in 1981/82 ­
the lowest since the late 1950s.l / Ghana, which held the largest share
 
of the world cocoa market in 1963/64 through 1972/73 at 30 percent, dropped
 
in the late 1970s to third place behind the Ivory Coast and Brazil.
 
Ivory Coast
 
The development of expoxt oriented agriculture in the Ivory Coast
 
dates back to the early colonial period at the turn of the century.
 
Rubber, palm products and timber, the first export crops, were later
 
replaced in importance by cocoa and coffee during the interwar period.
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In 1940, the Ivory Coast exported about 45,000 mt of cocoa and 15,000 mt
 
of coffee (Hermann 1981: 77). A decade later, local coffee trees were
 
severely attacked by tracheomycosis, and were replaced by robusta
 
varieties imported from the Belgian Congo. Timber exploitation expanded
 
after World-War II, and at tue time of independence in 1960, coffee,
 
cocoa, and timber had become the mainstay of the Ivorian economy, accounting
 
for 85 percen6 of the country's export earnings.
 
Three policies were the key to the success of agriculture in the
 
Ivory Coast. The first was the decision to build transport infrastructure
 
opening up zones of unexploited potential at lowered transport costs.
 
Equally important was the establishment of crop specific agricultural
 
research institutes for the development, testing, multiplication,and
 
dissemination of adapted varieties and technologies. Finally, coffee
 
and cocoa production was supported through the operations of stabilization
 
funds established in 1956.
 
The Ivorian government after independence continued the
 
colonial strategy of export orientation and development base on agriculture.
 
In addition, however, the government sought to broaden exports
 
by diversifying away foom coffee, cocoa, and timber into
 
other export crops such.as palm products, pineapples,and cotton. Research
 
remained in the domain of sectoral agricultural research institutions.
 
Extension of the new technologies, however, was delegated to autonomous
 
regional authorities, (e.g., Autorite de la Vallee du Bandama, Autoritd
 
pour l'Amenagement de la R9gion du Sud-Ouest) or to crop specific development
 
agencies (Sociftes de Dgveloppement, or SODE).
 
An ambitious oil palm nrogram, aided by the World
 
Bank, was begun in 1962 and sought to develop 63,000 ha of plantations by
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1970.A / As shown in Table 17.6, output grew from 290,000 mt in 1961-63 to 
707,000 mt in 1971-74. The growth of output of pineapples during
 
the 1960-74 period was about 24 percent per annum,-and cotton
 
production in the drier areas to the north increased by 21 percent per
 
year.
 
The traditional export products - coffee, cocoa, and timber ­
expanded at a slower rate. By 1970, the exploitation of timber resources
 
was progressing more rapidly than regeneration, and reserves were being
 
depletei. To sustain the levels of timber output, the government.embarked
 
upon an investment program in the San Pedro area to open up the hitherto
 
unexploited tracts of the southwest. Coffee production contivued to
 
expand, but at only 3 percent per annum, reaching 258,000 mt in 1971-74.
 
Production of cocoa grew more rapidly, aided by a large replanting and
 
rehabilitation program.
 
Urbanization accelerated after independence, and national food
 
requirements tripled in ten years. Even though food production increased
 
more rapidly than population growth, urbanization and rising incomes
 
placed large and increasing demands on food productivity. Food imports,
 
perceived as threatening the positive trade balance, became a major concern
 
for government. Rice production was promoted to substitute against
 
imports and to generate additional income in the north. The first major
 
investments were for mill and irrigation construction. Fertilizer, seed,
 
and extension services complemented the program.
 
The 1973 drought and the commodity price boom of 1973-74 led to a
 
major reassessment of Ivorian objectives. Concern over growing and
 
increasingly expensive food imports, especially rice, and over fluctuating
 
export earnings resulted in greater importance being attached to the
 
reduction and eventual elimination of food imports as a central national
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Table 17.6. 	Production of Key Agricultural Products in
 
the Ivory Coast (1960-1974)
 
Product 	 1960-63 1971-74 %Incre
 
Palm Clusters (mt) 290,188 705,737 10
 
Pineapples (mt) 23,142 192,790 24
 
Timber (000 m3) 3,470 4,669 4
 
Coffee (mt) 184,477 258,409a 3
 
Cocoa (mt) 91,965 199,829 8
 
Cotton (mt) 8 ,094b 55,933b 21
 
Source: La Cote d'Ivoire En Chiffres, Edition 1976-77.
 
Notes: a 1972-7!
 
b 1959/60-1962/63 to 1971/72-1973/74
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objective. As rice imports rose to over 100,000 mt per year in the
 
early 1970a and world prices quadrupled, the Evorian government accelerated
 
its investment in swamp and irrigated paddy production. As an added
 
incentive to producers and to aid farmers in the north, prices were
 
increased sharply. In 1975-76, with new investments, higher producer
 
prices, and demand dampened by a consumer price hike, the Ivory Coast
 
became self-sufficient. The subsidies on locally produced rice, inputs,
 
infrastructure, and services were a great fiscal burden, however, and the
 
rice development agency, which began amassing large debts, was eventually
 
disbanded in 1977.
 
Questionable investments were also made in sugar production, which
 
received the largest chunk of public investment funds between 1971 and
 
1980 - 21 percent of the total (Hermann 1981: 121). Production targets
 
of 135-150,000 mt by 1980 were established despite anticipated high
 
costs in relation to world market prices.
 
Foreign Assistance in the Rural Sector
 
In the 1960s, foreign assistance stressed capital development projects
 
such as irrigation, roads, ports, and power facilities. World Bank lending
 
to the agricultural sector consisted mainly of irrigation projects. 
Bank
 
policy shifted in the early 1970s, however, towards maintaining the
 
momentum of the green revolution to feed the developing countries and to
 
increase the incomes of the poor (World Bank, Agricultural Sector 1972:
 
McNamara 1973). 
 Bilateral donors followed a similar transition. Whereas
 
AID had been concerned .nthe 1960s primarily with infrastructural aid
 
and balance.of payments assistance, the "New Directions" mandate of 1973,
 
and the subsequent "Basic Needs" philosophy shifted United States' aid to
 
the "poorest of the poor" and to small-scale projects with better distributional
 
effects. The history of foreign assistance to Ghana and the Ivory Coast
 
followed this worldwide direction.
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Ghana
 
Through 1966, most foreign assistance in Ghana was allocated to
 
capit2ldevelopment projects and to assisting Nkrumah's industrialization
 
policy. The World Bank had no projects in the rural sector, while AID,
 
I 
the largest donor, funded an agricultural extension and production
 
project. The objective of AID strategy was to assist Ghanaian
 
production programs through price supports, subsidized input deliveries,
 
and credit programs. Technical assistance and management training were
 
important components of this strategy.
 
The first World Bank Cocoa Project to Ghana was initiated in
 
1970. This called for 20,000 ha of cocoa to be rehabilitated and 15,000 ha
 
of new trees planted over a five year period. Asked by the government to
 
assist in revitalizing the extension service, AID revamped the Agricultural
 
Extension and Production Project to emphasize extension and input delivery
 
aspects. Further resources were directed to health and population projects.
 
Significant amounts of PL 480 and about $30 million in program assistance
 
were also made available.
 
The unilateral repudiation of part of Ghana's foreign debt by the
 
NRC in 1972 resulted in a sharp drop in foreign assistance to Ghana. With
 
the exception of few bilateral donors (e.g., Canada), disbursement against
 
existing projects continued but no additional projects were designed.
 
From 1972 to 1974, donors awaited major macroeconomic policy reforms before contin­
uing their assistance programs. AID, no longer the largest donor,
 
relied on World Bank leadership and minimized its involvement in policy
 
questions (AID 1975, Vol. I: 34). The World Bank funded a Sugar
 
Rehabilitation Project and designed a Rice Development Project in the north
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that was never funded. AID sought to influence policy indirectly through training of
 
management. After 1972, the Economic Development Management Project and various
 
other training projects gained importance in USAID's portfolio (AID
 
1975, Vol. I: 24).
 
When Ghana's external debt was successfully rescheduled in 1974,
 
and long term stabilization seemed a likely prospect, project assistance
 
increased significantly. Agricultural and integrated rural development
 
projects predominated. Four World Bank Projects totalling $51 million
 
(Cocoa II, Oil Palm, Livestock Development, and Upper Region Integrated
 
Rural Development) were approved. US objectives, in line with the
 
Congressional mandate, sought to ensure that "the poor majority have more
 
adequate incomes and greater access to health care services of sufficient
 
quality" (AID 1975, Vol. I: 21-22). The basic approach of better
 
delivery of inputs and services, stronger planning and management, and
 
development of local institutions focused on a specific region was
 
maintained for all three sectors of AID involvement - agriculture,
 
health, and family planning. The large Managed Inputs and Delivery of
 
Agricultural Services (MIDAS) Project illustrates this comprehensive
 
approach. The project was comprised of imports and distribution of
 
ertilizers, seed multiplication and distribution, extension services,
 
rural credit, management training, studies of the marketing structure,and
 
a number of other components.
 
By 1977, economic mismanagement in Ghana had resulted in triple­
ligit inflation, a severely overvalued cedi, and cumbersome import
 
licensing procedures. Macroeconomic distortions created an undesirable
 
Lncentive structure favoring corruption, smuggling, and arbitrage.
 
he environment being no longer conducive to development, donor assistance
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programs began to be scaled down. As existing projects come to completion even today,
 
both multilateral and bilateral donors are reducing their assistance
 
programs to Ghana.
 
Ivory Coast
 
Until 1967, the Ivory Coast relied heavily on bilateral, especially
 
French, foreign assistance. Of an estimated total of about $260 million
 
between 1960 and 1967, France contributed about $135 million in funds,
 
personnel, and commodities, compared to $33 million from the US and $93
 
million from all multilateral donors (France 1976: 189: Appendix
 
Table A-5).
 
Donors' programs supported the government's policy of rapid,
 
export-oriented growth. In the early 1960's, infrastructural projects,
 
training, studies, resource surveys,and research projects were important.
 
France, for instance, financed one-half of the agricultural research
 
agencies, to which it also furnished substantial technical personnel.
 
In addition, a series of regional socioeconomic studies and resource
 
surveys were also funded. Top-level technical and managerial personnel
 
were sent from France to assist the Ivorian government in its program of
 
rapid economic growth. The presence of top-level administrators and
 
technicians, and the large financial support lent by France, undoubtedly
 
accorded France an important influence on policy decisions and aided in
 
the establishment of a stable and conservative economic environment.
 
By 1968, the Ivory Coast had built up an impressive infrastructure
 
of ports, roads, and power networks. The government's emphasis on agriculture
 
as the'principal source of growth was lent support by increasing project
 
aid. Donors' assisted the expansion of traditional export crops,
 
as well as the diversification program that sought to widen the country's
 
foreign exchange base.
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Project identification was facilitated by extensive studies and
 
surveys which analyzed the country's comparative advantage. Agricultural
 
project financing increased rapidly from the mid-1960s. The World Bank
 
group funded the first of over 15 agricultural projects in 1969. During
 
1968-81, of the $710 million in aid extended by the World Bank, one­
quarter was for the agricultural sector. This included cocoa, rubber,
 
oil palm, coconut, and cotton production projects. In the mid-1970s, the
 
Bank's program towards integrated rural development projects (North-'
 
eastern Savannah Project, Center West Project, etc.).
 
American assistance in the post-1967 period declined to $23.3
 
million in AID projects and other economic assistance, and $7 in PL 480
 
assistance from 1968 to 1981. This is not surprising since, with sound
 
international creditworthiness and aper capita GNP of $1200 in 1980, the
 
Ivory Coast no longer met the congressional mandate conditions. On the
 
other hand, the EX-IM Bank extended $255 million in various loans during
 
the 1968-81 period.
 
Project aid proceeded satisfactorily until the late 1970s when the
 
Ivorian government attached increasing importance to regional development
 
and to foodcrop production, thus moving away from traditional, comparative
 
advantage sectors into those with lower rates of return. The decreas­
ing return on investment, coincided with the oil crisis, and was
 
soon followed by a drop in coffee and cocoa prices. The Ivorian public
 
investment program for 1978 was planned during the 1976/77 coffee and
 
cocoa boom. Over $2 billion was allocated, 40 percent from external
 
sources. Available funds were used for some bad investments (the sugar
 
complexes, rice production), to meet rising public recurrent
 
expenditures, and for projects with long gestltion periods (education and
 
health). The Ivory CoastIs debt service had risen to 25 percent by 1980,
 
and the need for structural readjustment was recognized.
 
Constraints on Project Design and Implementation
 
Ghana
 
Two broad types of projects have been financed in Ghana's rural sectoz
 
Directly productive investmenti include various cocoa, oil palm, rice,
 
and livestock projects. At the other extreme are projects with an
 
indirect impact on production, such as those involving health, education,
 
and training.' Integrated rural development projects, -like the World
 
Bank's Upper Region Project and USAID's Managed Inputs and Delivery of
 
Agricultural Services (MIDAS) Project, have sought to incorporate elements
 
from both ends of the spectrum.
 
Few, if any, projects in the rural sector have succeeded in attaining
 
their targets in Ghana. This is particularly true of the directly
 
productive projects. The World Bank's Eastern Region Cocoa Project,
 
for example, set as its goal the replanting of 15,000 ha and the
 
rehabilitation of an additional 20,000 ha. By the end of 1973/74, one
 
year before foreign financing ended, only one half of the acreage had
 
been planted, while only 29 percent of the target 20,000 ha had been
 
rehabilitated.
 
Similar problems faced the MIDAS project, USAID's major integrated 
rural development project in Ghana. Whereas the project's stated goal was 
to increase agricultural production on small holdings through better 
input distribution, a 1979 mid-project evaluation stated that "the 
project failed to deliver agricultural inputs such as fertilizer, seeds, 
credit, and technical services.to small farmers", (Hess andUney 1979). 
A common constraint to design and implementation of all Ghanaian
 
projects has been the lack of a clear overall rural development plan to-guide
 
donor participation (AID 1973: 1). In addition, rapid staff
 
turnovers of upper and middle level Ghanaian management have hindered
 
constructive dialogue. These problems have been further compounded by
 
the rapid rate of inflation and the overvaluation of the cedi. In 1977,
 
inflation reached 60 percent, and thereafter exceeded 100 percent each
 
year (AID 1981: 8). In the face of a constant official rate of exchange,
 
this led to an increasingly overvalued currency. Imported inputs and
 
tradable outputs were underpriced in relation to local currency expenditures
 
and the opportunity cost of labor. Furthermore, local operating expenses
 
of projects and donor missions, when converted to dollars at official
 
exchange rates, became prohibitively expensive. / The World Bank Oil
 
Palm Project, for example, was appraised at $22.5 million in
 
1975 but cost $53.3 million in 1982 due to inflation. Price distortions
 
encouraged people to take advantage of differentials in order to supple­
ment their meager incomes. Managerial inefficiency and corruption became
 
entrenched. Donars complained frequently that projects could not "keep
 
good people" (North 1982).
 
A number of specific problems also constrained the successful
 
implementation of projects in Ghana. The government's cocoa price policy,
 
for example, inadequately reflected production costs. In 1975, the
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producer price was the equivalent of 0.59 N¢/kg, whereas the breakeven
 
price was estimated at about 0.73 to 0.88 N¢/kg. At those prices farmers
 
were unwilling to maintain and, at times, to harvest their farms. They
 
of course did little replanting. Shortages of consumer goods and farm
 
inputs also reduced farmers' real purchasing power. Not surprisingly,
 
even though cocoa was very profitable at economic prices (Stryker 1975:
 
21), farmers switched to privately more profitable foodcrops. The average
 
age of trees in the meantime increased so that,by 1978, 85 percent of the
 
cocoa trees were estimated to be 16 years or older.
 
To arrest the rapid decline in cocoa production, the Limann
 
government tripled the producer price to 12 Nc/kg in 1981 (Economist
 
Intelligence Unit 1982 (1): 10). Even at 12 NC/kg, however, -- which
 
traded at 35 Nf€/$ on the black market -- the Ghanaian cocoa producer
 
received less than half the price to Ivorian producers when comparison is
 
made at the black market exchange rate of 35 N€/$. As a result, about
 
50-60,000 mt of Ghanaian cocoa are currently being smuggled annually
 
to the Ivory Coast and Togo.
 
Pricing and availability of primary factors of production has also
 
biased the types of techniques employed. Ghanaian exchange rate policy
 
has favored capital intensive, mechanized production techniques. Due to
 
the overvalued cedi, imported equipment appears less expensive than
 
locally procurred labor services. This bias is compounded by the
 
government's decision to apply no duty on mechanized equipment imports.
 
Mechanized services are also strongly subsidized by the government,
 
with subsidies ranging from 70 to 90 percent of costs. Yet studies have
 
shown that whereas capital-intensive techniques are financially attractive,
 
they are economically least profitable (Winch 1976: 92).
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The Ghanaian government has also heavily subsidized other
 
agricultural inputs. The subsidy on fertilizer was 77 percent in 1974
 
and 56 percent in 1981, while the subsidy in 1975 on sprayers and
 
inaecticides was 80 and 90 percent respectively. At these subsidized
 
prices, however, insufficient inputs could be supplied. In 1972, only
 
8,000 of the required 11,000 mt of fertilizer were delivered (Gilbert
 
1972: 7). Imports of insecticides and sprayers also declined.
 
Insecticide supplies averaged 205,450 gallons in 1957-64, but only 137,900
 
gallons in 1964-74. Between 1970 and 1975, sufficient insecticides were
 
made available to spray only 15,000 hectares, or about 9 percent of the
 
total land area each year. The World Bank Cocoa Project "had very few
 
cutlasses which it could supply" and a "limited quantity of gammalin 20"
 
to spray farms. Pruners and sprayers were "on order" (Christian 1974:
 
11).
 
Projects also suffered from inadequate local support services.
 
Ghanaian seed multiplication farms had a total annual production capacity
 
of 1.65 million cocoa pods in 1976, enough to replant 20,000 ha per year,
 
or less than 1 percent of the cocoa area. Even the declining demand
 
for seedlings could not be met. The Eastern Cocoa Project requested
 
250,000 pods in 1972/73 but received only 150,000,enough for 5,400 of
 
the planned 8,000 acres (Christian 1974: 11-12).
 
In Ghana, it has not been the price of the input that has limited
 
consumption but the "lack of an effective system of ...importation and
 
distribution" (Gilbert 1972: 8). 
 The foreign exchange constraint has limited
 
the quantity of inputs imported,, Agricultural inputs have not received
 
priority in foreign exchange allocation. When funds have been'allocated, the
 
licensing procedure has been cumbersome, susceptible to corruption, and subject
 
to long delays. Due to the lack of fuel and spare parts, transport of
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inputs upcountry to the project areas has been delayed. Relative
 
scarcity induced by the subsidized prices has necessitated elaborate controls
 
to ensure input use by the target groups. But since sprayers in 1975
 
cost 30 N¢ in Ghana, and comparable sprayers cost the equivalent of 700 N¢
 
in the Ivory Coast, smuggling of project inputs has been prevalent. Credit, too,
 
has been subsidized. In AID's MIDAS Project, rural credit has been made available
 
at 8-12 percent. But inflation since 1977 has exceeded 100 percent, so
 
the real rate of interest has been strongly negative. Whether the credit has been
 
used for its intended productive ends under such circumstances is
 
doubtful.
 
Finally, institutional weaknesses have hindered project success.
 
Various government agencies involved in agriculture have been overstaffed,
 
poorly trained and motivated, and underequipped. Recurrent administrative expendi­
tures have been high. The CMB with a staff of about 50,000 had in 1982 an
 
estimated 4,000 N¢ in administrative expenditures per ton of cocoa.
 
(Economic Intelligence Unit 1982(2): 16).
 
In the face of these difficulties, it has been extremely difficult
 
to design and implement projects successfully. Infrastructure projects have
 
become enormously expensive as local costs have mounted with the increasingly
 
overvalued exchange rate. AID has concentrated instead, in recent years,
 
on training projects designed to improve the human resourc. base upon
 
which future development will depend. But it is estibaated that as much
 
as half of the participants subsequently emigrate from Ghana in search
 
of more remunerative employment elsewhere. Furthermore, training and
 
education projects have difficulty in meeting recurrent expenditures. In
 
Ghana AID has covered about 90 percent of the operating costs of training
 
projects.
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Ivory Coast
 
The economic performance of the Ivory Coast, which is heavily
 
reliant on its rural sector, has been ote of the few successes of
 
independent sub-saharan Africa. Not surprisingly, most rural development
 
projects have attained their objectives. Most commercial crops grown
 
in the forest zone, for example, attained or exceeded their production
 
targets in the 1971-75 Plan. Large investments in ill-planned projects
 
financed chiefly by external borrowing, however, later led to structural
 
imbalances in the Ivorian economy.
 
The factors that resulted in the structural difficulties of the
 
economy also acted as constraints on the design and implementation of
 
externally financed projects. One constraint stands out in particular
 
In its desire to develop the relatively poor northern savannah region,
 
the Ivory Coast moved away from its traditional comparative advantage
 
in high rainfall crops produced in the south. Large amounts of resources
 
were transferred north through production projects that were hastily
 
selected and poorly prepared. Not only was there a shift towards the north,
 
but there was an inappropriate selection of crops and techniques.
 
The Ivorian government planned, through the construction of twelve
 
irrigated sugar complexes, to produce 600,000 mt of sugar. Of the
 
public investment planned for 1976-80, 35 to 40 percent was to be allocated
 
to sugar production. Since Ivorian demand was estimated at 100,000 mt,
 
one-half million tons of sugar would have had to be exported. As the
 
world sugar price declined, the number of sugar complexes was decreased
 
to six, with 470,000 mt of sugar output. Capital costs were very high,
 
and overruns not only resulted in partial completion of projects but
 
they also severely affected project profitability (den Tuinder 1978: 35).
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As designed, the complexes were capital intensive, used sophisticated
 
technology, and would have few linkages with the rest of the Ivorian
 
economy. Total production costs were estimated at $.23/lb, while 1980-85
 
world prices were projected at $.10/lb. It was unclear where the surplus
 
of sugar could be exported and how the difference between the world
 
price and domestic cost of production would be financed..
 
Cotton, which seems to be a reasonably profitable crop .for the
 
north, at first failed to reach its overoptimistic production targets.
 
The cotton program has, however, successfully employed animal ,traction
 
technology in an integrated regional development setting. Under the
 
guidance of CIDT, the development agency for the north, cotton and
 
fooderop production has been expanding steadily.
 
The objectivesof the rice program was to gain food elf-suafft'eiency, 
to traiisfer income to the north, and to diversify pridu't"':o.i'loti price 
and investment policy were heavily employed. About 21' I|ilIonCFAF, 
or 6-15 percent of total public investment for the '1976-80,plan, were 
allocated to developing the rice sub-sector. Whereas the program achieved 
success -- producing large quantities *of rice, the costs were very high. 
Rice projects generally involved costly irrigated and mechanized schemes 
with a high share of imported inputs (Humphreys 1981: 102). To be 
privately profitable, these required protection against lower cost 
imports. As discussed earlier, this was accomplished primarily by 'raising 
the producer price and incurring public marketing losses. This was not 
only financially, but also economically,unprofitable since the rice 
program was an inefficient means of saving foreign exchange (Humphreys 
1981). Unsound projects could not be sustained over the longer run
 
through public subsidies, and the system collapsed.
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The second major constraint on projects has been the absorptive
 
capacity of ths Ivory Coast. Successful planning, design, and
 
implementation of projects requires flexible and skilled administration.
 
As the Ivorian economy has grown in complexity, centralized state­
operated or supported'programs have become more difficult to manage.
 
A governmental reorganization occured in the 1970s to allow for greater
 
decentralization of decision making and to render ministries more responsive
 
and effective in implementing policy, but skilled Ivorian managers, though.
 
growing in number, are still in short supply.:
 
Donors were faced with similar constraints in realizing the, 
objectives of their programs. As project selection became less obvious 
and as the Ivorian government's obj'ectives grew in complexity, the 
importance: of planning became evident. Without effective planning of 
sectoral and intra-sectoral resource allocation, bad investment choices,as
 
in .the case of the sugar complexes, diverted,scarce human and financial
 
resources into inefficient activities.
 
Similarly, price policy has led to important misallations of 
resources, reducing the effectiveness of foreign -assistance., The large 
rice program.-of the 1970s absorbed labor, land, foreign and domestic
 
capital, and managerial skills from other, more profitable uses.. As 
another example, coffee and cocoa prices are currently both ma-rntained 
at 250 CFAF/kg, even though coffee is more costly to produce and its 
price has recently been l1igher on world markets.
 
Finally, public enterprises have played a crucial role in the 
success of project design and implementation. The Ivory'Coast'has used 
these enterprises in relatively high risk agricultural programs and to 
further its efforts to promote Ivorianization. But over.time, the public
 
enterprises have became overstaffed and bureaucratic. At the same time,
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many public enterprises have lacked the flexibility and autonomy to
 
increase their operating efficiency. Thus donors desiring to participate
 
in those sectors where these public development agencies are involved
 
have been increasingly confronted with high administrative costs and
 
inefficiency.
 
Foreign Assistance as an Unfavorable Policy Environment
 
As the previous discussion suggests, the impact foreign assistance
 
is likely to have depends critically on the economic policy environment
 
of the recipient country. Foreign assistance to the rural sector
 
of a severely distorted economy, as in Ghana, is generally ineffective
 
as a means of acaieving either donor or host country goals. In many ,
 
instances, it is simply a resource transfer to the government and to that,
 
segment of the Ghanaian population benefitting from the officially:
 
sanctioned economy.
 
TMis tends to encourage the design of projects that are impervious .
 
to the distortions and inefficiencies introduced by government policy.
 
Local expenditures are minimized since they are much more expensive at-.
 
the overvalued exchange rate than purchases in foreigi currency. These
 
enr.laves, such as the Volta River aluminum project, replace projects
 
with greater linkages to the local economy and bienefictal distributive
 
effects.
 
At the other extreme are the integrated development projects
 
designed with the view that a single component is more likely to fail
 
than a comprehensive package that maintains a critical momentum.' Despite
 
its size, however, the.MIDAS project could not overcome the constraints
 
facing isolated projects with more limited objectives. Administrative
 
and managerial capacity proved. insufficient to coordinate elements
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of the project. The import licensing mechanism --
ever though the
 
project was exonerated --
 delayed imports of gools and inputs. Lack,
 
of transport equipment slowed shipments upcountry. Cuts rose tit an
 
annual rate of over 100 percent due to inflation.
 
Infrastructure projects, such as the construction or rebuilding of
 
roads, have the advantage that their success does not depend on government
 
incentives to producers. In many instances, they can benefit the market
 
economy outside the public sector. 
But they suffer from the same problems
 
as other projects with respect to implementation, and they are particularly
 
susceptible to cost overruns to the extent they require large expenditures
 
in local currency.
 
Probably most successful have been the human resource projects
 
(health, training, and education), which are only indirectly productive.,
 
The objective of these projects has been to reach the people directly,
 
rather than passing through the government. While delays, cost overruns,
 
and partial competitions have been encountered, these projects are regarded
 
as a relative success in Ghana by AID. Nevertheless, cost recovery is
 
low, and as many as one-half of the successful trainees are believed
 
to have left Ghana to work in neighboring countries. One can only hope
 
that these people will-someday return;when-conditions in Ghana improve.
 
It may be argued that ultimately foreign assistance should develop' 
people and not governments, 'and thus human resource projects with long 
gestation periods and few direct quantifiable financial benefits are 
Justified in cases like Ghana. The beneficiary of human resource 
projects will be able to earn higher income, and may, if he has:migrated,
 
even remit some funds to his family in Ghana. The difficulty, however,
 
is that without quantifiable benefits there is no benchmark for 
evaluating
 
the desireability of these projects.
 
3.7.4 
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The Economic Policy Environment and Foreign Aid
 
The analyses thus far has shown a remarkable difference in the 
experience since independence of the two neighboring countries, Ghana
 
and the Ivory Coast. Ghana, despite a substantial inflow of foreign
 
p 
aid, has seen a steady deterioration in nearly all its macroeconomic
 
indicators such as GDP per capita, real investment, imports, inflation,
 
and the black market rate of exchange. The critical constraint on its
 
development seems to have been a severe shortage of foreign exchange.
 
The Ivory Coast, on the other hand, hns experienced high rates of growth
 
of investment, domestic savings, exports, capital inflows, and per
 
capita income. Inflation has been relatively low and linked primarily
 
to that of the rest of the world because of the country's openness.
 
The CFA franc has been strong with little or no over-valuation, and,
 
until recently at least, the country has increasingly been able to borrow
 
on the international capital market, replacing concessionary aid.
 
At the proje:ct level, Ghana has experienced any number of problems.
 
The choice of promoting mechanized farms during and after the Nkrumah
 
period proved disastrous. Low producer prices, especially for cocoa,
 
have discouraged farmers and reduced their incentives to participate
 
in projects. 
 Efforts to establish public agencies for the collection,
 
and distribution of food have been costly and have interfered with the
 
development of private marketing. Input subsidies, including the
 
influence of the overvalued cedi, have created financial problems lo-r
 
public distribution agencies, encouraged smuggling of inputs to netighboring
 
countries, discouraged private distribution of inputs, and benefitted
 
lisproportionately those with sufficient influence to gain access to
 
3carce supplies. Inflation and the increasingly overvalued exchange rate 
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have raised the cost of project expendistures in local currency to
 
prohibitive levels. While projects in the Ivory Coast have also had
 
problems, these have been relatively isolated, at least until recently,
 
and have at no time taken on the proportions of those in Ghana.
 
A major thesis qf this paper is that the varied experiences of Ghana
 
and the Ivory Coast with respect to their ability to mobilize and make
 
effective use of foreign aid are to be explained primarily by the
 
differences in their economic policy environments. These differences
 
have not been isolated and particular but rather have been systemic
 
and general. This section describes those environments and how they have
 
influenced tte effectiveness of foreign assistance. Thereafter, the
 
historic role of foreign aid in improving the economic policy environment
 
in each of the two countries is examined.
 
The Economic Policy*Environment and Its Impact on-the Effectiveness of
 
Foreign Aid
 
The economic policy environment is the set of laws, decrees,
 
regulations, and other legal or administrative devices that establish the
 
economic framework in which producers, traders, and consumers, whether
 
public or private, operate. This framework consists of tax rates,
 
subsidies, investment regulations, import quotas, exchange controls,
 
regulated prices, and a hostof other "policy constraints". All of these
 
alte•rthe profitability or desireability, from a private point of view,
 
of economic activities.
 
Of majorimportance, in this respect, are the economic policies a
 
country establishes that govern its economic relations with the rest of
 
the world. These',influence domestic prices relative to those on world
 
markets, create differences between private market and official exchange
 
rates, determinethe availability of imported goods and services, affect
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flows of labor and capital across international frontiers, and act in
 
numerous other ways to relate one country's economy to those of the
 
rest of the world.
 
Ghana
 
Ghana's economic policy environment has been characterized above
 
all by shortages of foreign exchange and a system of import and exchange
 
controls, which as a result of mounting inflation has led to an increasingly
 
1
overvalued currency despite several devaluations and attempts at liberalization.7

One result has been artificially low official prices for agricultural
 
products, especially export crops such as cocoa. In addition, the
 
government has been heavily dependent on cocoa exports as a source of
 
tax revenue, further depressing the official price to producers.
 
Equally important has been the effect of import and exchange
 
controls on the prices and availability of consumer goods purchased by
 
farmers in rural years. The supply of these goods has been severely
 
restricted, with priority being given instead to imports of capital and
 
intermediate goods and to basic foodstuffs consumed in the cities. As
 
a result, there has been a severe shortage of consumer goods in the,
 
countryside and those that have been available have been sold at very,
 
high prices. The farmer, therefore, ,has suffered-in two ways:, the prices
 
received for his export crops have been low, and the prices paid for
 
consumer goods, when available, have-been high.
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Since the late 1960s, however, the Ghanaian government has tried
 
to offset this disincentive by offering subsidies on credit and on
 
agricultural inputs, such hs seeds, fertilizers, insecticides, and
 
machinery services. These subsidies have been facilitated by the over­
valued exchange rate at which the external prices of imported inputs
 
are converted to domestic currency. Nevertheless, the subsidies have beet
 
a financial burden on public supplying agencies and to some extent have
 
encouraged inappropriate techniques and crops in which Ghana does not
 
have a comparative advantage. In addition, tha subsidies have strongly
 
discouraged the distribution of agricultural inputs by private traders.
 
Furthermore, severe shortages of the inputs, resulting from import
 
restrictions and management problems, have biased their distribution
 
towards larger, more prosperous farmers and have created uncertainty as:
 
to their availability.
 
Projects have succeeded only where these have been established in
 
such a way as to be insulated from these problems. The Volta River project
 
for example, was set up essentially as an enclave, importing capital
 
and intermediate goods directly from abroad and bypassing the government's
 
system of procurement. On the other hand, even when projects in the
 
agricultural sector have been able to procure inputs without difficulty i
 , 
these have had to be sold at subsidized prices that were substantially 
below prices on the private market or,in neighboring countries. Diversion 
of the inputs from the project area and smuggling outside of Ghana have
 
thus been strongly encouraged, 'enrichingthose able to gain access to
 
to the inputs.
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At the same time that export crops has been discouraged, the
 
Ghanaian government has tried to promote the production of food and other
 
import substitution crops. A key mechanism for accomplishing this has
 
been its import policy. For imported rice, for example, tariffs and
 
the margin of the Ghana National Trading Corporation equalled 66 percent
 
of the c.i.f. value of imports in 1972. Distribution of this rice throug
 
established wholesale and retail,traders was ostensibly made at officiall
 
regulated prices, but restrictions on imports and lack of enforcement of
 
official prices resulted in large quantities of rice being sold at
 
higher prices. The free market price of rice in Accra in 1972, in fact,
 
was 2.3 times the c.i.f. price. Obviously, incentives for domestic
 
farmers to produce rice were strong as long as that rice could be
 
marketed by private traders...
 
The government, however, was more concerned about supplying urban
 
areas with food at low prices. For this purpos.e, the Food Marketing
 
Corporation was created under Nkrumah. This wis later merged with the
 
Task Force Distribution Unit to create in 1971 the Food Distribution
 
Corporation. In 1975, this state agency"took over the MarketingDivision
 
of the Grains Development Board. '.In addition,_the Rice Mills Unit, which
 
had been part of the Grains Development Board, was made an autonomous
 
body under the Ministry of Agriculture.
 
Ostensibly these agencies have been responsible for implementing
 
guaranteed minimum prices designed to cover production costs, especially
 
for rice and maize. In fact, they have been obliged to sell at maximum
 
prices that are insufficient to cover' their operating Icosts in order
 
to keep retail prices to consumers at low levels. As a result, they
 
have incurred heavy financial.losses. 'In most years, .market prices
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have been higher than the minimum prices offered by these agencies so
 
that buying has been difficult. Even when the minimum price has been
 
above the market price, buying operations have been limited because of
 
lack of funds and storage space. Thus the influence of the state trading
 
agencies on domestic marketing of food has had little importance at best
 
and at worst has been detrimental since large producers and Agricultural
 
Development Bank borrowers have at times been required to sell to these
 
agencies at the official minimum price.
 
At the same time that government policy in Ghana has discouraged
 
the production of export crops, it has offered positive incentives,
 
in general, to industry. Import quotas and high tariffs, for example,
 
have protected industrial firms from import competition. Non-traditional
 
exports have enjoyed bonuses on their export earnings. In addition, the
 
Capital Investments Board has provided tax holidays and exemptions from
 
duties'and other taxes on inputs. These benefits have been of limited
 
value to foreign equity-holders, however, because remittances of profits
 
and dividends have been blocked by exchange controls.'
 
A useful way of comparing the incentives offered in different
 
agricultural and industrial,activities is to examine the effective rate 
of protection (ERP) in each. This measures the incentives applicable
 
to both outputs and'inputs and thus indicates the extent to which policy
 
permits actual value added to diverge from its level in the absence of 
protection. The results are shown in Table 17.7 for 1972, a year in whicb. 
the overvaluation of the cedi was not very'great following its devaluation 
in late 1971, but the values of the ERP are-essentially as expected. 
That of cocoa, Ghana's major export crops, isnegative, showing the system's 
bias against this sector. The ERPs for maize, rice, and cotton are 
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Table17.7. 	Effective Rates of Protection (ERP) for Selectei
 
Agricultural and Industrial Activities in Ghana
 
1972
 
Activity ERP Activity ERP
 
Cocoa -0.5 Fiber and Paper Products 1.3
 
Maize 0.7 	 Chemicals 0.7 
Nonmetallic Mineral Products-2.4Rice 0.7 
.81 Basic Metal Products 0.6Cotton 
Processed'Food 1.4 Fabricated Metal Products, 7.4 
Textiles and Clothing, 15.5 Machinery & Equipment 
Footwear1 
Wood and Wood.Products 2.9 
Source: 	 Scott R. Pearson, Gerald C. Nelson, and J. Dirck Stryker,
 
"Incentives and Comparative Advantage in Ghanaian Industry and
 
Agriculture," August 1979, pp. 38-40 and calculations of the
 
author.
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positive at fairly modest levels. This primarily reflects the effect
 
of restrictions on agricultural imports, leading to inflated prices on
 
the private market. Effective protection of industry is in general
 
much greater, partly because there is less political resistence to
 
restrictions on imports of manufactured goods compared with foodstuffs.
 
The ERP for nonmetallic mineral products is negative, not because
 
protection is negative, as is true of cocoa, but because it is so strongly
 
positive that resources are misallocated to such an extent that value
 
added measured in world prices is negative.-8/
 
Although comprehensive data are not available, it is clear that
 
the policy distortions shown in Table 
17.7 have become accentuated since
 
1972. The producer price for cocoa divided by the national consumer
 
price index, for example, decreased by 37 percent from 1972 to 1979.
 
In rural areas, consumer goods prices rose even faster, and in many
 
instances the goods were not available at any price. As a result of,
 
inflation the cedi depreciated rapidly on the black market, making
 
agricultural input subsidies for the favored few'who cuuld obtain them­
even greater. In addition, the requirement on the part of the donors.-to,
 
convert foreign exchange to cedis at the official rate of exchange
 
implied that the cost of local.purchases rose enormously, making most
 
projects prohibitively expensive. At the same time, restrictions on 
food
 
and other.imports raised their domestic prices on the free market, further
 
biasing the structure of incentives against the export sector. By the
 
beginning of the 1980s,.the result was a highly distorted economy in,which
 
the incentives for black marketdealing, smuggling,- and corruption were
 
so great that almost any project,channeled through the public sector was
 
unlikely to succeed.
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Ivory Coast
 
In contrast to Ghana, the Ivory Coast's economic policy environment
 
has been one in which these kinds of distortions have been minimal.
 
First, the CFA franc has been rigidly linked with the French franc and
 
has remained a convertible currency without exchange controls on current
 
account. Second, the use of quantitative import restrictions has been
 
minimal, implying that the relation between domestic and world prices of
 
tradeable goods has been determined primarily by tariffs and, for agricultural
 
products, by the operations of the Caisse de Stabilisation et de Soutien
 
des Prix des Produits Agricoles (CSSPPA), charged with stabilizing produce
 
prices of the major cash crops, and the Caisse de Perequation, responsible
 
for stabilizing the prices of rice and some other basic foodstuffs
 
(den Tuinder 1978: 42). Third, the bias towards industry has been less
 
than in Ghana. Coffee and cocoa have been taxed, but the priority given
 
by the government to agricultural development has kept it from squeezing
 
that sector too hard. Fourth, import tariffs have, in general, been
 
moderate, though effective rates of protection have been higher because
 
of low duties on intermediate inputs and because of benefits from the
 
Ivory Coast's investment code. Finally, though input subsidies have hardly
 
been absent from Ivorian agricultural policy, they have been much less
 
pronounced than in Ghana.
 
The lesser degree.of distortions ,in the Ivory Coast economy compared
 
to that of Ghana. can be seen by looking at effective rates of'protection 
(ERP) in Table 17.. AlthoIugh cash crops in the Ivory Coast have been taxed 
and food grains protected, these distortions have been less severe than
 
in Ghana. Furthermore, industry in the Ivory Coast has received,
 
substantially less protection than in Ghana. The net impact of these
 
distortions was such as to cause the exchange rate to be overvalued by
 
an estimated '15 percent-in 19,72.
 
Table 17.8. Effective Rates of Protection (ERP) for Selected
 
Agricultural and Industrial Activities in the
 
Ivory Coast, 1972
 
Activity ERP 
Coffee -0.4 
Cocoa -0.4 
Palm Products -0.1 
Copra -0.i: 
Pineapples 
Bananas -0.3 
Cotton 
Rice 0.3 
Maize 0.4', 
Grain Milling: 27 
Processed Foods 0.1 
Beverages -0.4 
Activity ERP 
Edible Oils, Soap 1.5 
Milk Products 0.0 
Tobacco 0.2 
Textiles and Clothing 1.5 
Footwear8 
Lubricants 1.2 
Chemical Products 0.8 
Rubber Products 0.0 
Cement 0.0 
Transport Equipment !0.2 
M Transformation, 0.8 
Machinery 
Paper Products 0.2 
Source: J. Dirck Stryker, Garry Pursell, and Terry Munson, "Incitations
 
et C s Reels en Cote d'Ivoire," May 23, 1975, Table A, and J. Dirck Stryker
 
"Western Africa Regional Project: Ivory Coast -- Economic Incentives and
 
Costs in Agriculture (Chapter II), April 14, 1977, Tables 5 and 7.
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Nevertheless, particular policy distortions have existed from time
 
to time that have had an adverse impact on-the effectiveness of foreign
 
aid. One- of the most notable of these, discussed earlier, was the sharp
 
increase in 1974 of the official price offered to rice producers. This
 
diverted large quantities of paddy from on-farm consumption and the private
 
market to publically operated mills that were required to sell to
 
wholesalers at a price which did not cover their costs. The result was
 
overflowing public storage facilities and financial disaster for the
 
public agency concerned. A rice production and milling project that 
was being considered for financing at the time by the World Bank was
 
abandoned as a result of this untenable situation.
 
More generally, there was during the last half of the 1970s 
a
 
sharp decline in the productivity of public investment resulting from a.
 
series of high cost projects. Those involving thesugar complexes in the
 
north were discussed above in the section on Agriculture and Rural
 
Development. In addition, there were several very costly higher education
 
projects and some excessive investment in highways. Much of this program 
was financed by foreign borrowing on fairly hard terms. As a result, 
debt service obligations rose sharply just as coffee and cocoa earnings 
were declining, threatening the country's pace of'development.' With 
growing fiscal problems, too, essential services such as those in agricultural
 
extension were also threatened. There was, therefore, a strong need for
 
structural readjustment and for better planning and preparation of
 
investment projects.
 
The Role'of Foreign Aid in Policy Reform
 
The, role that foreign aid can play in promoting and enhancing
 
the impact of policy reform has become increasingly recognized.- To some
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extent thi's can be accomplished at the project level, but more often it. 
requires structural adjustments that are at least sector al, if not, 
macroeconomic, in nature. The history of foreign aid in Ghana and the
 
Ivory Coast offers some illuminating examples.
 
Policy Reform and Project Aid.
 
Aid donors generally establish with host governments certain
 
understandings and preconditions'considered as necessary for the success
 
of a particular project. These may involve institutior changes, better
 
accounting practices, reduced input subsidies, higher producer prices,
 
and any number of other reforms. Frequently, compliance with these 
conditlions has an influence not only on the.project concerned but also 
on other projects in the same sector. This, plus political factors,
 
may.make agreement difficult and require extended discussions over a
 
relatively long period of time, during which mutual confidence needs to
 
be established.
 
..
As an example, the World Bank and the government of the Ivory Coast 
continued to discuss the issue of the producer price for rice for several
 
years after the original project was first'rejected. The 'governmentagreed
 
in principle that a new policy was needed in order to eliminate the producer
 
subsidies but argued that this would have to come about through infation
 
since a reduction'in the producer price was politically impracticable.
 
The Bank financed further studies but would not go ahead with a production
 
project as long as its implementation was thought to worsen, rather than
 
to improve, the problem in the rice sub-sector. The Bank's continuing
 
involvement was nonetheless thought to be useful,if it could help improve
 
policies and institutions or identify projects that would meet the needs 
of..the sub-sector. A dialogue was thus maintained, though it became 
increasingly apparent that the agricultural-policy problems were not
 
limited simply to rice but extended across the ent.ire sector., The rice
 
issue was, therefore, finally'dealt with as part of theoverall approach
 
to policy reform discussed below.
 
In: Ghana, the Managed Input Delivery and Agricultural Services
 
(MIDAS) project, financed by AID,ralso offers some useful lessons. At
 
the time the. project was prepared, in 1973/74, agricultural iuts and
 
services were being supplied to farmers by the Ministry of Agriculture,
 
-withcredit being handled primarily by .the AgriculturalDevelopment Bank.
 
These inputs and services were offered either.for free or at highly
 
subsidized prices but were generally in'very short supply because of
 
foreign exchange shortages and because the Ministry's capacity to manage
 
an input distribution system was very limited. 
The MIDAS project was
 
designed'to overcome these constraints by financing the foreign exchange'"
 
costs of the project and by establishing autonomous agencies to'hmidlc
 
distribution. 
Another major goal was to,reduce or elimitate,input
 
subsidies'.-
Success with the MIDAS project has been ighly uneven. The Ghana
 
Fertilizer Company was established to import, blend,' bag, and distribute'
 
fertilizers, but complications developed, partly because of deep vested
 
interests,'and the Ministry continued to supply fertilizers at subsidized
 
prices, primarily to larger farmers withinfluence. On the other hand,
 
the Ghana Seed Company was successfully established and the seedsubsidy
 
was eliminated. 
The project was reduced in scope, however, from the
 
national level to a single region. 
 This has suosequently reduced the
 
impact it might have on national policy.
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These are but two examples, but' they suggest some, important lessons.
 
First, changes in economic policy are oftenvery difficult because of
 
vested interests and political pressures. The leverage'Liffered by donor
 
financing of projects is seldom great enough to overcome these obstacles.'
 
Second, policy changes do not come quickly and often in;olve a long
 
period of dialogue and building of mutual trust. This is difficult or
 
impossible if there are frequent-changes in personnel by the host govern­
ment or lack of a long-term commitment on the part of donors. Finally,
 
economic policy issues oftenextend beyond the domaine of a particular.''
 
project, requiring a sectoral or macroeconomic perspective on foreign'
 
aid.
 
A Comprehensive Approach to Policy Reform.
 
The experience of both Ghana and the Ivory Coast suggests the
 
importance of taking a comprehensive approach to policy reform and
 
designing foreign aid programs that can reinforcu this approach.
 
Ghana
 
At the end of the Nkrumah period in,1966, Ghana wasin serious
 
macroeconomic difficulties with mounting inflation, growing budget
 
deficits,,a deteriorating balance of payments, and rising debt service
 
obligations. With assistance from the IMF, a stabilization program
 
was undertaken by the National Liberation Council (NLC) government,
 
which used-external aid and short-term debt relief to maintain Ghana's
 
capacity to import at the same time that aggregate demand was reduced
 
through credit constraints and a tight budget. Although the exchange
 
rate was devalued in,1967 from 0.714 to 1.02 cedis per dollar, relatively
 
little attention.was otherwise paid to removing the distortions resulting
 
from overvaluaton of' the exchange rate, import. and exchange controls,
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the tariff structure, the credit system, and the government's monopoly
 
on the distribution of agricultural inputs (Gilbert 1976: 290-94).
 
By 1969, when the Busia government took over from the NLC, the economy
 
was more stable and functioned more smoothly than three years earlier,,
 
but inflation had eroded the effects of devaluation, and the longterm
 
prospects for Ghana's .economywere little improved. In retrospect, it
 
appears that the stabilization program of the post-Nkrumah era was too
 
short-term in nature, partly because economists at that time were not
 
fully aware of the serious effects that distortions such as existed in
 
Ghana could have on the allocation of resources and long-term development.
 
In addition, the political situation probably would not have permitted 
more fundamental reforms without substantially more program aid to 'soften 
the blow to Ghana's urban population. Yet donors.were unwilling to 
'
commit that level of aid and the administrative machinery in Ghana was 
hard pressed to utilize the new aid that was made available without a 
significant liberalization of procurement-tying provisions. Untied 
drawings on the IMF were extensively made but 'were inadequate by themselves 
World Bank loans were also available, but only for projects, requiring
 
a slow process of project identification and preparation. Finally, the
 
contribution of debt rescheduling was limited because this was pre­
dominantly the responsibility of government export and investment credit
 
guarantee agencies in',the donor countries, which were unsympathetic to 
broader foreign policy and development concerns (Gilbert 197_6: 333-37). 
:,By late,1971,• however, this situation had changed very'substantially. 
,The Ghanaian government and the Consultative Group of donors, under the 
chairmanship of the IMF and the World Bank, had decided to shift away 
from the IMF-led stabilization program of 1966-69 and to.combine
 
broad-based economic reform and liberalization of the economy with
 
large-scale balance of payments support and a generous rescheduling of
 
the medium-term debt. The total package of external assistance required
 
for committment in 1972 was estimated at $150 million. The US contributi(
 
was envisioned as $30 million in program loans, with direct US involvement
 
in policy questions being minimized by thei establishment of the World
 
Bank,as the principal external economic policy advisory agent (Agency for
 
,International Development: 1975,: Vol. 1, 34-35). 
The cedi was deyalue'd in late 1971, but the rest of the reform 
program was cut short with the militazy coup in January 1972. The 
National Redemption .Council, which came to power at that time, partially 
reversed the devaluation, repudiated much of the debt, imposed restrictior
 
on private foreign investors, provided large subsidies for "essential"" 
commodities, and otherwise undermined the structure of refom.- Donors 

and creditors held up on their assistance plans awaiting resolution of
 
the debt issue. Under the threat of complete re'pudiation, negotiations
 
were entered into. They lasted two years during which foreign Aid
 
continued at only minimaldlevels.
 
There was another opportunity to deal comprehensively with the issue
 
of policy reform in.Ghana following the settlement of the debt situation 
in 1974. The donors appeared to be ready to commit over $100 million, 
and professional members of the World Bank staff were assisting Ghanaian 
.economic policy and planning ministries. On the other hand, after the 
experience of the early 1970s,-the government was.more.:interested in. 
.concrete projects than in macroeconomic policy issues, Furthermore, 
the interests of the donors were shifting away from program loans towards 
1 
projects that were particularly likely to aid the poor, especially in 
rural areas. These types of projects took an especially long time to, 
prepare in relation to the quantities of resources being'transferred., 
Finally, there was a serious lack of coordination among donors, who 
frequently competed for projects rather than worried about structural 
reform. The opportunity for policy,reform was thus missed, and the 
economic situation in Ghana continued to deteriorate., 
Another stabilization program was attempted in September 1978 with
 
a 58 percent devaluation, an austerity budget, and.a-stand-by agreement 
with the IMF, but this program was abandoned following the coup d'etat 
)f June 1979. By this time, the correlation between devaluations and 
:oups d'etat was deeply embedded in Ghanaian minds, and attempts at 
iusterity measures alone proved useless in the face of massive price.:, 
listortions (Morrison and Wolgin 1980).
 
Ivory Coast 
The use of foreign aid to support policy reform in the Ivory Coast 
Oas instartling contrast tothe experience in Ghana. The, World Bank 
began project lending in the late 1960s, and by 1981 had made 41 loans 
and credits, mostly in agriculture and complementary infrastructure.
 
Although theeconomic policy environment in the Ivory Coast was far 
superior to that in Ghana, a number of problems, discussed earlier, were 
6eginning to appear by the mid-1970s. Many of these were identified in 
the Bank's 1977 basic economic report and in its reviews of external 
6orrowing and investment policies and programs between 1978 and 1980. 
rhe government responded well to the Bank's advice during this period, 
reducing the size of the public investment program and the external
 
3orrowing to finance it. Inaddition, the 'government began to seek the
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Bank's advice in, devising a longe .r-term.approach to the restructuring of
 
the economy,.and the institutional framework to manage the process. 
This
 
was a national consequence of the years of dialogue that,had taken place 
at the project level over various aspects of economic policy..
 
The result was a World Bank Structural Adjustment Loan (SAL) which
 
responded to the government's programs for wide-scale reform, including 
imr.oved economic manqgement of agriculture and industry, as well ' as"a 
revised role for public enterprises. This loan of $l50'million complemented 
an IMF Extended Fund Facility (EFF) program and paved the way for further
 
lending by private banks and bilateral donor agencies to cover, the 
expected external payments gap over a period of several years. Prior to 
approval of the loan, the Ivorian government undertook a number of specific 
policy reforms, including eliminating cash subsidies on cocoa and lowering 
the producer price of rice. Under the terms of its EFF agreement, the 
government also agreed to limit its borrowings of less than 12 years 
maturity. 
Further reforms included increasing budgetary discipline, 
centralizing public finances, strengthening the Ministry,Of Agriculture's . 
capacity for sectoral planning and for project preparation and implementation, 
reforming the.public enterprise sector, and improving the industrial. 
incentives system. 
17.5 Some. Conclus ions 
The major conclusion of this comparative analysis of the' .: 
impact of development assistance in Ghana and. the Ivory Coast is that, 
foreign aid is unlikely to be effective in achieving either donor or 
host country goals in the absence of an economic policy environment that 
is reasonably conducive to long term development. This is true regardless 
of whether aid is seen as a transfer of resources or as a means of 
implementing project packages involving a combination of capital,
 
technology and managerial knowhow.' When the policy environment is
 
severely distorted, as it has been in Ghana on several occasions, it
 
is difficult to find any type of foreign assistance that can be success­
fully implemented, except possibly for some training and investment in
 
human capital that may prove valuable sometime in the future.
 
The donors cannot be absolved of responsibility simply because
 
the existing policy envornment is inappropriate, however, since foreign
 
aid can play an effective role in altering that environment. There were,
 
several occasions over the past two decades when that might have been the
 
case in Ghana, but each time the opportunity was lost. At first, there
 
was excessive focus on short-term stabilization through control of' 
demand without enough attention to eliminating the fundamental distortions
 
that were restricting supply. Later, after the debt settlement, donors
 
concentrated on designing projects to aid the poor, oblivious to the 
fact that the poor could never benefit if the entire economy.was running 
'downhill. ,Throughout Ghana's history since independence, there have 
been deep misunderstandings on: both sides. 
Even in the Ivory Coast, where both project and program aid were 
highly effective during the 1960s and early 1970s, project-aid was first 
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seen as the meansto improve the policy environment, threatening to 
retard~growth. in the latter half of the 1970.s. Soon it became,,apparent, 
however, that the problems were sectoral 'or macroeconomic in nature..' 
and that it was inappropriate to deal with them at the project: level -­
even though experience with projects had helped to identify these problems 
and to build the mutual trust and confidence to overcome them. Ultimately, 
it was medium-term program assistance from both the IMP and the World 
Bank that was found to be most useful in undertaking the-structural 
reforms necessary to promote development over the longer term., 
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Footnotes
 
1/ 	Stephen H. Hymer has argued that the colonial government's investments
 
and policies in Ghana were largely unproductive and may even have re­
tarded grrith of the economy (Hymer, 1971: 129).
 
2/ 	The incremental capital-output ratio (ICOR) would more appropriately
 
b estimated 'using investment net of depreciation. Unfortunately, dat
 
on depreciation are unavailable so that gross investment is used inste
 
This should result in a downward bias in the estimated coefficient of
 
I or an upward bias in the estimated ICOR.
 
Production is in fact higher than 230,000 mt since it is estimated tha
 
40-50,000 mt are smuggled to Togo and the Ivory Coast each year
 
(Economist Intelligence Unit, 1982: 12).
 
-/ 	By the late 1960's, oil palm was the Ivory Coast's major investment
 
project taking 45 percent of all public agricultural investment. Rice
 
investments during the same period (1967-70) comprised 17 percent,
 
while cocoa, a traditional export received only 8 percent of total invi
 
ment.
 
From only 23,000 mt in 1960-63, pineapple production grew to 193,000
 
mt in 1971-74. One-third of the output was exported as fresh fruit,
 
mainly to France, and the rest, or about 150,000 mt, was processed at
 
three local plants for exports as canned product.
 
6/ 	 Per diem in Ghana ranged in the fall of 1982 from $130 when'local staf: 
housing was provided up to $283 with hotel accommodations, compared to
 
$88 in Abidjan, Ivory Coast (Standardized Regulationsr, Section 925,
 
October 1982: 3-4).
 
7Z/ 	 Part of this section is drawn from Pearson, Nelson, and Stryker (1979)
 
which summarizes the literature available on the Ghanaian incentive
 
system at the time of the mid-1970's and analyzes a substantial .body
 
of new data.
 
8/ 	The effective rate of protection can be written as:
 
Value Added in Domestic Prices
 
Value Added in World Prices
 
If value added in world prices is negative but value added in domestic
 
prices is positive, -he ERP is less than minus one.
 
The World Bank, Accelerated Development in Sub-Saharan Africa- An
 
Agenda for Action, Washington, 1981: 121-33.
 
APPENDIX TABLE A-1 
SOFFICIAL FOREIGN CAPITAL FLOWS FOR 
($ million) 
:1971 *:1972 1973 1974 1975 
GRANTS 
Investment 
Technical Lssistanco 
8.4 
15.9 
5.7 
14 .9 
4.6. 10.0 
17.6 .19.7 
5.925.9 
Total 24.3 - 20.6 22.2- 29.7 -31.8 
LOANS
 
Concession 38.1 43.3 24.1 13.8, 102.0 -.-
Othera .a na na- na na 
Total 38.. 431.3 24.1 13.8 . 102.0 
Gross Officil Flow, 521.2 63.9 46.3 43.6 133.6 

Debt Service 3 5.4 5.3 7.1 7.9 
Net Official Flows 56.9 :58.5.41;0 '36.5 125.7 
Source:. OECD 1978:,-80-81 a E 1981: 82-83 
Note: "a O:.-heroffiial:flows are not reportedR  197-1976.
 
GHANA.(1971-1980):'
 
19:717 " 

18.0
27.4 

45.4 
29.1 

na 

29.1 

74.5 

10.5 

64.0 

23.7
29. 
-52.9 
47.3 

19.0 
66.3 

119.1 

13.1 

106.0 

' 978>1971.0A1979-1980 
.5

- 374-
66.9 

-.55.7 

341 
89.8 

156.7 

15.4 

141.3 

3514 4 .9 
"67.1 .64.9
 
114.6- 140.9
 
34.91 30.5-, 
149. .5171.4!"
 
216.6 236.3 
.20.6 -;22.9 
196.0 213.4
 
APPENDIX TABLE A-2
 
OFFICIAL FOREIGN CAPITAL FLOWS FOR THE IVORY COAST (1971-1980)
 
($ million) 
1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976: :1977 1978 1979 1 .980 
GRANTS 
Investment 10.0 34.5 13.6 25.2 16.8 15.6 17,.4 11.8 24.1 25.11 
TechnicalAssistance' 23.8 26.8 35.7 39.4 55.2 54.2 57.3 61.6 83.7 101.4-
Total -33.8 61.3. 49.3 64.6 - 72.0 69.8 74.7 73.4 107.8 126.5: 
LOAHS 
Concessional 23.2 15.5 23.0 20.9 41.6 49.7 42.4 73.3 67.8 100.0 
Othera 
Total 
na 
23.2:. 
na 
15.5 
na 
23.0 
na 
20.9 
na 
41.6 
na 136.2 
49.7, 178.6 
117.8 
-191.1 
102.3 _1188.4 
170.1 288.4-
Gross Official Flows 
Debt Service 
57.1 
6.0 
76.9 
28.6 
72.4, -85.5 
9.0. 9.5 
113.6 
'13.0 
119.4 
11.2 
253.3 
-22.2": 
264.4 
29.7 
:277.9 
34.5 
-414.9, 
44.8 
Net Official Flows 51.1 48.3 63.4 76.0 100.6 108.2 231.1 234.8 243.4- 370.1 
Source: -OECD 1978: 1:A10,;1!1-i-and.OECD 1981: 108, 109. 
Note: aThe period-1971-76 does not report other offcial-flows 
APPENDIX 	TABLE A-j
 
TOTAL AID RECEIVED BY THE IVORY COAST (1960-1973)
 
(million CYAF)
 
i960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 i971 1972 1973
 
;. NTs :-- 3000 .5165 3216 3594 2354 10584 2006 680 976 1044 2392 970 5045 -2840 
Z of Total 	 51 56 57 34 37 62 49 15 3 13 12 5 19 8
 
.O.,- - 2891 4089 2391 6932 4016 6352 2101 3750 34640 7196 17435 18257 21425 31646 
Zof Toral 49 43 .44 66 63 38 51 85 97 87 88 95 81 92 
NJTAL 5891 9254- 5607 10526, 6370 16936 4107 4430 35616 8240. 19828 19227 26470 34486 
Z from France 65- 48 73 -. 49 35. 83 26 15 27 26 19 15,.-44 	 57 
Lktal iii, :26.3 40.4 24.4 45.5 27.2 71.2 16.9 18.0 146.5 31.5.- 65.2 59.4 82.9 -103 4 
(million)', 
FOREIGN TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE PERSONNEL IN THE IVORY COAST (1960-1972) 
1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972
 
TOTAL NUMBER OF PERSONNEL 1300 1215 1355 1432 1484 1692 1772 1936 2373 2577 2849 2966 3614
 
Z from France 96.9 95.5 95.2 95.0 95.0 94.0 89.1 88.5 88.5 87.3 86.9 86.3 85.1
 
S.'.urce: 	 The Republic of France,Ministry of Cooperation, C~te d'Ivoire; Donnfes Statistigues sur les Activitfs Economigues, Culturelles,
 
et Saciales, Paris, Janvier 1976:(p. 139).
 
:1967-69. 100, constant dollats
 
APPLIDIX TABLE A-4. 
US OV1_3SVAS WA.'4S AP GRANTS AND ASSISTANCE FUNl I~rERNArIOIAL ORGANIZATIONS 
OBLIGATIONS AMD LOAN AUFHOR1ZATIONS IN $ MILLION (curran) 
70OGHA"A (1958-1981) 
.COD FOR REEDOrb 
1955 _195. 
'GD.2 1.0 
0.7 
19-30 
- o.8 
. 1. 
1961. 
21.4 
1.0 
1962 
63.9 
0.7 
1963 
1.6 
0.6 
1964 
0.5 
2.0 
1965 
1.0 
0.3 
1966 
1.5 
7.0 
1967 
23.9 
8.6 
1968 
19.3 
14.2 
1969 
4.5 
19.1 
1970 
17.7 
12.1 
.1971 
10.6 
1.7 
1972 
'2.6 
1.7 
1973 
22.0 
0.9 
1971 
2.6 
2.1 
1975 
2.9 
2.8 
1976 
U.j9 
. 9 
1977 1978 
7.5.-5 6.9 
. 7 3.0 
1979 1930 1981 
________________________Total 
74 10.0 5.0 
14. 15.7 19.0 
(195P­
s254.*9C 
$L5.OC 
• H.E1R ECONIIC AID 
;JAL02 
.... ... 
. 09 
. 
22.4 
0.5 
'65.1 
0.7 
2.9 
0.6 
.3.3 
0.9 
-2.7 
0.7 
S.2: 
1.2 
33.7 
1.1 
-34.6 
1.1 
24.7 
1.4 
-31.2.. 
1.8 
22.1 
1.8 
15 .1 
1.5' 
2-.4 
1.3.-
b.0 
1.8 
7± 
1.6 
1. 
2-4 
86 
2.3 
1. 
2.0 
42 
1.8 
2. 
1.8 
58$3. 
4 28"5 
•ifLWS -- • 65.0-0.2 1.5 2. 5 - -,.- .60 -.. 1.. ..... 27.6 $114.81 
'.Y7LRXATIOHAL 
-')%MRS2. 
BO~ANKGROUP 
0.2 
-
0.6 
-
0.3 
.­
1.1 48.4' 
47.0 
. 
-
1.9 
--
.7 .2.7 3.3'. 12.i 
10.0 
7.9 .15.5 
6.0 14.6 
9.7 
7.a 
1.0 '7.7 
15.6 
-20.5 
13.0 
61'_ 
!-9-C 
49.9 
76.5 
'71.9. 
57.0 
23-
-
112  
19.0 
77777 
54.5 
31.3 
29.0. 
$493.7C­
$395.3C' 
iSurce: U.S. Department of State. AID. -U.i; Overseas Loan. and Grants (Creen Books). Uashingtom. D.C., various. 
a SAID and Ia predecessor agecli 
b Later Food for ?-.:co (PL 480) 
c Includes some OPIC direct loan. 
- : " ,' 
-Z 
IIPPENIX TAL A-
US VC'ERSEAS LOANS Li, -GRANTS AND ASSISTANCE RM IITERN&TIOtIAI, ouomNZAmOKs TO flE 1VOKY COAST (1561.1931). 
OBLIGATIONS AND LOAN AUflh!OIIZATIONS 13$ HULIOSI (current) 
1961 1962 1963 1964 1565 1966 1967 1968 1969 1910 1971 1972 1973 1974 -1975 1976 1977 1976 1979 1980 .1 (968)Total 
USAID. 2.1 - 2 1 2.0 6.0 -0.1 0.3 0.8 0.2 0.1 -1 i 0.1 0.1 -- 138 
FODoFR FREEDO , = - - 2.1 4.0 1.8 -2 .1 - 1.3 - 1.0 0.7 1.2 0.5 0.1 0.2 0.1 , 
1151 
OER ECONOMIC AID 0.4 0.6 1.0 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.7 0.7 0.7 0. 0.6 0.9 1.2 1.4 1.3. 1.5 1.3 ' -1.4 1.5 1.3 - $19.3 
TOTAL 2.1 2.5 2.6 9.1 4.5 2.7 1.4 0.9 2.9 0.7 2.1. 0.6 1.5 1.9 2.6 1.6 1.7 1.6 1.6 .5 1.3 148.: 
LOANS -- , 4.6 -- 3.0 0.2 3.5 5.1 16.1 20. 2.0 '32.3 5.1 2.5 .6.7 374 95.3 $262.60 
INTERATIONL. 14.8 6.8 6.0 3.0 38.5 3.4 13.0 10.1 31.3 27.7 5.0 35.3 32.2 64.- 45'7 13.4 89.2 ,07.5 60.8 .9 - 161.3 $895.70 
DONORS 
uon flR GROUP - - -- . --- .. 2 - . 5.3 17.1 18.5 21.9 1. 7.5 32.4 71.5 7.1, s9 8992.2 59.1 6S.5 151.0 8657.50 
Source: U.S. Department of State. AID. U.S. Oveiiea. Loas''and Grant(.-Green looks) Ishlahinton. D.C .varims 
£'otes:USAID and Ite predecessor sgencL­
b Later Food for +Peac e (FL 480) 
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